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Beyond Informed Consent
ANTHONY SZCZYGIEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of a patient in determining the course of medical
treatment has evolved over time in response to changes in the status
of physicians and medical knowledge. Ideas about a patient's right
of self determination are continuing to develop, increasingly empha-
sizing the patient-provider relationship as a cooperative venture. This
trend is supported by newly articulated professional medical ethics.
However, structural changes within the medical care industry and
budget driven initiatives designed to change the way medicine is
practiced threaten to overwhelm this movement toward fuller patient
participation. One important issue in the evolving process of medical
care giving is how the patient-provider relationship will be affected
by these changes. A related concern is how best to define and support
effective patient participation in the evolving process of medical
decision making.
The legal system has had a limited, but important, impact on the
evolution of the patient-provider relationship. In the twentieth cen-
tury, we can identify two periods of intense development in the law
directly focused on patient decision making: the Era of Consent
(roughly 1905 to 1930) and the Era of Informed Consent (roughly
1957 to present). The courts played a leading role in both eras as the
forum in which new interactive norms were articulated, publicized,
and enforced.' Legal responsibilities placed on medical professionals
reflect, in part, concerns about the risks borne by patients who rely
on the professional's advice or treatment. Legal standards evolved to
give greater weight to patient autonomy by creating a role for patients
in determining whether to undertake the risks of treatment. 2
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1. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCWAP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 142 (1986) [hereinafter FADEN & BEAUCHAMP]. State legislatures had a limited involve-
ment during the Era of Informed Consent. They responded to limit the common law rejection
of professional practice standards in informed consent cases. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra at
114-143.
2. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 114-143.
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The development of the informed consent doctrines in the courts
and state legislatures is a story nearing its final chapter.' Every U.S.
jurisdiction has adopted an informed consent doctrine and has chosen
a minimal disclosure standard.4 With few exceptions, the standards
have not changed in the past ten years . Surprisingly, the medical
profession has recently revitalized the doctrine for one more round
of policy development by providing a new definition of what is
expected from a reasonable practitioner.6 New ethics code provisions
reassert the profession's role in defining the provider-patient relation-
ship, while recognizing a patient's right to self determination. 7 The
principles adopted go beyond the doctrines established by the courts
and legislatures, both in their scope and the extent to which the
patient's choices are to be respected.8
These developments raise the possibility that the patient-medical
professional relationship may be moving beyond the minimal require-
ments of current informed consent doctrine. However, a host of
developments, including budgetary restraints, increased reliance on
management of care, a decline in the status of physicians, and the
continuing depersonalization of individual medical care are challeng-
ing this opportunity. Choices being made now to reform the health
care system will determine whether patient involvement will sink to
the level of a "Medical Miranda Warning" 9 or evolve toward a process
that more actively involves the patient.
In response to the problems of limited access to medical care
and sharply rising costs, insurance companies, employers, government
and other payers are experimenting with initiatives designed to change
the practice of medicine. These programs have a special emphasis on
the physician's role. One major change is the explicit consideration
of cost in treatment decisions. Long standing deference to professional
3. See FADEN AND BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP
(October 1982) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
4. See infra Section 1II(F) text and accompanying footnotes.
5. Id.
6. See AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, reprinted in JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMER-
ICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION - 1981 [hereinafter CURRENT OPINIONS - 19811; AMERICAN COLLEGE
OF PHYSICIANS, ETHICS MANUAL, reprinted in 101 ANNALS OF INTERN. MED., 129-37, 263-74
(1984) [hereinafter ETHICS MANUAL].
7. CURRENT OPINIONS - 1981; ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 6.
8. This codification in the professional ethic brought an end to the policy debate over
the general desirability of patient participation. Patient participation is now a component of
medical care quality, measured by the extent to which professional culture and practice match
the expectations of patients and, more generally, society.
9. ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 2.5, at 21, 22 (1989).
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self-regulation is giving way to reimbursement methodologies and
utilization review standards designed to encourage cost awareness in
medical providers and to reduce variations in practice patterns. Re-
imbursement methodologies are being redesigned to influence the
amount and type of medical care provided. New approaches to util-
ization review will intensify the pressure to make choosing the most
cost-effective regimen of care a part of professional responsibility.
Further change is occurring because the medical care industry is
restructuring itself in response to changing demographics and care
needs, as well as in response to the new reimbursement trends.
Managed care exemplifies these changes. The various forms of man-
aged care Share the characteristics of bringing the insurance risk to
bear more directly on treatment decisions. Participating providers
agree to abide by group practice protocols. In this process, physicians
cede some of their clinical discretion to medical care administrators.
Patients find themselves dealing with a medical care group rather
than the prototypical family doctor.
The complexity of the systems and the novelty of the means of
intervention are producing very mixed results. The changes have
slightly narrowed the gap between the rate of medical care inflation
and the overall rate of inflation. However, the private sector has been
cutting back on the medical coverage it provides faster than the public
sector has been expanding its coverage. This set the stage for the
Clinton Administration's far-reaching proposal to extend medical
coverage and impose cost containment mechanisms: 0 the Health Se-
curity Act." Unlike in prior eras, federal policy is playing a leading
role in how the new patient-provider relationship develops. The failure
of Congress to enact the Health Security Act or any of the competing
bills will slow, but not stop, the pace of change. 2
The changes underway will significantly affect the interaction
between medical professionals and patients in ways intended and
unforeseen. The net impact on the role of the patient will be deter-
mined by the reaction of the medical providers, the balance struck
10. See Renee Blankenau, CBO Study Takes Technical Angle, Leaves Politics for
Congress; Congressional Budget Office Study on Healthcare Reform, HOSPITALS, Mar. 5, 1994,
at 14; Clinton Plan Will Reduce Deficit Less Than Earlier Estimated, Moynihan Says, 2 HEALTH
L. REP. (BNA) 42 (Oct. 25, 1993); Thomas Scarlett, Killing Health Care Reform: How Clinton's
Opponents Used a Political Media Campaign to Lobby Congress and Sway Public Opinion,
CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS (Nexis-Current News) (Oct. 1994).
11. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Slightly altered versions were introduced in the Senate. S. 1775, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993);
S. 1779, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
12. The Congress failed to enact any version of the Health Security Act prior to the
close of the 1994 legislative session.
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between cost and quality, the effectiveness of administrative oversight,
and the extent to which patient participation can be statistically
measured. Current informed consent doctrines will be relegated to a
minor role as we move toward a cost conscious system of medical
care with more standardized treatments.
Cost containment measures will limit the alternatives available to
both patients and health care professionals. A more widespread and
subtle impact will be reflected in the type of information provided to
patients, as well as in the provider's assessment of the patient's needs. 3
Further, the ongoing changes greatly increase the supervision of prov-
iders' relationships with patients by third parties. Increased supervi-
sion and the concomitant setting of standards for quality and quantity
of service may combine to enhance patient autonomy by making
patient participation an explicit standard for job performance and
reimbursement. To date, however, the utilization review standards
and practice guidelines have focused on cost of care or the technical
aspects of diagnosis and treatment. Expanded access will provide
more individuals with the opportunity for meaningful participation
in their own care, but will infringe on the providers' tradition of
selecting who they will serve. The new organizational structure of
care may limit the medical professional's sense of responsibility for
the patient's welfare. These important and potentially contradictory
effects of the new public agenda in medicine require careful consid-
eration as the new era unfolds. There is a danger that these policy
choices will denigrate the importance of the interaction of provider
and patient.
This article will review the evolution of the provider-patient
relationship and define some possibilities for the new era. 14 Parts II,
III, and IV describe the law's response to increasing awareness of the
importance of protecting patient autonomy. The legal rules affecting
13. The difficulty in choosing the services to restrict has renewed efforts to develop
better information on the impact and limitations of medical care. A growing body of outcomes
research is being produced and processed into practice guidelines. Some professionals are
concerned this will lead to "cookbook medicine," while patients may find a growing intolerance
for personal values not reflected in the guidelines. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL
PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr
eds., 1990).
14. The thorny issues related to medical decisions that may lead to death, the use of
surrogate decision makers without statutory authorization and the standard of decision that
courts are to apply when they are called upon to decide on medical care for an incompetent
person are closely related to the topic of this article. However, this article will not directly deal
with them. Much of the writing on these important issues assumes the starting point of a
competent person's "right" to determine his or her own medical care, without examining the
extent or limitations of that right. For a critique of this line of reasoning, see, Lee A. Albert,
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health; Too Much Ado, 12 J. LEG. MED. 331 (1990).
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participation in decisions about medical treatment had their origin in
tort law. These were the battery rules to protect bodily integrity
(battery). These rules later evolved to take account of the fact that
patients must understand the nature of a physical invasion before
consent to it can be meaningful (informed consent). The early fight
for patients' rights in the doctor-patient relationship was carried on
largely in the courts.'5 In recent years, concerns for patient autonomy
have become part of the fundamental health care policy debate and
have been incorporated into the AMA's Revised Code of Professional
Ethics. 16
This history of the development of legal standards for informed
consent provides a context for Part V which examines the changes
defining the next era in medical delivery. These will, in turn, shape
the evolution of the medical provider-patient relationship. The variety
of forces at work, as well as the differing agendas of the interest
groups most affected, make it difficult to predict the outcome. Nev-
ertheless, immediate attention is needed to assess whether these major
changes will erode the progress made toward involving patients in the
decisionmaking process of their own health care.'
7
II. THE ERA OF CONSENT (1905-1930).
Changes in medical technology and the social context of medicine
have repeatedly tested the limits of established legal doctrine. The
early twentieth century saw a marked change in the delivery of medical
care. What we now call conventional medicine overpowered the com-
peting sects of medical care providers. 8 Government involvement in
the form of restrictive licensing laws came at the request of the
emerging profession.' 9 The intent and effect of these rules were to
eliminate or marginalize competing providers groups, to restrict entry
into the profession, and to professionally define the minimum level
of practice of conventional practitioners. 20 As new techniques of
15. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note I, at 142-3.
16. See generally AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS.
17. In this article, "medical care" will mean the services licensed medical practitioners
provide to specific individuals. "Health care" will encompass the more general notion of care
an individual takes of herself, including the services sought from others. "Public health" will
refer to those steps taken by governmental agencies designed to affect the health status of
groups.
18. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 85; KENNETH M. LUDMERRER, LEARNING
TO HEAL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION 234-54 (1985). It is curious
that our society has failed to find a better title for the particular school of medicine that has
dominated the 20th Century.
19. LUDMERRER, supra note 18, at 237-38, 240.
20. Id. at 249-54.
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surgery and anesthesia came into widespread use, hospitals grew in
size and importance.
These changes inevitably affected the patient-medical professional
relationship. One aspect of that interaction, the surgeon's discretion
to extend an operation on an anesthetized patient beyond that agreed
to by the patient, produced a flurry of court decisions. 21 The cases
affirmed a broad principle of patient autonomy and laid the ground-
work for a later series of conflicts over the content of the disclosure
by the provider. 22
A. A Short History of 19th Century Medical Ethics and
Practice.
We have very limited knowledge of the historical disclosure and
consent practices of physicians or other medical professionals. Pa-
tients' medical records routinely include the provider's clinical obser-
vations, medications prescribed, and procedures performed but rarely
the content of what was discussed between provider and patient. Nor
do other sources enlighten us on this topic. 23 As one scholar concluded,
[N]ever in the history of professionally articulated ethics had there
ever been any acknowledgement of the patient as a dignified agent
free to participate in and exercise self- determination over medical
decisions. Not in the Hippocratic Oath, not in the prayer of Mai-
monides, not in Percival's ethics, the codes of the AMA or the
World Medical Association. 24
Not until the 1980's was the patient's role in decision making
acknowledged in written medical ethics. 25 This absence has historical
origins. The 19th century European codes of ethics for physicians and
the later U.S. codes that emulated them were primarily intraprofes-
sional rules of conduct. The 1803 Code of Medical Ethics authored
by Thomas Percival in England is acknowledged as the most influ-
21. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W.12 (Minn. 1905); Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (I1. 1906);
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
22. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 120-25.
23. Scholars only began to seriously study the history of consent giving by medical
patients in the 1960s. See, e.g., William H. Karchmer, Informed Consent: A Plaintiff's Medical
Malpractice "Wonder Drug", 31 Mo. L. REv. 29 (1966); Marcus L. Plante, An Analysis of
"Informed Consent", 36 FORD L. REV. 639 (1968). Further research occurred in the 1970's
and 1980's. See, e.g., Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment:
An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 407 (1980); Alan Meisel, The Expansion
of Liability for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability By Way of Informed
Consent, 56 NEB. L. REv. 51 (1977).
24. Robert M. Veatch, Autonomy's Temporary Triumph, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT,
Oct. 1984, at 38.
25. See CURRENT OPINIONS - 1981, supra note 6.
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entiar ethical treatise of modern times. 26 Percival's Code was an
administrative response to a major upheaval within the medical staff
of the Manchester Infirmary. 27 The Code focused extensively on the
roles and interactions of physicians with the newly emerging specialties
of surgeon and apothecary. 28
The Code only indirectly addressed the patient-physician rela-
tionship. Percival saw the provision of spiritual support to patients
as a primary function of the physician:
For the physician should be the minister of hope and comfort to
the sick; that by such cordials to the drooping spirit, he may smooth
the bed of death, revive expiring life, and counteract the depressing
influence of those maladies which rob the philosopher of fortitude
and the Christian of consolation. 29
26. THOMAS PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS; OR A CODE OF INSTITUTES AND PRECEPTS,
ADAPTED TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS (Manchester: S. Russell,
1803) reprinted in PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS (Chauncey D. Leake ed., Robert E. Krieger
Publishing Co., 1975) [hereinafter LEAKE].
The introductions to the ethical codes of the American Medical Association and the
American College of Physicians acknowledge the influence of Percival's Code. See JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASsOcIATION, History, at vii (1992);
see AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, ETHICS MANUAL, reprinted at 117 ANNALS INT. MED.,
at 947-960 (1992); see also FADEN AND BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 67-74; LEAKE, supra at
33-57.
27. Thomas Percival (1740-1804) was an English physician and philosopher with a long
association with the Manchester Infirmary. Percival's writing extended beyond the ethical role
of the physician. LEAKE, supra note 26, at 25-28. He took an interest in public health policy
and administration and published a great deal, championing such causes as accurate and
consistent collection of vital statistics, improving the administration of hospitals, and increasing
public health action to address problems of the growing urban areas. Id. Percival was instru-
mental in establishing a hospital for contagious diseases and arranging for free dispensary
service for the poor. Id. His goal of expanding access to care, improving information gathering
and administrative efficiency, and highlighting preventive care are strikingly similar to the goals
of the Health Security Act of 1993 and many other current proposals.
28. Percival's Code consisted of four chapters: Of Professional Conduct Relative to
Hospital or other Medical Charities; Of Professional Conduct in Private or General Practice;
Of Conduct of Physicians to Apothecaries; Of Professional Duties in Certain Cases Which
Require a Knowledge of Law. See LEAKE, supra note 26. This last chapter dealt with dying
patients who did not have a will.
Apothecaries dispensed medicines and served as primary care providers for the urban
population and full service medical providers to the poor and rural residents. Percival's
description of the apothecary's function stresses the interaction with patients:
[HJe will be a most valuable auxiliary through the whole course of the disorder, by
his attention to varying symptoms; by the enforcement of medical directions; by
obviating misapprehensions in the patient, or his family; by strengthening the authority
of the physician; and by being at all times an easy and friendly medium of com-
munication.
LEAKE, supra note 26, at 113.
29. LEAKE, supra note 26, at 22.
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A physician needed to maintain a detached professional demeanor
with patients, one that combined authority with benevolent optimism,
in order to banish harmful emotions:
The character of the physician is usually remote either from super-
stition or enthusiasm. And the aid, which he is now exhorted to
give, will tend to their exclusion from the sick wards or the hospital,
where their effects have often been known to be not only baneful,
but even fatal.3 0
To accomplish his job, Percival advised the physician to develop some
understanding of the patient as a person and tolerance for her idio-
syncracies. Percival noted,
And human nature must be intimately studied to acquire that full
ascendancy over the prejudices, the caprices and the passions of the
sick, and of their relatives, which are essential to medical success.3
The feelings and emotions of the patients, under critical circum-
stances, require to be known and to be attended to, no less than
the symptoms of the disease .... Even the prejudices of the sick
are not to be condemned or opposed with harshness. For though
silenced by authority, they will operate secretly and forcibly on the
mind, creating fear, anxiety and watchfulness.3 2
Given the limited diagnostic techniques, the physicians of that
era knew little more about a patient's physical condition than did the
patient. The available remedies were simple and often well known to
the patient population. Through their experience, physicians might
have had a better idea of the patient's prognosis. It was in discussing
this subject that they exercised discretion. Percival advised that in
"bleak cases" the physician is "not to make gloomy prognostications
... but to give to the friends of the patients timely notice of danger
and even to the patient himself, if absolutely necessary." 33 Per-
30. Id. at 73. The hospitals of that time serviced the poor who were not infectious or
terminal but needed more care than the apothecary could provide. Physicians might make home
calls on the poor, where the rural nature of the area made this care more appropriate or where
diseases were "so infectious, malignant or fatal, as to be excluded from admission into
Infirmaries." Id. at 83. The extent to which the Infirmary tended to sick, but not dying patients,
is revealed in the statistics Percival appended to his Code as "Notes and Illustrations". For
the ten year period from June 24, 1792 to June 24, 1802, 8,083 in-patients were admitted, and
361 of these died in the Infirmary. Hospitals had not yet become acute care sites. Even where
administrative concerns led Percival to state that hospital patients could not choose their own
doctor "consistently with the regular and established succession of medical attendance," he
acknowledged the importance of attending to their feelings. Id. at 71. "Yet personal confidence
is not less important to the comfort and relief of the sick-poor, than of the rich under such
similar circumstance." Id.
31. LEAKa, supra note 26, at 84.
32. Id. at 72.
33. Id. at 91.
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cival's Code did not advise withholding this information from the
patient.3 4 The doctor was to delegate this job of informing the patient
"to any other person of sufficient judgment and delicacy" because
such comments coming from the doctor would be "peculiarly
alarming."" Thus, the Code promoted conversation with the patient
for practical reasons. This role-modeling incorporated a certain respect
for the patient's idiosyncracies and acknowledged the limited curing
power of nineteenth century medicine.
The Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical As-
sociation (AMA), adopted at the first national meeting of the organ-
ization in 1847, relied heavily on Percival's Code.36 The AMA Principles
addressed primarily the relations within the profession and incorpo-
rated much of Percival's language on that subject.37 This focus was
appealing since the association was formed to differentiate members
from the less respectable conventional practitioners as well as other
schools of health care providers.
The 19th century was notable for a true pluralism in medical
care provision. Various sects vied for clients and respectability. 9 There
was no common understanding of how one could go about correcting
a medical condition, nor was there a common understanding of what
even caused a medical condition. Homeopaths, eclectics, osteopaths,
and patent medicine companies presented viable challenges to the
34. Id.
35. Id. at 22.
36. CURRENT OPINIONS - 1981, History, at vii.
37. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 69-72.
38. There was a debate in the 1880's over a simplified ethics code which the Medical
Society of the State of New York (MSSNY) adopted and its favorable treatment of "irregular"
medical providers. See AUSTIN FLINT, MEDICAL ETHICS AND ETIQUETTE: THE CODE OF ETHICS
ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WITH COMMENTARIES 23-24 (1883). MSSNY
delegates had been refused seating at the 1882 AMA meeting as a result of their action. FADEN
& BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 73. The MSSNY remained separate from the AMA until 1903
when it merged with the New York State Medical Society, which had been formed by a group
of "conservative" physicians in 1883 in order to retain their ties with the AMA. LEAKE, supra
note 26, at 51-55.
The AMA's Principles eventually did change form and, more recently, its treatment of
"cults." The principles were simplified to seven, single sentence standards of conduct "defining
the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS. However, there was a recognized need for a fuller explication
of these principles. The full AMA code of ethics now includes the Principles, the Current
Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs and the Reports of the Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs. One lasting change brought about by this conflict was the rejection
of the requirement that local medical societies had to conform their ethical principles to those
of the AMA. Id.
39. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 93-109 (1982)
[hereinafter STARR]. The regular medical profession constituted between 80% and 90% of all
physicians in practice throughout the nineteenth century. Id. at 99.
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basic principles of conventional medicine.4 Martin Pernick suggests
that this social context caused American physicians of that era to
abide by an indigenous medical tradition including truth-telling and
consent-seeking'.4 Pernick stated that
[T]he variety of competing sects and the unrestricted number of
practitioners gave the nineteenth-century patient a great deal of de
facto autonomy without formal regulations. Neither the law nor
medical ethics consistently required anything like informed consent
in drug therapy, but the wide-open medical marketplace guaranteed
that most paying patients who wanted either information or a par-
ticular kind of therapy could shop around for it.42
Professional control over medical education and entry into practice
had been rejected during the Jacksonian period 3.4  For the first forty
years of its existence, the AMA was not yet ready to reverse that
social policy.
A lack of status helped to keep the physician-patient interaction
collaborative rather than professionally dominated. As one surgeon
later noted,
Abroad, the medical degree per se invested the physician with a
social standing and authority unknown in America, where, in 1874,
the meager educational requirements made it easy to secure a diploma
after "two sessions of so many weeks a year." With some exceptions,
the rank and file of the profession were-as far as general education
went-little, if any, above the level of their clientele. And the clientele
not only felt this, but knew it.
... [T]he American physician of those days wielded less authority
over his patients than did his European colleagues; he had to endure
too much quizzing, and had to waste time in arguing patients into
acquiescence."
The care setting used by the 19th century physician was most often
the patient's home, with family or friends in attendance 5. 4  The situs
of care put the physician into the patient's world." Women still bore
40. Id. at 94-99. Some sects, such as the homeopaths and eclectics, were coopted after
agreeing to work together toward restrictive licensing. Id. at 106-08. Others, such as the
osteopaths, chiropractors and patent medicine companies, continued to compete until they were
marginalized or driven out of business. Id. at 108-09.
41. Martin S. Pernick, The Patient's Role in Medical Decision-making: A Social History
of Informed Consent to Medical Therapy, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, vol.3, at
3. [hereinafter Pernick].
42. Id. at 17.
43. STARR, supra note 39, at 55-59.
44. ARPAD G. GERSTER, RECOLLECTIONS OF A NEW YORK SURGEON 162, 163 (1917).
45. STARR, supra note 39, at 32.
46. Id.
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the traditional responsibility for providing primary care in their homes
and in their communities.4 7 Oral tradition and domestic medical man-
uals written by physicians guided them.41
Even at the turn of the century, available heroic medical inter-
ventions were often futile, if not harmful. 49 However, scientific un-
derstanding of the causes of disease were beginning to distinguish the
services of conventional medicine. The impact is described by George
Annas, a health law scholar, as follows:
Only slowly did the edicts of science for the practice of medicine
emerge and take hold. If germs, not moral failure or a vindictive
deity, caused disease then a properly trained physician could diagnose
an illness, evaluate and prescribe a remedy. If infections could be
prevented by antiseptic technique-the advantages of cleanliness in
the operating room were not discovered in this country until the
1870s-then surgery could be less a heroic, last ditch effort to save
life and more a restorative, professional skill. Above all, if science
could rationalize medical practice, then both the therapeutic value
of medicine and the social and economic status of its practitioners
could be greatly enhanced.5 0
B. Professionally Defining Medical Care Quality.
The AMA and its state and local affiliates had substantial control
over medical licensing and education during the first quarter of the
century.5' State legislatures delegated to medical boards the respon-
sibility and power of setting the minimum standards for licensure. 52
The boards were filled with representatives from organized medicine."
47. Id.
48. Id. Two of the most prominent manuals were entitled "Domestic Medicine." STARR,
supra note 39, at 32-34. William Buchan's was published in 1769 and had at least thirty
reprintings in the U.S. through the middle of the century. Id. at 32-33. John C. Gunn's was
published in 1830 and soon replaced Buchan's as the popular favorite. Id. at 34.
49. See Harrman L. Blumgart, Caring for the Patient, 270 NEw ENO. J. MED. 449, 449
(1964). "Somewhere between 1910 and 1912 in this country, a random patient, with a random
disease consulting a doctor chosen at random had, for the first time in the history of mankind,
a better than fifty-fifty chance of profiting from the encounter." Id.
50. GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 3 (1990) [hereinafter ANNAS ET
AL.].
51. LUDMERER, supra note 18, at 235-40 (1985). In 1889, the United States Supreme
Court had approved medical licensing by the states and its corollary, prohibiting those without
licenses from practicing medicine. Dent v. State of West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). All
states (then twenty-seven) and the District of Columbia had a requirement of physician licensing
by 1901. STARR, supra note 39, at 104.
52. LUDMERER, supra note 18, at 236. State licensing boards also have the authority to
discipline physicians for professional misconduct, a power they have been reluctant to use.
53. Id. at 237. The AMA initially agreed to work with the homeopaths and eclectics on
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The boards evaluated and accredited medical -schools.5 4 Graduation
from an approved institution was a common prerequisite for state
licensure.11
The educational process for physicians that developed under
AMA supervision focused on individual medicine, rather than public
health. However, it put little emphasis on the issue of physician-
patient relations. Funding source incentives, combined with institu-
tional pressure to improve a school's ranking, encouraged an emphasis
on research and specialized practice by those who were educating
medical students.16 The lesson was not lost on the students. The
ranking within the profession that resulted, which still persists today,
has been described by one writer as follows:
On the first rung of the medical hierarchy are the various primary-
care physicians: general practitioners, family-practice specialists, and
internists. These physicians must deal with such an enormous variety
the state licensing boards. STARR, supra note 39, at 102, 106-08. These alternative voices were
soon overwhelmed by the growth of the larger organization as a major restructuring of the
AMA into a federal organization in 1901 helped to swell its membership from 8,000 to 70,000
by 1910. Id. at 110.
54. Id. at 249-254. One goal of the AMA at the time of its formation was to standardize
and upgrade the medical education required of physicians. As early as 1870, the House of
Delegates, the elected policy making body of the AMA, resolved "that the American Medical
Association has the power to control the subject of medical education in the United States and
the power to exercise that control in any manner upon which it may become agreed." Official
Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates, May 1870, at 35.
In 1902, the AMA House of Delegates authorized a permanent Council on Medical
Education to help achieve the goal of "obtaining a uniform and elevated standard of require-
ments for the degree of M.D .. " 28 JAMA 1659, 1662 (1902). By 1910, the Council had
developed the guidelines, Essentials for an Acceptable Medical School, to govern the accredi-
tation process. While various associations worked with the state boards, the AMA's voice was
strongest and came to have the force of law. LUDMRER, supra note 18, at 237.
Medical school accreditation by the AMA's Council on Medical Education was essentially
mandatory in all states by 1920. Id. at 121. This exclusive control over medical education by
the AMA continued for almost fifty years. In 1957, the Essentials for an Acceptable Medical
School was replaced by a new set of guidelines, Functions and Structures of the Modern Medical
School, developed by the AMA Council on Medical Education and the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC). See Official Proceedings of AMA House of Delegates, June 1957,
31, 33-36. Currently all states rely on accreditation by the Liaison Committee on Medical
Education (a joint venture of the AMA and the AAMC) or the American Osteopathic Asso-
ciation. Until 1960, the AMA opposed the provision of federal funds to directly subsidize
medical school education. ANNAS ET AL., supra note 50, at 27. This was due, in large part, to
concerns about losing control over the educational process.
55. Internships and residency programs became a regular part of the medical training
for virtually all U.S. medical school graduates in the 1950's. These programs were also subject
to AMA accreditation as they were developing. The accrediting body for residency programs
is now the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME).
56. The initial funding sources for medical education in the beginning of the century
were tuition and endowments. JAMES R. SCHOFIELD, NEW AND EXPANDED MEDICAL SCHOOLS,
MID-CENTURY TO THE 1980's 125-130 (1984). By 1970 these were largely supplanted by patient
care revenues and federal research grants. Id. at 132-34.
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of human ailments that much of the time they can only apply
hundreds upon hundreds of rules learned mostly by rote. Primary-
care physicians will refer the cases that cannot be dealt with by that
approach to the physicians on the next rung, the specialists. Spe-
cialists are likely to know and understand a much greater fraction
of the scientific literature in their field. Their therapies may depart
more frequently from what they were taught.
At the top of the hierarchy are the academic faculty of medical
schools and teaching hospitals.5 7
While massive investments were made in hospitals and the training
of medical doctors, the availability of alternative approaches to health
care decreased. Some methods were proven ineffective or even dan-
gerous. Active steps, taken by organized medicine to discourage pa-
tient usage of other approaches, also eliminated or delayed the
development of alternatives. 8
As the AMA and its physicians gained prestige and control over
medical education and delivery, the tradition of patient involvement
in decision making suffered. The practice of medicine became more
technical and specialized. Improved diagnostic techniques and the
accumulating body of medical knowledge that was safeguarded by
the profession put a distance between physician and patient. Physi-
cians changed their language and their capacity to talk with their
patients. The evolving medical capabilities presented new situations
that tested the developing professional control over medical care. On
one particular question, whether the physician could extend an op-
eration without the consent of the patient, physicians found that their
assumptions were not shared by patients or the courts.5 9
C. Developing the Legal Doctrine of Consent.
After 1904, medical consent cases began to appear in state courts,
starting slowly and then gradually increasing in number after 1913. 0
57. Thomas J. Moore, The Cholesterol Myth, TmE Anm l7c MoNTmY Sep. 1989, 38,
at 44.
58. See, e.g., Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ili. 1987)
(AMA and its members conspired against the chiropractic profession), aff'd, 895 F.2d 352.
59. See FADEN & BaEAUCna', supra note 1, at 119-25; Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (I11.
1906); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905); Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96 (Okla. 1913);
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
60. See, e.g., Mohr, 104 N.W. 12; Pratt, 79 N.E. 562; Luka v. Lowrie, 136 N.W. 1106
(Mich. 1912); Schloendorff, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914); Rolater, 137 P. 96 (Okla. 1913). A
separate, and somewhat earlier, line of consent cases involved the question of the status of the
person consenting to his/her own care. See State v. Housekeeper, 16 A. 382 (Md. 1889) (married
woman's ability to consent without husband's agreement); Bakker v. Welsh, 108 N.W. 94
(Mich. 1906) (ability of minor to give effective consent to surgery).
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The issue in most cases was the extent to which surgeons could exercise
their discretion to alter the surgical plan for anesthetized patients. 6'
A theory of implied consent would have accorded broad discretion
to the surgeons. Courts declined, however, to trust the surgeons with
that decision making power in the absence of a medical emergency. 62
The courts built the legal doctrine of consent to medical treatment
from the ancient notion that one's body should not be touched without
one's approval 63 Enforcement of this right to be left alone is by a
civil action of battery, with money damages as the remedy.64 The
relevant facts and applicable doctrine are uncomplicated. Where a
patient had allegedly rejected a proposed surgery, the courts could
easily fit the issue into the analytical framework of battery. 65 Similarly,
where the surgeon operated on a part of the body other than one
discussed with the patient, there was liability for battery.6 The central
issue is whether an intentional "touching" occurred. 67 If so, and there
61. See, e.g., Mohr, 104 N.W. 12; Pratt, 79 N.E. 562.
62. Pratt, 79 N.E. at 565. The following proposition of law was submitted by defendants
in the Pratt case:
The court holds, as a proposition of law, that when a patient places herself in the
care of a surgeon for treatment without instructions to the surgeon or limitations
upon his authority, she thereby, in law, consents that he may perform such operation
as in his best judgment, care and skill is necessary, proper and essential to her
welfare, and in case the surgeon performs an operation upon the plaintiff, and there
is no complaint against the surgeon for want of the exercise of care and skill, there
can be no recovery.
Id. The court rejected the defense because the facts did not suggest an emergency condition
arose during the surgical procedure. Id.
63. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). In that case, the United
States Supreme Court clearly expressed its support for the underlying notion of bodily integrity.
It stated "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."
Id. at 251.
The defendants in this personal injury action sought an order requiring the plaintiff to
submit to an examination to assess her physical condition. Id. at 250. The court concluded that
"such an order has no warrant of law." Id. at 256. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 now
provides for such orders where the physical condition is in controversy and good cause is shown
for the examination. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
64. In the history of the common law, there is perhaps no right which is older than a
person's right to be free from unwarranted personal contact. As early as the middle of the
thirteenth century, English law, through the writ of trespass vi et armis, provided a method of
monetary recovery for unpermitted contacts with the person. F. W. MAITLAND, THE FoRts oF
ACTION AT COMMON LAW 40, 43, 53 (1971 ed.). See generally George F. Dreiser, The Devel-
opment of Principle in Trespass, 27 YALE L.J. 220 (1917); George E. Woodbine, The Origins
of the Action of Trespass, 33 YAIE L.J. 799 (1924).
65. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905); Schloendorff v. Society of
N.Y. Hosp's, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
66. Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15-16. More recently see, Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (1972).
67. Mohr, 104 N.W. at 16.
BEYOND INFORMED CONSENT
was no express or implied consent, there is liability. 68 This classifi-
cation of the claim stresses respect for bodily integrity and distin-
guishes the legal claim from the more common form of action involving
medical professionals, medical malpractice. It also has the effect of
removing the case from the realm and rules of negligence and into
that of an intentional tort.
69
The basic principle that consent was necessary before a physician
could operate on a patient was well accepted at the turn of the
century. The inherent dangers of surgery made the choice a very
personal one. A 1903 torts treatise explained the law as follows: "The
patient must be the final arbiter as to whether he will take his chances
with the operation, or take his chances of living without it. Such is
the natural right of the individual, which the law recognizes as a legal
one." 70
The dramatic increase in the use of hospitals in the early 1900's
removed the patient from her home in the event of a serious illness. 7'
The separation was especially severe when surgery was to be per-
formed. Family and friends were excluded from the hospital's surgical
area as part of the new aseptic protocols. 72
The widespread use of anesthesia complicated matters regarding
a patient's consent to treatment. 3 In a 1912 case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court explained that the use of anesthesia
68. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39-42
(5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 8 (1965); 6 N.Y. JUR. 2d Assault-Civil Aspects
2 (1980).
69. Some practical consequences of this distinction are that: 1) a shorter statute of
limitations would apply to the intentional tort. Compare N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. § 215(1)
(McKinney 1993) - One year statute of limitations for assault, with N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R.
214-a - Statute of limitations for medical malpractice is two years and six months; 2) In an
assault, the skill with which the procedure was done is irrelevant, while in a malpractice action
that issue is central. This framing of the issue may preclude the need for expert testimony.
Liability based on battery is not denied because the plaintiff was not aware of the touching.
See, e.g., Mohr, 104 N.W. 12; or the touching was beneficial or otherwise harmless. See, e.g.,
Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25, 26 (Ohio 1956); Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15-16.
70. Mohr, 104 N.W. at 14-15, quoting I KINKEAD'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 375 (1903).
71. See STARR, supra note 39, at 156-57.
72. Id.
73. Anesthesia was introduced by William Morton in 1846, and by 1853, it was available
at every hospital in the country. MARTIN S. PERNICK, A CALCULUS OF SUFFERING: PAIN,
PROFESSIONALISM AND ANESTHESIA IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 3-4 (1985) [hereinafter
PAIN]. Despite this availability, it was not until the 1880's that the disability of being anesthetized
during medical treatment came to be seen as an ethical or legal problem. The Patient's Consent
to an Operation and the Surgeon's Discretion, THE MEDICAL RECORD Dec. 1880, at 715.
Hospital surgery was performed far less frequently in the nineteenth century. It was still a
crude and dangerous undertaking. STARR, supra note 39, at 156. Most of the competing medical
philosophies rejected surgical intervention.
At least until the turn of the century, anesthesia was used only on selected patients. Adult
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[r]enders the patient unable to consent at the very time that the rule
of the common law required that his consent be obtained; for in
those days the patient (such was the horror of it) was a conscious
participant in such surgical operations as were then performed, and
as his consent could be obtained the rule of the common law was
that it must be obtained.74
Virtually all the court decisions on consent, and later, informed
consent, arise out of the surgical context. 75 The discussion of consent
cases often starts with quotation of Associate Justice Cardozo's opin-
ion in the 1914 decision, Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hos-
pitals.76 In Schloendorff, the New York Court of Appeals was defining
males were the least anesthetized group as their tolerance of pain was seen as greater than
women and children. Anesthesia was used at times to subdue objecting patients or to render
them unconscious so the physician could perform surgery without the awareness of the patient.
Women were anesthetized involuntarily far more frequently than men since their autonomy was
much less respected. PAIN, supra at 149-50, 229.
74. Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 A. 948, 949 (N.J. 1912). The court overturned a jury award
for the plaintiff since it found that the unauthorized operation was necessary to save the
patient's life. Id.
75. Tracing the development of a legal concept through reported cases is not entirely
satisfying nor accurate. Most litigation effort is at the trial level, but these courts rarely produce
substantial written opinions. Only those issues that generate opposition, either from the adversary
or the court, can proceed to the appellate levels. Where the litigation opponents accept one
legal theory, or decide for any of a variety of reasons not to pursue an appeal, there is little
chance to bring the issue before an appellate court for its determination.
76. 105 N.E. 92 (1914). Mary Schloendorff's complaint alleged that surgery was per-
formed contrary to her express direction. Id. at 93. The court accepted her allegations as true
for purposes of reviewing the directed verdict in favor of the defendant hospital entered by the
trial judge. Id. The patient had agreed to an "ether examination." Id. While the patient was
under the effects of the anesthesia, the surgeon removed a fibroid tumor discovered during the
examination. Id. An infection, gangrene and the amputation of several fingers allegedly resulted
from the operation. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. 93.
The court's opinion provides a taste of a very different medical world:
In the year 1771, by royal charter of George III, the Society of the New York
Hospital was organized for the care and healing of the sick. During the century and
more which has since passed, it has devoted itself to that high task. It has no capital
stock; it does not distribute profits; and its physicians and surgeons, both the visiting
and the resident staff, serve it without pay. Those who seek it in search of health
are charged nothing if they are needy, either for board or for treatment. The well-
to-do are required by its by-laws to pay $7 a week for board . . . .
To this hospital the plaintiff came in January, 1908. She was suffering from some
disorder of the stomach. She asked the superintendent or one of his assistants what
the charge would be, and was told that it would be $7 a week. She became an inmate
of the hospital, and after some weeks of treatment, the house physician, Dr. Bartlett,
discovered a lump, which proved to be a fibroid tumor. He consulted the visiting
physician, Dr. Stimson, who advised an operation. The plaintiff's testimony is that
the character of the lump could not, so the physicians informed her, be determined
without an ether examination. . . . Following the operation, and, according to the
testfmony of her witnesses, because of it, gangrene developed in her left arm, some
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a non-profit hospital's liability for acts performed by the doctors and
nurses it employed and not any claim of liability against the individual
physician or nurse. 77
Two theories were offered supporting the conclusion that the
hospital was immune from liability for the patient's damages. 71 One
theory implied a waiver of the right to sue for negligent treatment
when the patient turned to a charity for help (charitable immunity). 79
In rejecting the application of this doctrine to the facts alleged by
Schloendorff, Justice Cardozo summarized the state of the common
law regarding consent to surgery:
In the case at hand, the wrong complained of is not merely negli-
gence. It is trespass. Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body;
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for Which he is liable in damages.8 0
The decision proceeded to its major holding that the hospital could
not be held liable for acts of its employed physicians: "[Tlhere is no
relation of master and servant between a hospital and its physicians,
and it does not undertake to act through them, but merely to procure
them to act upon their own responsibility." ' 81
Schloendorff relied upon the earlier decisions of Pratt v. Davis 2
and Mohr v. Williams83 in classifying the cause of action. 8 In these
of her fingers had to be amputated, and her sufferings were intense.
Id.
The court continued:
There may be cases where a patient ought not to be advised of a contemplated
operation until shortly before the appointed hour. To discuss such a subject at
midnight might cause needless and even harmful agitation. About such matters a
nurse is not qualified to judge. She is drilled to habits of strict obedience. She is
accustomed to rely unquestioningly upon the judgment of her superiors. No woman
occupying such a position would reasonably infer from the plaintiff's words that it
was the purpose of the surgeons to operate whether the plaintiff forbade it or not.
Id. at 95.
77. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. Rather than an assault, Mary Schloendorff's injuries resulted from a battery. A
civil assault is "an intentional attempt to do injury or commit a battery upon the person of
another." 6 N.Y. JuR. 2d Assault-Civil Aspects § 1 (1980). The assault requires an intent to
inflict injury or put the victim in apprehension of such injury. 6 N.Y. JUR. 2d Assault-Civil
Aspects § 1. A battery consists of the slightest touching, with the only intent required being
the intent to make contact, not intent to do injury. Id. at § 4.
81. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 94. The New York Court of Appeals has since rejected
the "Schloendorff rule" and held that the principles of respondeat superior should be applied
to render a hospital liable for the negligence of the physicians and nurses that it employs. Bing
v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (1957).
82. 79 N.E. 522 (I11. 1906).
83. 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
84. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
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and other reported cases of this era, the allegations focused on surgery
that went beyond the procedure discussed with and agreed to by the
patient. 85 Often, the allegations were that the patient had clearly
rejected the additional work or had been misled.16
By the late 1920's, there was little controversy over the substance
of the legal rule .87 Lawful consent was clearly limited to the procedure
specifically agreed to by the patient. The case law moved from policy
making to enforcing compliance with the accepted professional norm
of obtaining consent for each separate procedure. 8  Observance of
85. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. 92 (ether examination which ended with removal of a
tumor); Pratt, 79 N.E. 562 (examination turned into hysterectomy); Mohr, 104 N.W. 12
(operation to be conducted on right ear but undertaken on left). See also Wells v. Van Nort,
125 N.E. 810 (Ohio 1919) (surgeon to perform appendectomy removed fallopian tube without
consent); Rolator v. Strain, 137 P.96 (Okla. 1913) (consent to foot operation to drain infection
but bone removed).
86. See Pratt, 79 N.E. at 562. A second surgery, removing a woman's ovaries to deal
with her epilepsy and depression was done without her consent. Therefore, an action based on
battery was appropriate. The physician defendant testified that: "I worked her deliberately and
systematically, taking chances which she did not realize the full aspect of, deliberately and
calmly deceiving the woman; that is, I did not tell her the whole truth." Id. at 564. In Mohr,
104 N.W. at 12, a physician who had been authorized to operate on a woman's right ear,
found that it was the left which required medical attention. Id. The surgery was done in a
professional manner and no negligence was alleged or proven. Id. This constituted a technical
assault and battery. Id. In Rolater, 137 P. at 97, a surgeon, in operating to drain an infected
toe, removed a bone. Id. The patient had explicitly told him she wanted to retain all of her
bones. Id. Rishworth v. Moss, 159 S.W. 122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), aff'd 222 S.W. 225 (Tex.
Com. App. 1920). The removal of tonsils and adenoids from an 11-year old, without the
consent of her parents, was unlawful irregardless of whether there was negligence in the actual
performance of the operation. Id. at 124. See also McClees v. Cohen, 148 A. 124 (Md. 1930);
(judgment affirmed against dentist who removed two molars rather than two "baby roots" as
sought by plaintiff); Franklyn v. Peabody, 228 N.W. 681 (Mich. 1930) (doctor who extended
an operation beyond the agreed upon hand surgery was liable for assault when no emergency
existed); Wells, 125 N.E. 910 (1919) (plaintiff agreed to "an operation for appendicitis" but
the physician went on to remove her Fallopian tubes which he observed to be in "bad shape");
Francis v. Brooks, 156 N.E. 609 (Ohio Ct. App. 1926) (dentist, who broke a woman's jaw
extracting an impacted, unerupted bicuspid, was held liable for assault since she had directed
him only to extract nine of her teeth); White v. Hirshfield, 236 P. 406 (Okla. 1925) (physician,
authorized to perform a Caesarian section, who extended operation to remove the plaintiff's
fallopian tubes committed an assault and battery); King v. Carney, 204 P. 270 (Okla. 1922)
(surgeon may be justified in extending an operation, where he has a general authorization to
"fix" what was wrong and he encountered unanticipated conditions that posed a danger to the
life of the patient); Hively v. Higgs, 253 P. 363 (Ore. 1927) (surgeon employed to operate on
plaintiff's septum, liable for assault when he removed her tonsils instead). See also Ericson v.
Charles, 194 P. 652 (1921).
All these cases had female plaintiffs. The percentage of female plaintiffs in medical
malpractice cases continued to be high after the Era of Consent. A study of appellate court
medical malpractice decisions handed down from 1946 to 1955 found that in 70°7 of. the cases
the plaintiff was female. Sandor, The History of Professional Liability Suits in the United
States, 163 AMERICAN MED. Ass'N J. 459 (1957).
87. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 125.
88. A steady trickle of cases on consent were reported with the consent standards
routinely applied. See WILLIAM A. KELLY, THE PHYSICIAN, THE PATIENT AND THE CONSENT, 8
U. KANSAS L. REV. 405 (1960) for a discussion of these cases.
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this rule in clinical medicine was not uniform. The lack of consistent
and effective enforcement from either within or without the profession
allowed for lax practices of disclosure with many patients.
As the century progressed, advancing medical technology and
techniques put powerful new tools in the hands of the medical pro-
fession. Use of these new tools carried the risk of severe harm to
patients even without negligence. The courts began to inquire whether
the patients had been informed of the risks of, and alternatives to,
the medical intervention.8 9 The underlying rationale of patient self-
determination moved the case law from fact patterns of total non-
disclosure or misrepresentation to those raising a question of whether
the patient was given enough information to decide intelligently on
the use of a treatment. 90 This legal analysis initially explored the
patient-provider relationship as a matter of contract law, as shown
in this opinion from the Fifth Circuit:
[I]f a physician advises his patient to submit to a particular operation
and the patient weighs the dangers and results incident to its per-
formance and finally consents, he thereby in effect enters into a
contract authorizing his physician to operate to the extent of the
consent given but no further. The same principle which supports the
holding that a surgeon performing an operation without his patient's
consent, express or implied, commits a battery or trespass for which
he is liable in damages, also supports the holding that a surgeon
may not perform an operation different in kind from that consented
to or one involving risks and results not contemplated. 9'
The disparity in status and information between physicians and pa-
tients made a contract analysis unsatisfactory. In time the courts
developed new malpractice doctrines to compensate those who suf-
fered serious injury that would have been avoided had the authori-
zation to proceed been an informed decision. 92
III. THE ERA OF INFORMED CONSENT (1957 TO PRESENT).
Between 1957 and 1984, every state, except Georgia, adopted a
litigation remedy for a failure to obtain informed consent. 93 A burst
89. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 125.
90. See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170,
181 (1957); see also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 125-90.
91. Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1943); see also Giambozi v. Peters, 16
A.2d 833 (Conn. 1940); Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716 (Fla. App. 1957); Bang. v.
Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. 1958); Robert E. Powell, Consent to Operative
Procedures, 21 MD. L. REV 189 (1961).
92. See Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, reh'g denied, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960);
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 505 P.2d I (Cal. 1972).
93. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, vol. 3, App. L. As of the time of that
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of activity between 1972 and 1982 identified the elements of the cause
of action in over two-thirds of the jurisdictions. 94 Georgia remained
the lone holdout against informed consent until 1988, when a new
Georgia statute mandated disclosure of a specific list of medical risks.9"
Two notable features of the Era of Informed Consent are the depar-
ture from the controlling force of professional norms in setting a
malpractice standard and the reaction of the medical professionals to
the imposition of practice standards by the courts and legislatures.
The cases and statutes use varying formulations to set a minimum
level of disclosure the medical professional is responsible for providing
before conducting an invasive procedure. % Under one of the least
demanding standards, the provider can meet the informed consent
requirements either by apprising the patient, in general terms, of a
short list of the most significant risks of serious harm or by having
the patient sign a consent form that contains the warnings. 97 The
doctrine, in its most individualized form, requires full disclosure of
the details of the treatment and of all risks and alternatives that are
relevant to the particular person's decision on treatment. 98 Most com-
monly, the standard makers viewed the choice as between a profes-
sionally established norm and one measured by the information needs
of a reasonable patient. 99 The jurisdictions are almost evenly split
between the professionally oriented and the lay standard of disclo-
sure. °0 Legislatively chosen rules primarily follow the professionally
Report, one state (Georgia) had rejected the informed consent doctrine and three states
(Connecticut, South Carolina and West Virginia) had not addressed the issue in either forum.
Id.
The Georgia Legislature rejected the informed consent doctrine in 1971. The Georgia
Medical Consent Law provided for disclosure "in general terms" of the treatment or course
of treatment. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6(d) (Michie 1991). The court cases made clear that this
did not require the treating physician to discuss any risks or alternatives. Simpson v. Dickson,
306 S.E.2d 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Young v. Yarn, 222 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
The courts of Connecticut, South Carolina, and West Virginia recognized the cause of action
soon after the President's Commission report was written. See Logan v. Greenwich Hosp.
Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1983); Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984),
cert. denied, 320 S.E.2d 35 (1984); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982).
94. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 139. See also Alan Meisel & Lisa Kabnick,
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 41 U. PrTr. L. REV. 407 (1980).
95. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6 (Michie 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1982). The act also
provides for acceptance of signed consent forms as proof of informed consent. Id. at § 31-9-
6.1 (b)(2).
96. See infra notes 161, 166-85, 190-241 and accompanying text.
97. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-6.1(a)(1)-(6), (b)(2) (Michie 1991).
98. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d at 554 (Okla. 1979); Cross v. Trapp, 294
S.E.2d at 455 (W. Va. 1982).
99. Scott, 606 P.2d at 554; Cross, 294 S.E.2d at 446.
100. See infra Section I(F) and accompanying notes.
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oriented standards, while court made rules most often choose the lay
standard.' 0 While "material risks" and "reasonable patient" are
standard terms in the lay rule, the professionally oriented standards
rely on the medical malpractice standards of care. 02
The state doctrines of the Era of Informed Consent evolved in
stages. Before 1975 informed consent doctrines were developed only
in lawsuits against medical professionals for their failure to provide
meaningful disclosure of the risks inherent in a medical intervention.0 3
The state courts hearing these cases unanimously held that medical
professionals had a legally enforceable duty to provide information
to the patient on the nature and purpose of the procedure as well as
its risks and alternatives.0 4 Their reasoning was based on the concept
of respect for personal autonomy central to the earlier consent cases.0 5
A meaningful consent requires that the patient have some understand-
ing of what she is agreeing to and how that course of treatment
compares to alternative therapies and to non-treatment.°6
The earliest of these informed consent cases did not directly
challenge professional self regulation. 7 Organized medicine was active
and successful in advocating for the use of a professional disclosure
standard in these cases. The courts adopted the customary professional
practice, or what a reasonable physician would have done in similar
circumstances, as the standard of disclosure. 08 Professionals were
allowed considerable discretion to withhold information for therapeu-
tic reasons. The courts held the physician liable only where disclosure
about an invasive procedure fell below the professional norm and
serious harm resulted.' °9 This continued the role of the courts as one
of several mechanisms for enforcing medical care standards defined
within the profession.
Criticism of the professional practice of disclosure by legal and
medical scholars as well as patient advocates had been building since
the end of World War II. The critics focused first on medical research,
and later, on clinical medicine. In 1972, the case law took a dramatic
turn toward imposing a patient-oriented disclosure standard rather
than enforcing compliance with the professional practice in therapeutic
care. 10 Courts in several jurisdictions established disclosure standards
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Salgo, 317 P.2d 170. See also supra notes 60-93 and accompanying text.
104. See Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181; Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1101-04.
105. See, e.g., Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93; Mohr, 104 N.W. at 14-15.
106. See infra Section III(F) and accompanying notes.
107. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181. See also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 126-27.
108. See, e.g., Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1103.
109. Id. at 1107. See also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 131.
110. See infra Section 111(F) and accompanying notes.
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for the profession that required more information than the physicians
customarily provided."' The nonprofessional disclosure standard most
widely used requires that the provider of care disclose risks and
alternatives that would be material information to a reasonable per-
son."
2
Physician lobbying groups quickly turned to the state legislatures
to stem the tide of court adoption of this standard."3 The state
legislatures, already dealing with a medical malpractice insurance
crisis, added the new informed consent doctrines to the debate." 4 In
the short span of 1975 to 1977, almost half the states enacted statutes
that made the legal doctrine less threatening to the medical profes-
sion."' The state legislatures that clearly addressed the disclosure
standard unanimously opted for the professional perspective if there
was no clear state common law standard." 6 Where there was a state
common law on informed consent, the acts either froze those disclo-
sure standards or replaced non-professional disclosure rules with pro-
fessional practice standards." 7
New statutory formulations adding diversity to disclosure require-
ments were written." 8 Several jurisdictions established procedures for
disclosure without incorporating either perspective." 9 Many acts en-
courage the use of consent forms as evidence of compliance with
disclosure requirements. 20 There were notable legislative efforts in
Hawaii and Texas to authorize an administrative process to specifically
list the risks the provider is expected to disclose.' 2'
The legislative activity on the informed consent cause of action
waned almost as suddenly as it had developed. Arkansas codified its
common law on informed consent in 1979.122 In 1988, Georgia became
the final jurisdiction to accept the doctrine.' 23 No other legislature
111. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d I (Cal. 1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972).
112. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783, 784.
113. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 139-40.
114. Id. at 139.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 139-40.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5.1(d), (e) (1992) (requiring the disclosure of
the substantial and significant risks of causing the patient serious harm).
119. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-1(2), 671-3 (1985).
120. In fact, the statutes passed in Iowa, Nevada and Ohio were limited to definitions of
the elements of a valid written consent form, without directly defining the cause of action.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (West 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.110 (Michie 1986);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (Anderson 1991).
121. See infra Section III (D) and accompanying notes.
122. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206 (Michie 1987).
123. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (Michie 1991).
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has defined this doctrine in the past fifteen years, nor have any
legislatures taken the initiative to alter the statutory disclosure stan-
dards they chose between 1975 and 1977. With the help of adminis-
trative enforcement, there have been new statutes requiring the
disclosure of specific information as a means of discouraging the use
of some medical procedures. 2 4
State courts, when not preempted by legislation, have continued
to develop disclosure standards.' 25 They have not felt constrained to
apply the professional disclosure standards. The courts of Oklahoma
and West Virginia wrote the strongest formulations of the patient-
oriented standards just after the flurry of legislative activity.,2 6 Other
courts adopted the reasonable person standard in the face of legis-
lation giving consent forms meeting the professional standard of
disclosure presumptive effect. 2 7 Patient autonomy continued to be
the chief value honored by the courts.
Just as the medical practice of obtaining consent existed before
the Era of Consent, there was a level of informed consent which
existed in clinical practice before the courts began to rule on the
issue. 21 Members of the profession have routinely disclosed treatment
risks and alternatives in situations other than the invasive procedures
addressed by the legal doctrine. However, limited professional support
and scant monitoring of this aspect of care allowed for wide variations
in clinical practice.
This situation began to change in 1980 as the medical profession
dramatically reasserted control in defining the patient-physician re-
lationship. 29 The profession articulated new medical ethics that respect
the patient's collaborative role in the decision-making process. 130 This
professional initiative increased the possibility of treating patient in-
volvement in medical decisions as an important element in quality
care.
A. The Special Case of Informed Consent in Medical
Research
The concept of informed consent to medical interventions, if not
the particular phraseology and formulation, gained prominence after
124. See infra Section Ill(E) and accompanying notes.
125. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d
446 (W. Va. 1982).
126. See Scott, 606 P.2d 554; Cross, 294 S.E.2d 446.
127. See infra Section Ill(D) and accompanying notes.
128. FADEN V. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 125-129.
129. See infra Section IV(A) and accompanying notes.
130. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 96.
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World War II.1' Attention was initially focused on medical experi-
mentation. However, attention eventually crossed over the elusive
lines between research, innovative treatments, and accepted medical
practice.
The war crimes trial of twenty Nazi physicians and three medical
administrators gave the public a view of the horrible acts, done to
allegedly improve scientific knowledge, perpetrated upon World War
II concentration camp prisoners.' The judgment entered against the
defendants included the Nuremberg Code,'33 the first major set of
substantive protections for human subjects in medical experimenta-
tion. 34 The Code emerged in reaction to the defense that voluntary,
informed participation in medical research was the exception, rather
than the rule.'35 The Code set the "absolutely essential" prerequisite
of a voluntary, competent, informed, and comprehending consent for
human experiment subjects.'36
Despite the high visibility of, and strong feelings engendered by,
the war crimes trials, the research culture was slow to respond to the
ethical declarations. Later efforts, such as the 1964 World Medical
Assembly, Declaration of Helsinki,'3 7 and Henry K. Beecher's 1966
article'38 detailing ethical violations in twenty-two reported research
cases, were needed to stimulate reform efforts.
Open abuses of informed consent in medical experimentation
continued into the early 1970's. Several of the research studies gen-
erated significant controversy when the public media reported the
details of the experiments. 3 9 Two such studies generated the most
131. Id. at 151-56.
132. See United States v. Karl Brant, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, THE MEDICAL CASE, vols. I & 11
(1948-49) [hereinafter TRIALS). Despite a continuing debate over the ethics of citing these studies,
and serious doubts about the methodology "[alt least forty-five research articles published since
World War II draw upon data from the Nazi experiments." Kristine Moe, Should the Nazi
Research Data Be Cited?, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Dec. 1984, at 5. The greatest use of
these studies has been in the field of hypothermia research. Id. The Nazi studies measured the
rate of body cooling when Dachau prisoners were submerged in ice water for up to five hours.
The prisoners often died as a result of the experiments. Id.
133. TRIALS, supra note 132, at 181-84.
134. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 153-56.
135. Id.
136. TRIALS, supra note 132, at 181.
137. Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical
Research Involving Human Subjects, adopted by the 18th World Medical Assembly, Helsinki,
Finland, 1964, reprinted in 271 NEw ENG. J. MED. 473 (June 1964).
138. HENRY K. BEECHER, Ethics & Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966).
See also HENRY K. BEECHER, EXPERIMENTATION IN MAN, Monograph (1959).
139. See FADEN AND BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 161-67 (discussing The Jewish Chronic
Disease Hospital Study and the Tuskegee Syphillis Study); see also Carel B. ljsselmuiden &
Ruth R. Faden, Research and Informed Consent in Africa - Another Look, 326 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 830 (1992).
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discussion. One study was the 1963 Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital
study where researchers injected live cancer cells into patients without
disclosing that fact.' 40 The other was the Tuskegee Syphilis Study
where the United States Public Health Service observed, but did not
treat, the progress of syphilis in approximately 400 black males from
1932 to 1972.141
Public reaction to the methodology of the research studies even-
tually took the matter out of the hands of the professionals. 42 Gov-
ernment grants fund the vast majority of research projects.
Consequently, federal and state regulations can govern the conduct
of most medical research. 43 This supervisory power allowed the fund-
ing sources to develop and to enforce regulations requiring an in-
formed consent procedure.
The subjects of an experiment must have the risks, benefits, and
alternatives fully disclosed in a language understandable by them.
44
A written document must substantiate the consent. 145 Before com-
mencing an experiment on human subjects, the researcher must con-
vince an Institutional Review Board (IRB) that they have minimized
risks and that the expected benefits exceed the risks.'" Unfortunately,
there is no requirement of post-experiment surveys or other means to
determine whether the disclosure, as understood by the subject, met
the reality of the experiment. 47
The development of protections for human subjects helped to
focus the issues and to involve practitioners and scholars in the related
issues of consent to therapeutic medical interventions . 48 However,
therapeutic medical care lacks the "single payer" with the power to
mandate informed consent procedures. Slow improvement is being
made through revisions in medical education and professional ethical
codes, resulting from the pressure applied by the state courts and
legislatures.
140. See Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1964), rev'd 206
N.E.2d 338 (1965).
141. JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1981).
142. See 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914 (1974) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46) for the first compre-
hensive set of federal informed consent regulations on human subject research.
143. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. 116 pt. 46 (1993); N.Y. PUBLic HEALTH LAW §§ 2440-46
(McKinney 1993).
144. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1993).
145. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (1993).
146. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (1993).
147. 45 C.F.R. § 46.113. The IRB's are authorized "to suspend or terminate approval
of research that is not being conducted in accordance with the IRB's requirements .... Id.
148. The President's Commission concluded that even though they developed from dif-
ferent sources and in different times, the concepts of informed consent for experimentation
and for therapy "are today basically the same." See PRESIDENT'S COMMIssIoN, supra note 3,
at 20, n.19.
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B. Therapeutic Care and Informed Consent - State Common
Law from 1957 to 1972
The consent doctrine is used to compensate patients who had not
given a valid consent to surgery and who suffer a negative outcome.149
Consent cases, as a legal battery, present a simple legal issue.'50 A
more complex analysis and factual predicate is required when the
legal issue changes from a lack of consent to a consent that is based
on an inadequate level of disclosure of the risks and alternatives of
that procedure. With some prompting from the medical professionals
and from plaintiffs' attorneys, the courts soon came to analyze the
cases as a form of medical malpractice.'5 '
The labeling of the cause of action as medical malpractice has
important practical consequences that have helped drive the case law
analysis. 5 2 The greatest significance of the change for the doctor is
that with a malpractice standard, she can rely upon expert testimony
that she has followed the professional standard of care. Once the
plaintiff establishes that the medical professional did not meet the'
standard of disclosure, the inquiry moves to the causation stage. The
plaintiff must show that actual damages were suffered and that the
actions of the defendant were the proximate cause of those damages.
The causation question is whether the procedure would have been
undergone even with appropriate disclosure.5 3
149. The majority of claims from 1930 to 1960 dealt with misrepresentations and reflected
the professional ethical concern that the physician not actively mislead the patient. "The
physician shall neither exaggerate nor minimize the gravity of the patient's condition." CURRENT
OPINIONS-1957 § 9, Opinion 2.
150. The court stated "[ilIf Dr. Wilson did not have Scott's informed consent to operate
upon him he would be guilty of assault and battery on Scott, and liable for the damages caused
by the operation." Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) citing Moss
v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. Comm'n Civ. App. 1920).
151. See, e.g., Natanson, 350 P.2d 1093.
152. See generally Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability For Unauthorized Medical
Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REv. 381 (1957). In the period of transition to an informed consent
action modeled on malpractice there was some inconsistency in the courts' categorization of
the cause of action. That variance resulted primarily from the practical litigation consequences
influencing the courts' decisions. The assault cause of action carried with it several favorable
consequences for plaintiffs, such as limited need for expert medical testimony, limited defenses,
and the possibility of punitive damages. Id. at 383-89. A major advantage for the defendants
was the shorter statute of limitations for intentional torts as opposed to negligence or medical
malpractice. Id. at 389. Often the issue of categorization during this period was raised on a
motion to dismiss for inadequate pleading or for missing the filing deadline. Id.
Courts often categorized the action as negligence rather than assault and battery to avoid
the shorter Statute of Limitations that would have barred an intentional tort claim. Id. at 422-
23. Another factor determining the classification was whether a claim received was the only
legal claim alleged in the complaint. Id. at 422-23, n.146.
153. This article will not discuss the causation standard in detail. The matter relates
primarily to the limitations of the litigation forum as a means of dispute resolution rather than
directly bearing on the patient-physician relationship. The use of an "objective" standard on
causation is seen as protecting against self-serving testimony from the plaintiff.
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The 1957 case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board
of Trustees'5 4 used the phrase "informed consent" for the first time
in a reported medical malpractice case." The application of res ipsa
loquitur was the prime issue addressed by the appellate court.1 6 The
court discussed informed consent only to give further guidance to the
trial court on remand.'57 The trial court was directed to add to its
jury charge explicit language on the therapeutic exception to disclo-
sure.' The Court suggested a broad reading of that exception, al-
lowing the physician to withhold information that would be harmful
to the patient while acknowledging, but not resolving, the conflict
with patient self-determination. 19
154. 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
155. Salgo did not announce the informed consent doctrine as a new, judicially imposed,
professional obligation. The case had been tried with the lack of informed consent as an issue.
See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 125-26.
156. The court held that the doctrine didn't apply to the facts of this case and therefore
reversed the verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 182. The "locality rule" makes the local medical
custom definitive of the professional standard of care. Malpractice defense through control
over the sole source of expert testimony on the topic was one service local medical societies
had long made available to members. STARR, supra note 39, at Ill. This "conspiracy of
silence" made it very difficult to get the expert medical witnesses necessary in negligence suits
to show both the standard of care and overcome the expert testimony presented by defendants.
Id. Reliance on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was an effort to obviate the need for experts on
the local custom. In Salgo, the court did recognize the complaints of plaintiff's attorneys on
the "conspiracy of silence." Salgo, 317 P.2d at 175.
But gradually the courts awoke to the so-called 'conspiracy of silence.' No matter
how lacking in skill or how negligent the medical man might be, it was almost
impossible to get other medical men to testify adversely to him in litigation based on
his alleged negligence. Not only would the guilty person thereby escape from civil
liability for the wrong he had done, but his professional colleagues would take no
steps to insure that the same results would not again occur at his hands.
Salgo, 317 P.2d at 175. See also Carl R. Robinson, Why the Conspiracy of Silence Won't Die,
MEDCAl EcoNomics Feb. 20, 1984, at 180.
Plaintiff's attorneys had limited success in avoiding the need for expert testimony by
applying res ipsa loquitur to medical care injuries. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687
(1944). They also had virtually no success in establishing a standard of strict liability. See Marc
L. Carmichael, Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Medical Practitioner Under the Doctrine
of Strict Liability in Tort, or Breach of Warranty, for Harm Caused by Drug, Medical
Instrument, or Similar Device Used in Treating Patient, 54 A.L.R.3d 258. Over time, most
states have rejected the strict locality rule and moved toward applying a reasonable physician
standard. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985). The similarity of medical
school admission standards and curricula, the national availability of professional journals and
computer databases, and the mobility of physicians have been cited as supporting this substi-
tution. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 870.
157. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
158. Id.
159. The court saw two ways to handle informed consent:
One is to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or
operation, no matter how remote; this may well result in alarming a patient who is
already unduly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to undertake surgery in
which there is in fact minimal risk; it may also result in actually increasing the risks
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The 1960 opinion in Natanson v. Kline'6° served as the leading
citation in the United States on the topic for the next twelve years.
The Natanson court was very conscious of the importance attached
to its decision by the medical profession, and it continued the tone
of deference set in Salgo:16 1
The primary basis of liability in a malpractice action is the
deviation from the standard of conduct of a reasonable and prudent
medical doctor of the same school of practice as the defendant under
similar circumstances. Under such standard the patient is properly
protected by the medical profession's own recognition of its obli-
gations to maintain its standards. t62
Natanson shared one notable characteristic with other major appellate
by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension itself. The other is to
recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the patient's mental and
emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in
discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed
consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent. [citations
omitted] ...
The instruction given should be modified to inform the jury that the physician has
such discretion consistent, of course, with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an
informed consent.
Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
The year after the Salgo decision, a Minnesota court recognized the right of patients to
have enough information to make an intelligent choice whether to accept the proposed treatment,
to seek to modify the proposal, or to reject it. Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, 88 N.W.2d
186 (Minn. 1958). The court made it clear that it did not wish to impose any onerous burdens
on the medical profession:
While we have no desire to hamper the medical profession in the outstanding progress
it has made and continues to make in connection with the study and solution of
health and disease problems, it is our opinion that a reasonable rule is that, where a
physician or surgeon can ascertain in advance of an operation alternative situations
and no immediate emergency exists, a patient should be informed of the alternative
possibilities and given a chance to decide before the doctor proceeds with the
operation. By that we mean that, in a situation such as the case before us where no
immediate emergency exists, a patient should be informed before the operation that
if his spermatic cords were severed it would result in his sterilization, but on the
other hand if this were not done there would be a possibility of an infection which
could result in serious consequences. Under such conditions the patient would at least
have the opportunity of deciding whether he wanted to take the chance of a possible
infection if the operation was performed in one manner or to become sterile if
performed in another.
Id. at 190.
160. 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), reh'g denied, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
161. The Natanson court recognized the professional practice as the standard of disclosure,
but found that it was appropriate to dispense with expert testimony regarding the accepted
practice in the case before it since the physician had not disclosed any of the dangers associated
with the relatively new and dangerous cobalt treatment. The court stated:
But on the state of the record here presented the appellant was not required to
produce expert medical testimony to show that the failure of Dr. Kline to give any
explanation or make any disclosures was contrary to accepted medical practice. To
hold otherwise would be a failure of the court to perform its solemn duty.
Natanson, 354 P.2d at 673.
162. Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1107.
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cases establishing informed consent, the presence of organized med-
icine as amicus curiae.163
The early reaction of organized medicine to the informed consent
cause of action was barely distinguishable from their general dislike
of malpractice. The Journal of the American Medical Association
published its first article on informed consent in 1960 shortly after
the Natanson decision.16 Written by the Director of the AMA's Law
Department, it opened and closed with the following paragraphs:
To be legally valid, the consent given to a procedure must be
an intelligent or informed consent, with an understanding of what
is to be done and the risks involved.
The holdings in the recent cases involving alleged lack of consent
may make the physician a frequent target for malpractice claims
whenever a bad result occurs. Since the gist of the action does not
involve negligent treatment but negligence in failing to explain the
hazards to the patient, the claim of alleged lack of informed consent
may become attractive to those attorneys who seek new "theories"
of liability against physicians .... The physician's best protection
is to inform the patient fully regarding any unusual risks that may
be involved and to insist upon a consent in writing in which the
patient acknowledges this explanation. 65
The intensity of feeling against informed consent cases was soon to
increase, as common law developments cut to the heart of the profes-
sion's self regulation.
C. Challenging the Professional Disclosure Standard (1972-
1975)
The courts have been accustomed to deferring to the standard of
practice established within the medical profession in malpractice cases. ,66
However, when the fact patterns brought before the court moved
beyond the complete failure to disclose in new and high risk proce-
163. In Salgo, 317 P.2d 170, the American College of Surgeons participated while in
Bang, 88 N.W.2d 186, it was the Minnesota State Medical Association, and in Natanson, 350
P.2d 1093, it was the Kansas Medical Society.
164. Bernard D. Hirsh, Informed Consent to Treatment - Medicologal Comment, 176
JAMA 436, 438 (1960).
165. Id. at 438.
166. The courts identified exceptions to the duty to disclose. An exception for emergency
situations is universally recognized. Medical professionals are not under a duty to discuss
commonly known risks even if the risk is not known to the individual. A therapeutic exception
is also allowed where the physician believes that broader disclosures carry significant risks to
the patient's well being. In the professional model it is assumed that the physician can withhold
information whenever she feels it is in the best interests of the patient to do so. See, e.g.,
Salgo, 317 P.2d 170.
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dures, there was some difficulty in finding a professional custom of
disclosure to the patient. 67 As the Canterbury court stated,
[T]he reality of any discernible custom reflecting a professional
consensus on communication of option and risk information to
patients is open to serious doubt. We sense the danger that what in
fact is no custom at all may be taken as an affirmative custom to
maintain silence, and that physician-witnesses to the so-called custom
may state merely their personal opinions as to what they or others
would do under given conditions. 68
Additionally, there was little professional writing on the topic.169 The
professional codes of ethics were silent as to any duty to disclose
risks or otherwise involve the patient in the decision-making process.
The paucity of guidance from the profession emboldened lower
courts in some jurisdictions to look outside the profession for a
standard.17 0 The 1972 decisions in Canterbury v. Spence,"' Cobbs v.
Grant,172 and Wilkinson v. Vesey173 marked a movement toward the
reasonable person disclosure standard.174 The most widely adopted
167. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
168. Id. at 783.
169. A review of medical literature found only nine U.S. medical journal articles address-
ing patient consent in the 27 years up to 1957. The pace picked up as authors had case decisions
to write about, with 12 articles found in the period of 1957 to 1959, and 50 for the 1960's.
The 1970's saw a veritable explosion of articles on the topic, in large part because of the change
in standards away from those set by professional practice. FADEN AND BEAUCHAMP, supra note
1, at 88, 95. Some part of the increase could be the result of the use of computerized data
bases for the search of the post-1970 literature.
. 170. See, e.g., Berkey v. Anderson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969); Cooper v. Roberts, 286
A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971); Hunter v. Brown, 484 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Wash. Ct. App.
1971), aff'd 502 P.2d 1194 (1972).
171. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
172. 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
173. 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972).
174. The courts in Canterbury and Cobbs modified the impact of their choice of a non-
professional disclosure standard by opting for a reasonable person causation standard. Canter-
bury, 464 F.2d at 791 (the prudent person in the patient's position); Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11-12
(citing Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791). The standard attempts to gauge the response of a
hypothetical "reasonable person" to the information on risks and alternatives that should have
been provided. The reliance on the objective reasonable person has been criticized as little more
efficacious than having a professional standard of disclosure. FADEN AND BEAUCHAMP, supra
note 1, at 32-33.
This model incorporates a significant degree of professional practice since the acceptable
response of the average person depends on the opinion of their treating physician. This is due,
in part, to the deference given medical professionals. In a trial setting, the "expert" opinion
can be additionally persuasive. Thus, the determination of what a reasonable person would do
can be very difficult to distinguish from a professional judgment as to what is proper treatment.
A subjective causation standard would have the case turn on whether that particular
individual would have consented if there had been the proper disclosure. Wilkinson, 295 A.2d
676, followed the lead of the early informed consent cases in adopting a subjective measure of
proximate cause; see also Di Filippo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333 (Del. 1961); Natanson, 350 P.2d
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nonprofessional model requires disclosure of information that would
be material to an "objective," but hypothetical, reasonable person.
This standard introduces the view of the nonprofessional community
as to what information should be made available to patients.' 75 That
the Canterbury court saw this as necessary to protect the rights of
the patient is illustrated in the following excerpt:
[T]o bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arrogate
the decision on revelation to the physician alone. Respect for the
patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy demands
a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians
may or may not impose upon themselves. 176
The adoption of a lay standard of disclosure may dispense with the
need for expert testimony on whether a material risk should have
been disclosed.' 77 This has significant implications for the cost of
litigation and the prospects of a plaintiff's recovery. Much of the
legal argumentation in informed consent cases is framed around the
issue of whether expert testimony is needed on the disclosure stan-
dard. 7 8
The challenge to its sense of professionalism was another reason
organized medicine became more vociferous in opposing the informed
consent doctrine with a lay standard for disclosure.7 9 All professions
attach importance to control of the "role definition vis-a-vis his
client."' 180 In few professions are the adult socialization processes and
continuing social and professional controls so pronounced as they are
in medicine. Through these processes, clinical practitioners internalize
the values that guide them in making medical decisions in a manner
acceptable to their fellow practitioners. In professional training, they
at 1106 (1961); Bang, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958); Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966).
Although most jurisdictions follow the objective test on causation, a number of the more recent
cases have adopted a subjective standard. See, e.g., McPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892, 896-
7 (N.C. 1982); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Arena v. Gingrich, 733 P.2d 75
(Or. Ct. App. 1987).
There have been some variations on these standards. The Alabama Supreme Court adopted
an "objective" test wherein causation was to be determined according to the response of a
reasonable person "with all the characteristics of the plaintiff, including his idiosyncracies and
religious beliefs." Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1155 (Ala. 1985). Massachusett's courts
limit recovery to cases where neither the plaintiff, nor a reasonable person, would have
proceeded. Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr, 439 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1982). See FADEN
& BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 30-35 for a discussion of the disclosure & causation standards.
175. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 32-33.
176. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784.
177. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note I, at 32.
178. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 103-04 (Ind. 1992).
179. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790.
180. See generally, William J. Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions,
22 Am. Soc. REV. 194 (1957).
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also develop role images of themselves and their patients, which serve
as the presumptive starting points for the physician-patient relation-
ships.
The threat of assessment of money damages for a failure to abide
by standards of conduct set outside the profession evoked a strong
negative response from physicians. In a 1976 article published in the
Journal of the American Medical Association, a surgeon reviewed the
new patient oriented disclosure standards and concluded,
Informed consent is a legalistic fiction that destroys good patient
care and paralyzes the conscientious physician .... The term has
no place in the lexicon of medicine. The integrity of the physician
continues to represent the most effective guarantee of the rights of
the patient and of the experimental subject.''
An editorial note at the end of that article stated that
The AMA has recognized the need for remedial legislation to correct
problems arising from the legal doctrine of "informed consent." A
model state law that has been distributed to all state medical asso-
ciations would specify what significant information about medical
risks must be given to a patient to assure valid consent to a medical
or surgical procedure. 82
The model law drafted by the Office of the General Counsel of the
AMA proposed a very restrictive formulation of informed consent. 3
It required disclosing "in general terms the nature and purpose of
the procedure" with a specifically limited list of risks.'8 4 A signed
consent form "shall be conclusively presumed to be valid and effective
.. . no evidence shall be admissible to impeach, modify or limit the
authorization for performance of the procedure" absent "clear proof"
that fraudulent misrepresentation of material facts induced the signing
of the form. 5 The AMA and its state and local affiliates next took
181. EUGENE G. LAFORET, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 JAMA 1579, 1584-85
(1976). One example the author provides of how the courts and some medical academicians
"twist the concept of informed consent to the point where, if it does not break, it at least
buckles unrecognizably," regards breast cancer. Id. at 1581. He strongly criticized the recom-
mendation that "every woman about to undergo surgery for breast cancer be told that the
superiority of the traditional radical mastectomy has not been proved and that there may be
suitable alternatives." Id.
182. Id. at 1585 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
183. See MODEL INFORMED CONSENT LAW, Section XXX, Consent to Treatment, reprinted
in Letter from S.E. Schonberg, Letters, 236 JAMA 1011, 1011 (1976).
184. Id. at 1011.
185. Id. The complete text of Section XXX provides for:
A consent in writing to any medical or surgical procedure or course of procedures
which (a) sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose of the procedure or
procedures, together with the known risks, if any, of death, brain damage, quadri-
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their proposals on limiting the informed consent doctrines to the state
capitols.
D. The Legislative Brake (1975-1977)
The values promoted by the informed consent ethic, promotion
of well-being and autonomy, are said to "transcend partisan ideologies
and the politics of the moment."'18 6 Whether that is true, history
shows that the same cannot be claimed of the legal doctrines of
informed consent. The most intense period of development, from
1972 to 1980, overlapped with a medical malpractice insurance crisis. 817
Insurance premiums for many specialties were raised precipitously,
and several carriers stopped writing policies, threatening the availa-
bility of malpractice insurance in some areas. 8 8 The politics of the
moment put the informed consent doctrines high enough on legislative
priority lists to prompt action in a political climate that was favorable
to physicians' interests. The medical profession had its concerns heard
in the legislative halls and chambers more clearly than in the court-
room. -
Before 1975, Georgia was the only state with legislation directly
affecting the legal doctrine. 89 In the three year span of 1975 through
1977, twenty-five state legislatures enacted statutes directly impacting
the informed consent doctrine. 9 In no instance was the statutory
plegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any organ or limb, or disfiguring
scars associated with such procedure or procedures, with the probability of each such
risk if reasonably determinable, (b) acknowledges that such disclosure of information
has been made and that all questions asked about the procedure or procedures have
been answered in a satisfactory manner, and (c) is signed by the patient for whom
the procedure is to be performed, or if the patient for any reason lacks legal capacity
to consent by a person who has legal authority to consent on behalf of such patient
in such circumstances, such consent shall be conclusively presumed to be valid and
effective, in the absence of clear proof that execution of the consent was induced by
fraudulent misrepresentation of material facts. Except as herein provided, no evidence
shall be admissible to impeach, modify or limit the authorization for performance of
the procedure or procedures set forth in such written consent.
Id.
186. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 17.
187. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 139.
188. Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's - a Retrospective,
49 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 7-9, n.23 (1986).
189. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 139.
190. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 139. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (1994);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-561.2, 563 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 766.103 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-1(2), 671-3 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39.4301,
.4304 - .4306 (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (West 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-
320 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40 (West Supp. 1994); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905 (West Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2816, 2820 (1988);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.110 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:2(II) (1983); N.Y.
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language designed to be more favorable to plaintiffs than the existing
common law standards. 91 Nineteen jurisdictions substantially defined
the cause of action. 92 In four jurisdictions, including New York State,
the legislatures chose to replace the patient oriented standards of the
case law with professional disclosure standards. 93 Nine more states
joined in adopting standards based on the customary practice of the
medical profession, the accepted standard of disclosure, or the practice
expected from a "reasonable and prudent" professional.' 94 Only two
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. 890-21.13 (1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26-40.1-02(5) and .05 (1977); OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (Anderson 1975); OR.
REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1993); 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1301.103; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-
32 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (1975); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 71 & 6.01-
.07 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909
(Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.050, 7.70.060 (West 1992).
At the time enacted, the Rhode Island law merely provided a merit screening role for the
courts in informed consent cases. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-32. The Iowa, Ohio and Nevada
laws listed the contents of signed consent forms that established a presumption of informed
consent without further defining the informed consent cause of action. See IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 147.137; Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54; NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A-110,-120. The Hawaii
and Texas laws created panels to promulgate disclosure standards for specific medical treatments.
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-1(2),-3; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 71 § 6.01-.07. The Texas
law was unclear as to the standard to be applied in other cases, and the Hawaii statute was
silent.
Alabama's general malpractice statute, passed during this period, has been held to apply
to informed consent cases even though that term is not in the law. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-484
(1975) and Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Ala. 1985).
191. See Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, supra note 94, at
563. These commentators read the unclear Texas statute as maintaining the professional disclo-
sure standard set by Wilson v. Scott. 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967). The Texas Supreme Court
later held that the proper standard for cases not covered by the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel
lists was the objective lay standard. See Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1983).
192. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 2905 (West Supp. 1977).
193. See Meisel & Kabnick, supra note 94, at 562 (identifying Maine, Nebraska, New
York and Vermont). See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 44-2816 (1988); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1909(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
The Nebraska Supreme Court has clearly reiterated its preference for the common law
standard:
The material risk theory protects a patient's "right of physical self-determination
[because it] mandates that the scope of a physician's duty to disclose therapeutic
risks and alternatives be governed by the patient's informational needs." (citation
omitted). Also, the professional theory "paternalistically leaves the right of choice to
the medical community, in derogation of the patient's right of self- determination."
(citation omitted). [N]otwithstanding voluminous criticism of the professional theory
of informed consent, this court is bound by § 44-2816 as a statutory standard and
prescription for an informed consent.
Eccleston v. Chait, 492 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Neb. 1992).
194. Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-563 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (1989);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103(3)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994) (originally codified at § 768.132); IDAHO
CODE §§ 39-4304 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-320(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:2(II)(a) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a) (1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-02(5) and -05 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (1980).
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jurisdictions clearly opted for the patient oriented material risk stan-
dard and these states codified their preexisting common law stan-
dards. 95
The enactments introduced more variety into both the substance
and procedure of disclosure. As examples, the Oregon and Louisiana
statutes incorporated two disclosure standards, depending on whether
the patient asks for more information after an explanation in general
terms. .96 Other states created standards without reference to either
professional standards or the reasonable patient. 97 The State of Ha-
waii has empowered an administrative board to set statewide standards
for providing informed consent. 98 Texas has likewise done so through
195. Compare 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1301.103 (1975); and Cooper v. Roberts, 286
A.2d 647 (1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.70.050(1)(c) (West 1992) and Miller v. Kennedy,
522 P.2d 852 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), aff'd 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
The Pennsylvania statute utilizes the material risk/reasonable patient disclosure standard,
but has no causation requirement. This maintains the essence of the battery cause of action,
wherein the affront of not obtaining informed consent establishes liability, whether or not this
patient, or a reasonable patient, would have proceeded even if properly informed. 40 PA.
CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1301.103.
196. The Oregon statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097, provides for a three step process.
The medical provider must explain the procedure in general terms, informing the patient that
there are risks and may be alternatives. Id. at § 677.097(l)(a). Then the provider must ask the
patient if he/she desires further explanations. Id. at § 677.097(2). If so, the provider must
disclose "in substantial detail" more about the procedure, its risks and its alternatives. Id. The
case law applied the material risk standard to the detailed explanation, along with a subjective
patient standard of causation. Zacher v. Petty, 826 P.2d 619 (Or. 1992); Arena v. Gingrich,
733 P.2d 75 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
Louisiana likewise has maintained a material risk standard for cases outside the statute.
Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40 (West 1975) and Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553
So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
197. Utah's statute requires the disclosure of the substantial and significant risks of
causing the patient serious harm. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5.1(d), (e) (1989). Hawaii's law,
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 671-3, empowers the Board of Medical Examiners to develop lists similar
to those in the Texas law, but also to develop the substance of the disclosure. The standard
would be admissible in a law suit on informed consent. For unlisted procedures, the courts
were left without statutory guidance. The case law has not filled in this gap. See Mroczkowski
v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 732 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (Haw. Ct. App. 1987); Leyson v.
Steuermann, 705 P.2d 37, 47 n.10 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985). A.AsKA STAT. § 09-55-556(a) (1994),
requires the disclosure of "common risks and reasonable alternatives." Id. Recent caselaw has
chosen the material risk/reasonable patient perspective for measuring the adequacy of disclosure.
Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d. 1145, 1149 (Alaska 1993).
198. See HAWAI REV. STAT. ANN. § 671-3 which directs the Board of Medical Examiners
to establish standards for health care providers to follow in giving information to a patient to
insure that the patient's consent to treatment is an informed consent. Id. at § 671-3(a). The
established standards "may include the substantive content of the information to be given, the
manner in which the information is to be given by the health care provider and the manner in
which consent is to be given by the patient or the patient's guardian." Id. at § 671-3(a).
The statute also defines the content of standards that can be used in litigation:
If the standards established by the board of medical examiners include provisions
which are designed to reasonably inform a patient, or a patient's guardian, of: (1)
The condition being treated; (2) The nature and character of the proposed treatment
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its Texas Medical Disclosure Panel which has created lists of proce-
dures requiring disclosure and non-disclosure of risks. 199
Legislation that codified the states' common law reliance on a
professional standard held back movement toward a more patient-
oriented common law. 200 In several states, the common law had not
directly addressed the issue. 20 1 Informed consent statutes stifled the
debate over the appropriate standard. 2 2 Some-acts followed the AMA
or surgical procedure; (3) The anticipated results; (4) The recognized possible alter-
native forms of treatment; and (5) The recognized serious possible risks, complica-
tions, and anticipated benefits involved in the treatment or surgical procedure, and
in the recognized possible alternative forms of treatment, including nontreatment,
then the standards shall be admissible as evidence of the standard of care required
of the health care providers.
Id. at § 671-3(b).
This mandate proved to be overwhelming. As of 1983, no standards had been developed.
See STAND. CoMm. REP. 823, on S.B. 236 of the HEALTH & JUDICIARY COMMITTEES 1983 HOUSE
JOURNAL at 1219-20; reprinted in Steuerman, 705 P.2d at 45.
199. TEXAS REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.03(a) (West Supp. 1994) created the
Texas Medical Disclosure Panel charged with developing a list of procedures requiring disclosure
(List A) and a list of procedures that do not require risk disclosure (List B). Id. at § 6.04(a).
A failure to disclose List A risks when required creates the presumption of a lack of informed
consent. Id. at § 6.07(a)(2). For procedures not in the list, the physician is "under the duty
otherwise imposed by law." Id. at § 6.07(b). Case law has held that this duty is not the pre-
existing professional practice standard of Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967), but the
reasonable patient/material risk standard. See Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1983).
The Texas Administrative Code incorporates, by reference, List A (required disclosure), List B
(no disclosure), and a standard disclosure and consent form. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 25, §
601.1-.3.
200. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 139-40.
201. The case law in Arkansas prior to its 1979 enactment on informed consent consisted
of only one federal court decision. See Pegram v. Sisco, 406 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Ark. 1976),
aff'd without opinion, 547 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1976). The federal district court looked to the
ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Ch. 14 (1974) in the absence of case law on the issue.
The parties tried the case with the issue being compliance with "standard medical practice"
in the community or similar communities. Pegram, 406 F. Supp. at 778. The court found that
the physician had violated that standard in failing to inform the patient of risks, but also
stated, "A patient must be reasonably informed of all material elements of the procedure and
all material risks which may affect his decision to undergo the treatment." Id. at 779. The next
informed consent case, Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88 (1980), concerned treatment provided
in 1976. The case reached the Arkansas Supreme Court after passage of the informed consent
statute. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 2 (effective Apr. 12, 1979) codified at § 16-114-206. The statute
"persuaded" the court to adopt the professional standard of disclosure. Fuller, 597 S.W.2d at
90.
202. The courts offset some of the favorable treatment accorded the medical profession
in the legislatures. Several reform efforts were found to be unconstitutional while restrictions
on the common law cause of action were read narrowly, or in some instances, ignored. The
North Dakota State Supreme Court declared the entire North Dakota Medical Malpractice Act
unconstitutional and specifically mentioned the legislative restriction on the informed consent
cause of action in Arneson v. Olson. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-
40.1-05 (repealed 1983). In Parikh v. Cunningham, the court stated that a "conclusive pre-
sumption" of informed consent from a signed form would be unconstitutional. 493 So.2d 999,
1001 (Fla. 1986) The statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103, was amended before the case was finally
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Model Code203 to provide that signed consent orders are presumptive
evidence of a valid consent, although the content requirements var-
ied. 201 In 1979, Arkansas passed its informed consent statute. 205 The
intense period of legislative activity on the topic was over. Apart from
the unique case of Georgia, no state legislature has since enacted
legislation defining or amending the informed consent doctrine.2 06
E. Legislating Informed Consent Without the Cause of
Action
Limited legislative action on the informed consent cause of action
has taken place since 1977, although several states have been active
in defining administratively enforced informed consent. 3" These state
laws replace the lay and professional disclosure standards with a
specified minimum level of disclosure. 2 8 Conveying this information
is a necessary element of professional conduct with respect to the
particular services or service providers. Commonly, the statutes pro-
vide for monitoring of the requirement by the state board or agency
overseeing the profession and disclaim any expansion of legal liabil-
decided. 1985 Fla. Laws 1985 ch. 175, § 21 (substituting a rebuttable presumption).
Several statutes used professional disclosure standards in defining a written consent that
presumptively establishes valid informed consent. Courts rejected the use of the professional
standard when no signed consent was obtained. Compare IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (West
1989) with Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 408 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987) (objective
patient standard) and Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (Anderson 1991) with Nickell v.
Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1985) (objective patient standard).
The Texas Supreme Court has been criticized for applying a lay standard to informed
consent cases that are not covered by the listings of the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel. See
the discussion of Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d 929 (1983) in D. Michael Wallach & Steven
J. Berry, Informed Consent in Texas: A Proposal for Reasonableness and Predictability, 18
ST. MARY'S L.J. 835, 860-62 (1987). The statute is not clearly written, but the prior common
law standard was a professional practice standard and several commentators read the law as
maintaining that standard. See Meisel and Krabnick, supra note 95, at 537.
LePelley v. Grefenson, 614 P.2d 962 (Idaho 1980) and Rook v. Trout, 747 P.2d 61 (Idaho
1987) read a patient oriented standard of disclosure into Idaho Code § 39.4304. IDAHO CODE
§ 39.4304 (Michie 1993). The statute set the required disclosure as that which "would ordinarily
be made and given under the same or similar circumstances, by a like physician . . . of good
standing practicing in the same community." Id. The holdings were overruled in Sherwood v.
Carter, 805 P.2d 452, 460, 462 (1991).
203. See Consent to Treatment, Section XXX, AMA MODEL INFORMED CONSENT LAW,
reprinted in 236 JAMA at 1011.
204. See, e.g. IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1.
205. AiK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206 (Michie 1987).
206. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (1988).
207. See, e.g., N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2404 (McKinney 1993). Section 2404(1) deals
with the physician's duty to inform the patient about alternative treatments for breast cancer.
Id. See also Section 2496 which establishes the disclosure requirements regarding a hysterectomy.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2496.
208. See N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW §§ 2404 & 2496.
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ity.2°9 The monitoring agency may be responsible for producing the
materials that are to be provided to patients. 10
Two common instances of this mandated disclosure concern med-
ical services used exclusively by women: abortion and treatment for
breast cancer. The statutes commonly require that practitioners pro-
vide women considering an abortion or being treated for breast cancer
with a uniform, written summary of the risks and alternatives. 2t' In
both cases the information is provided to discourage the use of a
service, i.e., abortion or mastectomy. This is typically the motive with
other service specific enactments as well.21 2
The provider specific laws are concerned with non-traditional
medicine such as hospice and midwifery213 or the use of specific
procedures by professionals who do not have a M.D. or D.O., such
as surgery by podiatrists or dentists.2 1 4 The recent repeal of a number
209. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2404(4) & 2499.
210. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2497.
211. Regarding abortion, see West's FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4) (West 1993); IDAHO
CODE § 18-609(2), (3)(ii) (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.726(2)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599
(West Supp. 1994); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112 § 12S (Law. Co-op. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
188.039 (Vernon Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-327.326(8)(a), (c) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.1-02; 13 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 3205 & 3208; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4010
(1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 23-4.7-3 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5 (Supp. 1994).
Regarding breast cancer treatments, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1704.5 (West Supp.
1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 458.324 (West Supp. 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-3(c) (1985);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.935 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §
2905-A; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.17013, 17513 (West 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-
22.2 (West 1991); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2404 (McKinney 1993); 35 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.
§ 5641 (1993).
212. A sampling of state laws shows specific legislation concerning informed consent to
the following services: chelation therapy, see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401 (Supp.
1993); provision of laetrile, see e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285.1 (West 1992); breast
implant, see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.740 (Michie 1991); artificial insemination, see,
e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1; hysterectomy, see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 1690 & 1691 (West 1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2495 (McKinney 1993); electro-shock
treatments, see, e.g., P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 4020; sterilization, see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2974 (Michie 1991).
213. For legislation specifically addressed to hospice see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.608
(West Supp. 1994) (repealed 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 60, 8; Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-85-15
(repealed 1983); 63 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-860.4 (West Supp. 1995). For laws concerning
birth centers or midwifery see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.31 (birth centers) (repealed 1994);
Td. at § 467.015 (midwifery) (repealed 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135G.8 (West 1989) (birth
centers). Other targets are naturopathy, see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1501 (Supp.
1993); homeopathy, see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630A.370 (Michie 1992); cardiac
catheterization laboratories, see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 444.4 & .8 (West Supp.
1994) (repealed 1994); and acupuncturists, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331 (West Supp.
1994) (repealed); and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:2C-1 (West 1991).
214. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-854.01 (Supp. 1993) (podiatrists performing surgery);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1682(e) (West 1990) (dentists using conscious sedation or general
anesthesia must obtain written informed consent).
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of the provider specific laws can be read as an acceptance of non-
traditional medical practice.
F. Counting the Jurisdictions
The last holdout against the informed consent cause of action
ended when the Georgia Legislature enacted its informed consent law,
effective January 1, 1989.215 Besides Georgia, the few jurisdictions
that emerged from the 1970's without a defined informed consent
cause of action soon recognized the claim in their common law.21 6
The standards chosen by the legislatures and those developed through
the common law have proven to be durable. None of the legislative
choices as to the perspective for determining the adequacy of disclo-
sure have been amended. 2 7 The courts have overturned three common
law standards since 1980.218 This quietude allows an opportunity to
assess the outcome to date of the court and legislative battles over
the informed consent doctrines.
A head count of the jurisdictions shows there is no majority
position. Twenty-five jurisdictions have accepted professionally ori-
ented standards of disclosure 21 9 while twenty-two states use the pa-
215. 1988 GA. LAWS 1443 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9.6.1).
216. See, e.g., Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1983); Hook v.
Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690 (S.C. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 320 S.E.2d 35 (S.C. 1984); Cross
v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982).
217. However, there have been several changes of note. North Dakota repealed its statute
and Florida amended its statute in response to constitutional challenges. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 26-40.1-05, repealed by ch. 82, 1983 N.D. LAWS § 154. Arneson v. Olson declared the entire
North Dakota Medical Malpractice Act unconstitutional, 270 N.W.2d 125, 138 (N.D. 1978).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103 changed the written consent presumption from conclusive to
rebuttable. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103, amended by 1985 FLA. LAWS ch. 85-175, § 21 (1985).
In Parikh v. Cunningham, the Florida Supreme Court stated that a conclusive presumption
established by the statute would be unconstitutional. 493 So. 2d 999, 1001 (1986). Several other
states have made statutory adjustments. See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-4(b) & (c) as amended by
1987 IND. ACTS 207, § 1) (defining the evidentiary weight of a signed consent form) (Burns
1993) (repealed); 1981 Wis. LAWS ch. 375, § 2 (codified as Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.30) (supple-
menting the common law lay disclosure standard with disclosure of alternatives) (West 1988);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40(E)(3)(a) (amended by 1990 LAW. ACTS 1093, § 1) (creating
a Medical Disclosure Panel to develop disclosure standards); and HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-3
(amended by 1983 HAW. SEss. LAWS 223, § 1) (slightly altering the charge to the promulgator
of disclosure standards).
218. See Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988) overruling the professional
perspective adopted in Kaplan v. Haines, 241 A.2d 235 (1968); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602
N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1992) overruling a line of lower court cases by adopting a professional standard
(with direct reference to the AMA ethic on patient involvement); Sherwood v. Carter, 805 P.2d
452 (Idaho 1991) overruling the lay standard read into the Idaho informed consent statute by
Rook v. Trout, 747 P.2d 61 (1987).
219. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
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tient's material risk perspective. 20 Four jurisdictions have not defined
the causes of action without using either the patient or physician
perspectives. 22' Fourteen of the sixteen states that have made a leg-
islative choice on disclosure use professionally oriented standards. 22
Twenty jurisdictions with no statutorily defined cause of action have
adopted a patient oriented standard; however, only eleven such com-
mon law states have adopted a professional standard.223 As a supple-
ment to their informed consent doctrines, three states have empowered
220. Alaska, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
221. They are: Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6(d) and § 31-9-6.1; Hawaii, see
HAW. REv. STAT. § 671-3; North Dakota, see, e.g., Wasem v. Laskowski, 274 N.W.2d 219
(N.D. 1979); Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5.
222. The statutes with professionally oriented disclosure standards are ALA. CODE § 6-5-
484 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-561(2) & 563 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206
(Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852(a)(2) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103 (West
Supp. 1994); IDAH-O CODE §§ 39.4304 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-320 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1988); Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905(l)(A); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2816,
2820 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:2(II) (1983); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d
(McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (1980);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909 (Supp. 1994). The statutes with a material information (i.e.,
reasonable person) standard are 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1301.103 (1992); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 7.70.050 (West 1992).
223. The states with a lay common law disclosure standard are: Alaska, see Korman v.
Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1993 WL 333558 (Alaska Sept. 3, 1993); California, see Cobbs v. Grant,
502 P.2d 1 (1972); Connecticut, see Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n., 465 A.2d 294 (1983);
District of Columbia, see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, (D.C. Cir. 1972); cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064, (1972); Iowa, see Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Cntr., 408 N.W.2d 355,
(1987); Louisiana, see Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398 (1988); see also LA. REV.
STAT. 40:1299.40(E)(2)(a); Maryland, see Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Massachusetts,
see Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Cntr., 439 N.E.2d 240 (1982); Minnesota, see Cornfeldt
v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684 (1977), modified on appeal after remand, 295 N.W.2d 638 (1980);
Mississippi, see Hudson v. Parvin, 582 So. 2d 403 (1991); New Jersey, see Largey v. Rothman,
540 A.2d 504 (1988); New Mexico, see Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180 (1978); Ohio, see
Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (1985); Oklahoma, see Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554
(1980); Oregon, see Zacher v. Petty, 826 P.2d 619 (1992); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097
(1993); Rhode Island, see Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); South Dakota, see Wheeldon
v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367 (1985); Texas, see Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d 929 (1983)
(construing TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 6.07(b); West Virginia, see Cross v.
Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (1982); and Wisconsin, see Scaria v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.,
Co., 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975).
States with a professional common law standard of disclosure are Colorado, see Bloskas
v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907 (1982); Illinois, see Guebard v. Jabaay, 452 N.E.2d 751 (Il1. Ct. App.
1983); Indiana, see Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98 (1992); Kansas, see Funke v. Fieldman,
512 P.2d 539 (1973); Michigan, see Roberts v. Young, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Missouri, see
Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Montana, see Negaard v. Feda's Estate, 446 P.2d
436 (1968); Nevada, see Smith v. Cotter, 810 P.2d 1204 (1991); South Carolina, see Hook v.
Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 320 S.E.2d 35 (1985); Virginia,
see Bly v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976); and Wyoming, see Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108
(1989).
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boards to develop risk-oriented disclosure lists without specifying the
perspective of disclosure for those lists.224
The doctrine is most personalized where it has been recently
developed in the case law without legislative restrictions. Until 1979,
all the patient-oriented standards incorporated the material risk, rea-
sonable person language of Canterbury v. Spence.225 Two jurisdictions
that joined the debate late extended the doctrine by setting "patient
perspective" disclosure standards. 226 The courts in Oklahoma and
West Virginia dropped the requirement of a "reasonable person"
screen to determine materiality. 227 Under their subjective standard,
the provider must satisfy the particular patient's needs to know enough
to make an intelligent choice based on the patient's own set of values.
This standard recognizes the idiosyncratic interests and values that
individuals might have. 221
The obligation placed on the professional is to ascertain a sig-
nificant amount of information about the person, besides the infor-
mation usually collected to form a diagnosis. The judicial evolution
of the doctrine away from professional standards might have carried
over into more states had their legislatures not stopped the debate in
the mid-1970's. 229
224. The Louisiana Medical Disclosure Panel was created by 1990 LA. ACTS 1093, § I.
The panel is charged with:
... prepar[ing] separate lists of those medical treatrments and surgical procedures
that do and do not require disclosure and for those treatments and procedures that
do require disclosure [the panel] shall establish the degree of disclosure required and
the form in which the disclosure will be made.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40(E)(4)(b). See also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 671-3; TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 4590i, § 6.03(a).
225. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
226. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W.
Va. 1982).
227. Scott, 606 P.2d at 559; Cross, 294 S.E.2d at 452 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d at 786 & 787).
228. This choice is clearly related to the concerns of autonomy:
The very foundation of the doctrine [of informed consent] is every man's right to
forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for him are intolerable consequences
or risks, however warped or perverted his sense of values may be in the eyes of the
medical profession, or even of the community, so long as any distortion falls short
of what the law regards as incompetency. Individual freedom here is guaranteed only
if people are given the right to make choices which would generally be regarded as
foolish ones.
2 FOWLER HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 61 (Supp. 1968).
229. Compare ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2905(l)(A) with Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d
82 (1974); and NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2816 with Ecceleston v. Chait, 492 N.W.2d 860 (1992)
and N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d with Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 344 N.Y.S.2d 552
(N.Y.A.D. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(a)(l) with Small v. Gifford Mem. Hosp., 349
A.2d 703 (1975). See also Rook v. Trout, 747 P.2d 61 (Idaho 1987) and LePelley v. Grefenson,
614 P.2d 962 (Idaho 1980) establishing a material risk/reasonable person standard for cases
1994l
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There are notable limitations on a jurisdictional head count. The
standards became more complicated with the diversification of dis-
closure procedures by the state legislatures. As an example, the com-
mon law standard of disclosure in Louisiana has been, and remains,
strongly supportive of the patient's perspective. 2 0 However, the Louis-
iana statute provides a presumption of effectiveness for a written
consent form that discloses "in general terms" the risks "of death,
brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function
of any organ or limb, or disfiguring scars" and which states the
provider has satisfactorily answered all questions. 23' Only evidence of
misrepresentation can be introduced to modify or limit that authori-
zation. 2 2 Where oral consent is used, the statutory list of risks must
be presented and "an opportunity shall be afforded for asking ques-
tions ...which shall be answered in a satisfactory manner. '233
The statute provides a third approach to disclosure: "[Als an
alternative, a physician or other health care provider may choose to
avail himself of the lists established by the Louisiana Medical Disclo-
sure Panel pursuant to the provisions of this Subsection as another
method by which to evidence a patient's consent to medical treat-
ment. ' ' 234 The Panel's mandate is to "prepare separate lists of those
medical treatments and surgical procedures that do and do not require
disclosure" and to establish the degree and form of disclosure for the
treatments and procedures that require disclosure. 235 The lists can be
introduced at trial to evidjence compliance or noncompliance with the
requirements of disclosure. 236 For the medical professional to have
the benefit of the statutory risks, they must also disclose alternatives,
additional risks specific to a patient, and provide an opportunity for
arising prior to the effective date of IDAHO CODE § 39.4301, .4304-.4306. Rook retained that
standard for post-statutory cases until it was overruled by Sherwood v. Carter, 805 P.2d 452,
462 (1991). A Delaware intermediate appellate court has held that Delaware's common law
standard is that of the reasonable patient. Molnar v. Rafetto, (Del. Super. 1990), interlocutory
review denied, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990). The decision was not controlled by the professional
standards in the Delaware statute because it involved a dentist, and dentistry was not included
in the definitions of the informed consent statute. Id.
230. See Percle v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d. 1289, (La. Ct. App.
1977), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1218 (1977); see also Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d
398 (La. 1988).
231. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40(A)(a) & (b) (West 1992).
232. Id. at § 40:1299.40(A)(c).
233. Id. at § 40:1299.40(C).
234. Id. at § 40:1299.40(E)(2)(b). The Louisiana lists are developed by an eleven member
panel consisting of six licensed physicians, four lawyers, and one dentist. Id. at §40:1299.40(E)(3)(a).
Three of the attorneys are chosen from a list submitted by the Louisiana Trial Lawyers
Association and one is chosen from a list submitted by the Louisiana Defense Counsel Asso-
ciation. Id.
235. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40(E)(4)(b).
236. Id. at § 40:1299.40(E)(4)(c).
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any questions.2 7 As a final twist on the possibilities, the Louisiana
Supreme Court relied on a state constitutional privacy right to limit
the therapeutic exception to the doctrine of informed consent. 218 Other
states present similarly difficult problems of categorization. 23 9
Another problem with jurisdiction counting is that it can distort
the human impact of the rules. With respect to informed consent, the
237. Id. § 40:1299.40(E)(7)(c).
238. Hondroulis v. Schumacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 415 (La. 1988).
239. The Texas Medical Disclosure Panel is made up of six physicians and three lawyers.
TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. art. 4590i, § 6.03(C) (Supp. 1994). It has a charge identical to the
Louisiana panel as to what the lists should contain. Id. at § 6.04(b). The Texas statute, however,
does not include the added disclosure elements on alternatives, individualized risks and patient
questions. The Texas Medical Disclosure Panel has promulgated List A, procedures that require
disclosure, with the risks or hazards to be revealed, and List B procedures that require no
disclosure. The Panel has also developed a standard consent form that satisfies the disclosure
requirements and incorporates by reference the lists promulgated under TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
art. 4590i, § 6.04(b). See TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 25, §§ 601.01-.4. The statute provides that
for procedures not listed, the provider "is under the duty otherwise imposed by law." TEx.
REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4590i, § 6.07(b). The Texas Supreme Court has held that language to
mean the material risk/reasonable person standard. Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d 929, 931
(1983).
Hawaii also provides authority for developing a risk list that satisfies disclosure requirements
for included procedures. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 671-3 (1985). The Hawaii standards, if they
include provisions designed to "reasonably inform a patient" of the "recognized possible
alternative[s]" and "recognized serious possible risks, complications, and anticipated benefits"
are "admissible as evidence of the [required] standard of [disclosure]." Id. at § 671.3(b).
However, neither the statute nor the case law makes clear the standard for unlisted procedures
or treatments.
Georgia's new informed consent statute is more restrictive than a customary professional
practice standard. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(a) (1991). Only patients who undergo surgery
with general, spinal or major regional anesthesia; or amniocentesis; or have an intravenous or
intraductal injection of a contrast material as part of a diagnostic procedure are entitled to
disclosure. Id. at § 31-9-6.1(a) (1991). This roster of patients needs to be told "in general
terms" of only the material risks of the procedure found on the statutory list. Id. Any patient
or procedure outside the coverage of the new statute has no informed consent cause of action.
See Young v. Yarn, 222 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
Oregon's statute creates a two step process. See OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1993). The
first step is for the physician to explain "in general terms" the procedure or treatment, and
whether there are risks and/or alternatives. Id. at § 677.097(1)(a). The physician then must ask
if the patient wants a more detailed explanation. Id. at 677.097(2). A positive response then
requires disclosures, "in substantial detail" of the three topics. Id. Failure to ask leaves the
disclosure to be measured against the common law backdrop of the material risk disclosure
standard. This process reflects a compromise between the legislative goals of the Oregon Trial
Lawyers and the Oregon Medical Society. See Zacher v. Petty, 982 P.2d 619 (Or. 1992).
The informed consent statute in Utah provides that the "substantial and significant risks"
of medical care need to be disclosed but neither the text nor the case law provide an answer
to the question of whether this is measured from the patient's perspective or that of the
profession. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(1) (1992).
In North Dakota, the Medical Malpractice Act with its professionally oriented disclosure
standard was held unconstitutional by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Arneson v. Olson,
270 N.W.2d 125 (1978). Subsequently, the act was repealed. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-05
(repealed 1983). The case law has not addressed the specific issue of which disclosure perspective
controls.
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states with the most protective professional standards are mainly states
with large rural areas and a relatively low physician to population
ratio. 240 Fifty-three percent of the nation's physicians serving fifty-
one percent of the population are in jurisdictions with non-profes-
sional disclosure standards.2 41
While all jurisdictions have an informed consent doctrine in place,
their direct impact on clinical medicine is limited. The origins in
litigation, and the narrow focus on spectacularly bad results of in-
vasive procedures, restrict the doctrines. Litigation provides a general
deterrent to substandard consent practices through the threat of dam-
ages for egregious violations. However, the small number of cases
brought on this theory, and the arbitrary process of identifying vic-
tims, restricts the monitoring role of litigation. The selection process
of malpractice cases for litigation overlooks most cases that merit
damages and proceeds with many that lack merit.2 42
Prosecution of informed consent cases is difficult because the
critical evidence includes the oral representations made by the medical
professional and, often, a written general consent. Compounding the
proof problems, the lack of informed consent is actionable only when
it causes a bad outcome leaving the patient with a significant disa-
bility. 243 This, in turn, limits the medical procedures or interventions
that are subject to possible informed consent lawsuits. 2" Some in-
formed consent statutes explicitly restrict their application to invasive
procedures .245
240. As discussed infra, there is a range of professional standards recognized in malpractice
cases. The customary or ordinary practice is a narrowly defined locality and was adopted to
protect rural practitioners from being held to an unobtainable standard.
241. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, T. 173, at 119 (1993) (based on
U.S. Bureau of Census estimates as of July 1, 1989).
242. PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND
PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, THE REPORT OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY
TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK 6 (1990).
243. As a consequence of the way that lawyers conduct their business, there is an informal
but real dollar threshold used to screen out cases with "small" damages potential. The amount
varies between jurisdictions, but the most commonly cited figure for recent years has been
$50,000.
A state medical board can investigate and impose sanctions for ethical or practice violations
even in the absence of specific damages being suffered by patients. The number of disciplinary
proceedings that are undertaken in any state might suggest that this distinction is primarily
theoretical. Similarly, institutional quality assurance and risk management committees monitor
performance to varying degrees, even without specific complaints being filed.
244. There have been a few cases that have gone beyond invasive procedures. See, e.g.,
Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88 (Ark. 1980) (drug prescription); Keel v. St. Elizabeth Med.
Ctr., 842 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1992) (CT Scan); Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980)
(failure to inform patient of risk of not having a pap smear).
245. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(2)(b) (McKinney 1993).
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The informed consent cases focus on one segment of medical
care services, surgery. In this and other areas of medicine, the pre-
senting of alternative approaches to a medical problem can be a more
far-reaching requirement than is risk-disclosure. It fosters more in-
teraction between patient and provider and requires more input and
understanding from the patients. Some state doctrines have focused
exclusively on risk disclosure and ignored the disclosure of alterna-
tives.24
IV. NEARING THE END OF THE ERA OF INFORMED CONSENT
Medical practitioners had to face a hard truth during the Era of
Informed Consent. Even with the favorable legislative treatment given
the medical profession in informed consent laws, lawyers, judges,
legislators, and academics were now defining acceptable medical con-
duct. As summarized by David Rothman,
[O]utsiders now framed the normative principles that were to guide
the doctor-patient relationship. The critical pronouncements no longer
originated in medical texts but in judicial decisions, bioethical trea-
tises, and legislative resolutions. Outsiders, not doctors, defined the
moral codes that were to guide physician behavior.2 47
Starting in 1980, the AMA and other national medical societies
reacted by addressing the patient relationship in their ethical codes.
To regain control over a critical element of professionalism, they
aligned their interests with the patient's right of self-decision. Organ-
ized medicine's redefinition of the standard of interaction with patients
is consistent with its later participation in developing practice guide-
lines and a national fee schedule for physicians.4 These steps can be
seen as efforts to retain professional control over medical decision-
making. As one health law scholar has said of the AMA's cooperation
on practice guidelines,
246. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b) (Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6852(b)(3) (1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 39.4301-.4306 (1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §507-C:2(II)(b) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a)(2) (1993).
247. DAVID J. ROTHmAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND
BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 4 (1991).
248. The AMA cooperated in the Harvard study that developed the relative values used
in the Resource-Based-Relative-Value-System (RBRVS). The RBRVS was developed as a method
to deal with payments to physicians for services under Medicare's Part B. See David Blumenthal
& Arnold M. Epstein, Physician-Payment Reform-Unfinished Business, 326 NEW ENG, J.
MED. 1330 (1992).
The AMA has developed criteria and procedures to assist researchers and medical specialty
groups with developing practice parameters. See Edward Hirshfeld, Medically Unnecessary
Denials: Where the Standards Come From and How Physicians Can Participate, 262 JAMA
3187, 3193-94 (1989) (Hirshfeld is Associate General Counsel of the AMA).
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Indeed, physicians appear to hope that by voluntarily supplying
better professional standards, they will be able to prevent this col-
lapse of their preferred paradigm of medical care, under which they
are held accountable only under norms and standards that they
themselves develop. 249
It is reasonable for those in organized medicine to hope their
codes will shape the law. The courts are willing to defer to professional
medical standards, where they exist. Reported court decisions fre-
quently have cited the AMA Code and, occasionally, other codes as
well. 210 The codes have been relied upon in defining such legal issues
as physician-patient confidentiality 25' and the propriety of discontin-
uing medical treatment. 152 Now that the profession has acknowledged
the importance of informed consent, the courts will likely resume the
role they performed after the era of consent ended - serving as one
mode of enforcing a standard of care developed within the profes-
sion. 253
As the Era of Informed Consent nears an end, there is consensus
at the policy level that the medical decision making process must
include the patient as an informed participant. However, there is
considerable uncertainty over the appropriate allocation of responsi-
bility and power between the medical provider and the patient. Various
models have been proposed, but none have reached the level of a
normative standard.254 Different views of the attributes of the sick
role lead commentators to opposite results. Defenders of paternalism
have emerged as have proponents of increased patient involvement.255
249. Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician
Liability, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLS. 87, 90 (1991).
250. A Westlaw search conducted on September 20, 1993, in the "Allstates" database
produced a citation list of 100 cases for the search query - "American Medical Association"
or AMA /s principles or ethics.
251. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 551 P.2d 334, (Cal. 1976); Perreira
v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989); Crist v. Moffatt, 389 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. 1990); Pearce v.
Ollie, 826 P.2d 888 (Idaho 1992); Brandt v. Medical Defense Assoc., 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.
1993). But see Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d at 114 (Okla. 1988) (ethical standards are
"aspirational" and not enforceable).
252. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Il1. 1989); Guardianship of
Doe, 584 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992); Cruzan by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.
1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990); Matter of Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); Couture v. Couture, 549 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1989).
253. See Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1992).
254. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-
Patient Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221 (1992). The authors offer the following models: pater-
nalistic, informative, interpretive, and deliberative (and perhaps a fifth, the instrumental model).
Id. at 2221-22.
255. See, e.g., Thomas P. Duffy, Agamemnon's Fate and the Medical Profession, 9 W.
NEw ENG. L. REv. 21 (1987). "Paternalism exists in medicine, not as some evil perpetrated by
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A. The New Professional Ethics - Redefining Quality of Care
In the decade of the 1980's, the patient-physician relationship
was prominently inserted into medical ethical codes. Organized med-
icine now explicitly recognizes the patient's right to be informed and
to control the choices on care. 256 Written ethics reject paternalism as
the basis for the patient-physician relationship. These codes articulate
the indigenous medical tradition of truth-telling and consent-seeking
suggested by Martin Pernick. 217
The AMA's Code of Ethics has evolved into three integrated
components: the Principles of Medical Ethics, the Current Opinions
of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, and the Reports of
the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs.28 Each part of the Code
serves a different purpose. The Principles have been pared down to
seven sentences broadly defining the parameters of ethical conduct
for physicians. They were revised in 1980 to "seek a proper and
reasonable balance between professional standards and contemporary
legal standards in our changing society. ' 259 To the extent that they
are relevant here, the new Principles state that
I. A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical
service with compassion and respect for human dignity.
II. A physician shall deal honestly with patients ...
III. A physician shall respect the law...
IV. A physician shall respect the rights of patients...
V. A physician shall continue to study, apply and advance scientific
knowledge, make relevant information available to patients, col-
leagues, and the public, obtain consultation, and use the talents of
other health professionals when indicated. 260
The AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs provides the
official interpretation of the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics in
its publication, Current Opinions.261 Immediately after the 1980 re-
the profession upon the patient, but rather to fulfill a need created by illness." Id. at 27. See
also Roger C. Sider and Colleen D. Clements, The New Medical Ethics: A Second Opinion,
145 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2169-71 (1985) (supporting paternalism). For a contrary view, see
Stanley J. Reiser, The Era of Patient, Using the Experience of Illness in Shaping the Missions
of Health Care, 269 JAMA 1012 (1993).
256. See CURRENT OPINIONS-1992 § 8.08.
257. See PERNICK, supra note 41, vol. 3, at 3.
258. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, REPORTS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETcAL & JUDICIAL AF-
FAIRS-(1984-90), Introduction, at 3 (1992).
259. CURRENT OPINIONS-1981, at viii.
260. See CURRENT OPINIONS-1981, at ix.
261. The Council (formerly the Judicial Council) is the judicial authority of the AMA.
It is composed of seven physician/members of the AMA, one resident physician and one medical
student. Council members are nominated by the President of the AMA and elected by the
House of Delegates, the AMA's representative assembly. Their published opinions on the
Principles appear in CURRENT OPINIONS. See AMEIUCAN MEDICAL ASS'N, CONSTITUTION AND
BYLAws, reprinted in ANNOTATED CURRENT OPnIONS, 86 (1992).
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vision of the Principles, the Council explained one of the recognized
rights of patients as follows:
The patient's right of self decision can be effectively exercised only
if the patient possesses enough information to enable an intelligent
choice. The patient should make his own determination on treatment.
Informed consent is a basic social policy for which exceptions are
permitted (1) where the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable
of consenting and harm from failure to treat is imminent; or (2)
when risk-disclosure poses such a serious psychological threat of
detriment to the patient as to be medically contraindicated. Social
policy does not accept the paternalistic view that the physician may
remain silent because divulgence might prompt the patient to forego
needed therapy. 62
The AMA Code is also noteworthy for its respect for the individual's
choice once the proper disclosure has been made. The Current Opi-
nions makes special mention of the variable values found in the
patient population: "Rational, informed patients should not be ex-
pected to act uniformly, even under similar circumstances, in agreeing
to or refusing treatment. ' 263
Further elaboration of the Principles and their application to
specific ethical issues in the practice of medicine are found in the
Reports. That is where, in 1990, the Council published the Funda-
mental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship.26 The descrip-
tion is of a "collaborative effort" and "mutually respectful alliance." 5
The AMA Code is the most cited, but not the only, statement
of ethical principles for medical professionals.2 6 The American Col-
262. CURRENT OPINIONS-1981 § 8.07. This opinion has been expanded to acknowledge
the physician's obligation to accurately present medical facts, make recommendations based on
good medical practice, and help the client make choices. CURRENT OPINIONS-1992 § 8.08. The
1992 CURRENT OPINIONS also strongly support patient self-determination when life-sustaining
treatments are at issue. CURRENT OPINIONS-1992 § 8.08.
263. CURRENT OPINIONS-1981 § 8.07.
264. REPORTS 1992 No. 26, Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship,
(issued June 1990).
1. The patient has the right to receive information from physicians and to discuss
the benefits, risks, and costs of appropriate treatment alternatives. Patients should
receive guidance from their physicians as to the optimal course of action.
2. The patient has the right to make decisions regarding the health care that is
recommended by his or her physician. Accordingly, patients may accept or refuse
any recommended medical treatment.
Id.
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., AMERICAN DENTAL Ass'N, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS § 1; and ADA, CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT I-L. See also Informed Consent & Refusal, in DENTAL ETHICS (Weinstein
ed., 1993).
Respect for autonomy has only recently become an ethical standard for treatment
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lege of Physicians (ACP), a national organization of internal medicine
practitioners formed in 1914, published the first edition of its Ethics
Manual in 1984.267 The narrative description of the physician-patient
relationship states,
The patient must be well informed to make health-care decisions
and work intelligently in partnership with the physi-
cian .... Information that the patient needs for decision-making
should be given in terms the patient can understand. The physician
should heed cues from the patient in setting the pace of disclosure,
particularly when the illness is grave .... Disclosure should never be
a mechanical or perfunctory process. Distressing news and infor-
mation should be presented to the patient in a way that minimizes
despair. . . .In general, full disclosure is a fundamental ethical re-
quirement .... The doctrine of informed consent goes beyond the
question of whether consent was given for a particular treatment.
Rather, it focuses on the content of that consent: specifically, on
whether the patient knew enough about the nature of the treatment,
the alternative methods of treatment, and what would happen in the
absence of treatment to make an informed decision .... Given the
imbalance in knowledge and expertise between the physician and the
patient, the physician must provide the patient with enough knowl-
edge to allow the patient to make an informed judgment as to how
to proceed. The physician's presentation should be understandable
and unbiased; the patient's or surrogate's concurrence must be
obtained without coercion; the physician must not take advantage
of a situation in which he or she may hold psychological dominance.
Truly informed consent is most apt to be achieved through effective
communication between patient and physician; it is not achieved by
the perfunctory signing of a "legal" consent form. . . .Using lan-
guage that can be understood, the physician endeavors to present
the patient with a basic understanding of the problems they face
together and makes it clear that the patient has the right to make
the final choice in accepting or rejecting the proposed plan of
diagnosis and treatment. 26
It is difficult to measure the clinical impact of the new ethics.
However, patient participation is being widely discussed in medical
journals and other forums.2 69 In addition to having an impact on the
decisions. Dentists had long appealed only to the principle of beneficence and, in so
doing, often acted paternalistically. This chapter identifies several forces that influ-
enced dentistry's recent adoption of the informed consent doctrine.
Id. at 65.
267. ACP, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS ETmCS MANUAL reprinted in 101 ANN.
INTERN. MED., 129, 263 (1984). A second edition was published in II ANN. INTERN. MED.
245, 327 (1989). The third edition appears in 117 ANN. INTERN. MED., 947 (1992).
268. ACP ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 268, at 949-50.
269. See, e.g., John M. Lee Screening and Informed Consent, 328 NEW. ENG. J. MED.
438 (1993); Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 254, 267 JAMA 2221; Reiser, supra note 255, 269
JAMA 1012.
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professional culture, the professional codes can be directly enforced
by the national organization. 20 The codes have been incorporated
into state medical licensing and review board standards,271 state and
local medical societies' bylaws,2 72 and the medical staff bylaws of
hospitals 273
The medical ethics codes have an impact on medical education.
Most medical schools in the United States include a medical ethics
course in their curricula.2 74 The Association of American Medical
Colleges, one of the accrediting bodies for medical schools in the
United States, has stressed the importance of such courses.27 The
educational response is broader than including ethical codes as re-
quired reading. There has been renewed attention to developing the
interpersonal skills (IPS) of physicians and medical students. The
AAMC has set improvements in this area as a goal for medical
schools.2 76 A recent study found that some progress has been made:
In the last two decades, there have been major advances in the
theory and technology of teaching of medical interviewing and IPS
270. The AMA Council has identified three categories of ethics: Moral principles or
practices, customs and usages of the medical profession, and matters of policy not necessarily
involving issues of morality in the practice of medicine. CURRENT OPvNIoNs-1981, § 1.01. Each
carries with it a different professional response if violated.
Unethical conduct involving moral principles, values and duties calls for disciplinary
action such as censure, suspension, or expulsion from medical society membership
.... Failure to conform to the customs and usages of the medical profession may
call for disciplinary action depending upon the particular circumstances involved,
local attitudes, and how the conduct in question may reflect upon the dignity of and
respect for the medical profession .... In matters strictly of a policy nature, a
physician who disagrees with the position of the American Medical Association is
entitled to freedom and protection of his point of view.
Id. The inclusion of patient participation in the AMA Code would appear to move it from the
category of custom and usages to that of moral principles or practices.
271. See, e.g., Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977);
Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991) (Indiana Medical Licensing Board); Petition of
Sprague, 564 A.2d 829 (N.H. 1989); Pons v. Ohio State Medical Bd., 614 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio
1993) (Ohio Revised Code § 4731.22(B)(18) specifically refers to the codes of national profes-
sional organizations including the AMA as the measure of unethical behavior).
272. See, e.g., 76 J. IND. ST. MED. Ass'N 93 (1983) (incorporating revised AMA Code
into bylaws); Kirk v. Jefferson Co. Medical Soc'y, 577 S.W.2d 419 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); State
ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelguist, 694 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (Missouri State Medical
Ass'n), overruled on other grounds, 776 S.W.2d 389; Guidry v. Harris County Medical Soc'y,
618 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
273. See, e.g., Volpicelli v. Jared Sydney Torrance Mer. Hosp., 109 Cal. App. 3d 242
(1980); Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249 (Conn. 1989); Ham v. Holy Rosary Hosp.,
529 P.2d 361 (Mont. 1974).
274. See Albert P. Jonsen, Leadership in Meeting Ethical Challenges, 62 J. MED. EDUC.,
95, 96 (1987).
275. Howe, Medical Students' Evaluation of Different Levels of Medical Ethics Teaching:
Implications for Curricula 21 J. MED. EDUC. 340-49 (1987).
276. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, PHYSICIANS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: THE GREP REPORT (1984).
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.... Studies have demonstrated that history taking and IPS can be
effectively taught. There is agreement about the essential elements
of effective courses, and successful medical student courses that
incorporate these elements have been described.
277
Virtually all medical schools report that they offer courses on
interviewing and IPS.27s However, the study found that problems
remain:
While these advances are encouraging, our survey data suggest
a wide variability in quality and intensity of medical interviewing
and IPS teaching among US medical schools. Many teaching pro-
grams appear to need substantial improvement .... There is a
paucity of educators who design, implement, and coordinate this
teaching. It appears that, as in 1977, there is little coordination or
sequencing of IPS teaching throughout the 4 years in most medical
schools.
27 9
This system of medical education does not reach the practicing phy-
sicians whose disclosure practices often fail to meet the information
needs of their patients. One medical educator notes,
In theory, informed consent has been accepted as an essential com-
ponent of the doctor-patient relationship; in actuality, physicians
frequently fail to communicate elements essential for informed par-
ticipation by patients. There are several reasons physicians may be
reluctant to disclose appropriate information to patients. However,
although many physicians favor a relatively non-informative, pater-
nalistic approach to the doctor-patient relationship, studies reveal
that most patients desire more relevant information about their
conditions, including specific facts regarding their diagnoses. 280
The concept of the dependent patient relying on the physician to
be the beneficent healer is resilient. 28' Percival's Code lingers in the
professional work ethic, as can be seen in the following quote from
the recently retired editor of the New England Journal of Medicine,
277. Dennis H. Novack et al., Medical Interviewing and Interpersonal Skills Teaching in
U.S. Medical Schools, Progress, Problems, and Promise 269 JAMA 2101, 2101 (1993) (footnotes
omitted).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2104.
280. Johnson et al., Teaching the Process of Obtaining Informed Consent to Medical
Students, 67 ACAD. MED. 598 (Sept. 1992).
281. See, e.g., MEISEL, supra note 9, § 2.7, at 24. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note
3, at 80, 85-93; Ruth R. Faden et al., Disclosure of Information to Patients in Medical Care,
MEDICAL CARE July 1981, 718, 730; Elizabeth G. Patterson, The Therapeutic Justification for
Withholding Medical Information: What You Don't Know Can't Hurt You, Or Can It? 64
NEB. L. REV. 721, 752 (1985); see also Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale, 39 U. PITT
L. REV. 137 (1977).
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Unlike the independent shoppers envisioned by market theory, sick
and worried patients cannot adequately look after their own interests,
nor do they usually want to .... If he does not trust the judgment
and competence of the first surgeon he consults, he may seek the
opinion of another, but he will very shortly have to trust someone
to act as his beneficent counselor, and he will surely want the best
care available, regardless of how much or how little his insurance
will pay the doctor. 28 2
When the patient is presumed to be unable or uninterested in con-
tributing to the decision making, there is little opportunity for a
cooperative venture to develop. While undoubtedly objecting to the
characterization on how it occurred, many practitioners appear to
agree with the conclusions of Ivan Illich that individuals are disabled
with respect to making their own health care decisions. 283
In their reform efforts, policy makers have especially targeted
physicians' central role in prescribing medical care. After noting that
physicians' services make up less than 25 percent of Medicare spend-
ing, but that physicians' decisions influence more than 70 percent,
the Harvard research team developing the basis for Medicare's new
physician reimbursement system concluded that "It is the physicians
who are the 'captains of the medical ship,' . . . .The patient's wishes
and preferences may be important, but it is the physician who is the
key decision maker in health care. ' '284
There are a range of opinions as to why practicing physicians
have not embraced the idea of medical treatment as a cooperative
venture. One legal scholar suggests it is merely indifference to the
concept:
In actual clinical practice, the opposition to informed consent
manifested in medical writing is not as apparent as is disinterest.
Unless one equates the signing of consent forms with genuine in-
formed consent, it is safe to say that informed consent is largely
absent from clinical practice, it is almost exclusively a creature of
law. 285
Others suggest that the educational process attracts those least likely
to be able to communicate well with patients:
282. Arnold S. Relman, What Market Values are Doing to Medicine, THE ATLANTIC,
March 1992, 99, at 100.
283. See IVAN ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH 40-47 (1975).
Illich used the term "expropriation" to denote his conclusion that the medicalization of health
under the pressure of the profession deprived individuals of their capacity to suffer and heal.
284. HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, A NATIONAL STUDY OF RESOURCE-BASED
RELATIVE VALUE SCALES FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES: PHASE II, FINAL REPORT, 29 (1990).
285. MEISEL, supra note 9, § 2.7, at 24.
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Some medical educators have recognized that a selection process
which rewards expertise in the natural sciences and an aptitude for
performing well on standardized examinations is not necessarily one
which will produce physicians inclined to listen closely, talk openly
and admit their limits and their ignorance when they exist. It may
be necessary to change not only what is taught in medical school,
as Katz suggests, but who is there to learn in order to assure more
conversation on the part of medical professions. 28 6
The limited involvement of patients in decision making reflects
and revitalizes these normative assumptions. The tendency of patients
to take a passive role in the diagnostic and treatment process is well
documented. As one scholar suggests,
Patients have allowed silence to substitute for conversation as
a result of conviction, shared and reinforced by their doctors, that
healing can be brought about only when the patient exemplifies the
virtues of trust, obedience, and compliance. Medical uncertainty and
ignorance have long been seen as the primary threats to patient
hope, and thus to the efficacy of medical interventions, not just by
physicians but by their patients as well. 8 7
This raises a profoundly important question - to what extent can
individuals handle the responsibility of deciding. their own medical
care? Studies show that patients can handle this task better than
medical practitioners believe. 8n There are, however, limitations on the
amount, and form, of information that a patient can absorb.
28 9
The 1980 AMA Principles defining the patient-physician rela-
tionship coincided with the publication of a newly formulated defi-
nition of quality in medical care. 290 Avedis Donabedian defined the
interaction between practitioners and patients as the "process of
care," divided into the technical and interpersonal domains. Thus,
Technical care is the application of the science and technology of
medicine, and of the other health sciences, to the management of a
personal health problem. Its accompaniment is the management of
the social and psychological interaction between client and practi-
286. Arthur Caplan, Can We Talk? A Review of Jay Katz, 'The Silent World of Doctor
and Patient', 9 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 43, 48 (1987) [hereinafter Caplan] citing generally
APPLYING Tn HumANmnas (Daniel Callahan et al., eds., 1985) and ERIC J. CASSELL, THE PLACE
Ov THE HutANimirs IN MEDICINE (1984), and Edmund D. Pelligrino, Educating the Humanistic
Physician, 235 JAMA 1288 (1974).
287. Caplan, supra note 286, at 45.
288. Faden, et al., supra note 281, at 728. See also Patterson, supra note 281, at 736-47.
289. See Jon F. Merz & Baruch Fischhoff, Informed Consent Does Not Mean Rational
Consent: Cognitive Limitations on Decision-making, 11 J. LEG. MED. 343-46 (1990).
290. 1 AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, THE DEFNIION OF QuALrrY AND APPROACHES TO ITS AS-
SESSMENT (1980).
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tioner. The first of these is called the science of medicine and the
second its art .... 291
Regarding technical management of the patient,
[T]his relationship is revealed in the work of the leading expo-
nents of that science and technology; through their published re-
search, their teachings, and their own practice these leaders define,
explicitly or implicitly, the technical norms of good care.
What constitutes goodness in the interpersonal process is more
difficult to summarize. The management of the interpersonal rela-
tionship must meet socially defined values and norms that govern
the interaction of individuals in general and in particular situations.
These norms are reinforced in part by the ethical dicta of health
professions, and by the expectations and aspirations of individual
patients. It follows that the degree of quality in the management of
the interpersonal relationship is measured by the extent of conformity
to these values, norms, expectations and aspirations .... 292
The important work of developing measures of the quality of the
provider-patient relationship is still in its early stages. As is discussed
in Part V below, practice guidelines and the emergent concepts and
processes of quality assurance have the potential to define more fully,
and then enforce, a new standard of interaction. 293
B. Revising the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent
In an informed consent lawsuit, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving the existence and likelihood of occurrence of the complication
produced by the medical intervention. These facts may be established
through the testimony of an expert witness or an admission by the
defendants. 294 The duty to disclose is set as a matter of law and
291. Id. at 4.
292. Id. at 5.
293. See text infra Part V(B) & (C) and accompanying footnotes.
294. This information is developed through medical research studies and reported in
medical journals or practice guidelines. Without the testimony of the researchers, this infor-
mation could be excluded from the trial as hearsay (i.e., a statement other than one made by
the declarant while testifying, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted).
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(c). A statement from a "learned treatise," a published book or
periodical established as a reliable authority by an expert witness or by judicial notice, is
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
The proliferation of practice guidelines and the statutorily mandated risk lists, for example,
those developed in Texas, Louisiana and Hawaii, eventually could provide the specific risks to
be disclosed regarding a procedure or treatment. There are experiments underway to use practice
guidelines in medical malpractice trials without the need for expert testimony. See UNITED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: MAINE'S USE OF PRACTICE
GUIDELINES TO REDUCE COSTS HRD-94-8 (October 1993) [hereinafter MEDICAL MALPRACTICE].
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applied to these facts. The material risk/reasonable patient standard
can be applied without further assistance from an expert medical
witness. The professional standard requires more evidence before it
can be applied. Again, this may be provided by expert medical
testimony.2 95 The rationale for expert testimony stems from the belief
that only an expert could know what a reasonably prudent physician
would or would not disclose under the circumstances of the case.
Nearly one half of the jurisdictions in the United States rely on
the medical profession's standards to establish the duty to disclose in
their informed consent cause of action. 29 These established doctrines
of informed consent may be revised to reflect the values in the new
medical ethics and in the process publicize the new professional norm
on the physician-patient relationship. To the extent that the national
professional codes establish the perspective for measuring disclosures
in informed consent cases, there no longer will be a significant
discrepancy between the jurisdictions using the professional and rea-
sonable person standards. 297
The AMA ethical code and other professional codes provide
national standards for patient participation, a subset of which is
disclosure of risks and alternatives. At a minimum, the new medical
ethics seem to announce that organized medicine will no longer sup-
port restricted interactions with patients regarding care choices. This
is a major reversal of the position advocated by the AMA five years
before the revision of the Principles.298 The AMA's proposed model
law on informed consent had sought to limit the information about
medical risks given to a patient to assure valid consent and treated
written consents as strong evidence of informed decision-making. 2 9
The AMA Principles and the ACP ethics manual only begin to
define the disclosure obligation. They were not written to supply a
disclosure standard for informed consent cases.3°° While the codes are
295. Some state statutes specify that expert medical testimony must be adduced as to the
insufficiency of the consent. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4401-a (McKinney 1992).
296. See discussion supra Part III(F).
297. The AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETICS supports the minority subjective patient
standard on causation. Its concluding sentence under § 8.07, Informed Consent, reads: "Ra-
tional, informed patients should not be expected to act uniformly, even under similar circum-
stances, in agreeing to or refusing treatment." CURRENT OPINIONS-1981, § 8.07. The objective
"reasonable person" standard is less accepting of idiosyncracies. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP,
supra note 1, at 31-34 for a discussion of the different standards.
298. See MODEL INFORMED CONSENT LAW, Section XXX, supra note 183, at 1011.
299. Id.
300. However, both the AMA code and the ACP manual define the therapeutic exception
narrowly. This should provide guidance to courts when they are faced with arguments on that
exception.
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not laws but "standards of conduct,"301 they do relate to legal obli-
gations: "Ethical standards of professional conduct and responsibility
may exceed but are never less than, nor contrary to, those required
by law." 3 2 The codes do not rely on the customary or usual practice
but clearly define the disclosure obligation as one to be measured by
the information needs of the patient.303
Introduction of the codes to help set the disclosure standard in
an informed consent case will decrease or eliminate the need for an
expert. The codes provide evidence of varying weight in the twenty-
five jurisdictions that have chosen the professional perspective. The
disclosure requirements range from the customary practice in a defined
locality to the accepted standard of disclosure or the practice of a
reasonable and prudent practitioner.304 Dissatisfied with the rigors and
justifications of the locality standard, all states, except Idaho, have
abandoned the use of narrowly defined geographic areas.30
301. CURRENT OPINIONS-1981, AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, pmbl., at ix.
302. CURRENT OPINIONS-1981 § 1.02.
303. Under the ethical codes the therapeutic exception to disclosure is significantly limited.
Informed consent is a basic social policy for which exceptions are permitted (1) where
the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting and harm from failure
to treat is imminent; or (2) when risk-disclosure poses such a serious psychological
threat of detriment to the patient as to be medically contraindicated. Social policy
does not accept the paternalistic view that the physician may remain silent because
divulgence might prompt the patient to forego needed therapy.
CURRENT OPINIo NS-1992 § 8.08.
304. Under the strict locality rule the customary or ordinary practice of the medical
community in a defined area has the force of law. To prevail the plaintiff must identify and
prove the local custom. If very limited disclosure is the practice, compliance is set at that level.
Procedural consequences stem from the need to secure a medical expert familiar with the local
custom who is willing to testify against a fellow physician. See Robinson, supra note 156, at
180 (discussing the "conspiracy of silence").
305. The Idaho Code defines both the general medical malpractice standard and the
specific informed consent standard as the care ordinarily given in the same community. IDAHO
CODE § 6-1012 (medical malpractice), § 39.4301 to .4306 (informed consent). The statutes
further define "the same community" as the geographic area served by the nearest general
hospital. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1012 (general medical malpractice) and IDAHO CODE § 39.4304
(informed consent). Idaho has the lowest ratio of physicians to population in the United States,
with 125 physicians per 100,000 residents, compared to the national ratio of 216 per 100,000.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, T. 173, at 119 (1993) (based on U.S. Bureau of
Census estimates as of July 1, 1989).
The treatment of the locality rule by the courts of one rural state will illustrate the changes.
Montana's common law malpractice standard of care moved from the care and skill usually
exercised in the same locality to a statewide standard of care, Tallbull v. Whitney, 564 P.2d
162 (Mont. 1977); then to a national standard for board certified specialists, Aasheim v.
Humberger, 695 P.2d 824 (Mont. 1985); and finally, a national standard for non-board certified
general practitioners, taking into account any legitimate local factors. Chapel v. Allison, 785
P.2d 204, 210 (1990).
Courts have been able to move away from the locality rule, where the standard a physician
is expected to exercise is that skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that
profession in good standing in "the same or similar communities." The comment below, taken
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Most states providing a statutory informed consent cause of
action based on a professional standard adopted either the "accepted
standard of disclosure" in the medical community3°6 or the practice
expected of a "reasonable and prudent" practitioner. 0 7 These are not
based on the customary practice in the locality but have been held to
incorporate national standards of practice or disclosure.30 8
Medical specialists, the target of most informed consent law suits,
are held to applicable national standards even under the strictest
locality rule. °9 The existence of national certification standards has
led to reliance on them as proof of the specialist's standard of care.310
from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A helps explain the significance of using the
"similar community" phrase.
Type of community. Allowance must be made also for the type of community in
which the actor carries on his practice. A country doctor cannot be expected to have
the equipment, facilities, experience, knowledge or opportunity to obtain it, afforded
him by a large city. The standard is not, however, that of the particular locality. If
there are only three physicians in a small town, and all three are highly incompetent,
they cannot be permitted to set a standard of utter inferiority for a fourth who comes
to town. The standard is rather that of persons engaged in similar practice in similar
localities, considering geographical location, size, and the character of the community
in general.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A cmt. g (1965).
The "same general neighborhood" in Code of Alabama, § 6-5-484 imposes a national
standard. See Bradford v. McGee, 534 So. 2d 1076 (Ala. 1988) and Zills v. Brown, 382 So. 2d
528 (Ala. 1980). For other states, see Gambill v. Stroud, 531 S.W.2d 945 (Ark. 1976); Bloskas
v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907 (Colo. 1982) (an informed consent case); Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d
867 (Il. 1986) (if uniform national standards exist they can be used to establish standard of
care in same or similar community); Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970) (rejecting
locality rule); Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989) (informed consent standard must
recognize movement to use of same or similar community standard in general medical mal-
practice); Kortus v. Jensen, 237 N.W.2d 845 (Neb. 1976).
306. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103 (West 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-320 (Michie
1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905 (Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21-13 (1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (1980). All, except the Tennessee statute, add the provision that
for disclosure to be adequate, a reasonable person would need to be able to understand the
information as it was presented.
307. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-561(2), 563 (1992); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d
(McKinney 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909 (Supp. 1993).
308. See, e.g., Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1983); Guebard
v. Jabaay, 452 N.E.2d 751 (Il. Ct. App. 1983); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982).
309. Buck v. St. Clair, 702 P.2d 781 (Idaho 1985).
310. See Dewitt v. Brown, 669 F.2d 516 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Arkansas law if a
national standard exists, it can be introduced to show the level of care expected in the locality
or similar locality); Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bahr v. Harper-Grace
Hosps., 497 N.W.2d 526 (Mich. 1993), appeal granted, 445 Mich. 861 (1994); Thomas v.
McPherson Community Health Ctr., 400 N.W.2d 629 (Mich. 1986); Melville v. Southward, 791
P.2d 383 (Colo. 1990); Farrow v. Health Servs. Corp., 604 P.2d 474 (Utah 1979); but see Bly
v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783 (Va. 1976) (declining to adopt national standard about legislative
enactment.
Other courts have held that the existence of nationally uniform standards for particular
conditions can be relied upon to establish the standard in the same or similar community.
Smock v. Hale, 555 N.E.2d 74 (Il. App. Ct.), reh'g denied 561 N.E. 708 (1990) (national
standard for treatment of Crohn's Disease applied to general practitioners); Swan v. Lamb,
584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978).
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Board certified specialists are seen as holding themselves out as having
greater skill than other physicians, thereby justifying the application
of a more rigorous minimum standard.
The potential impact of the AMA patient participation ethic in
defining the clinical conduct expected of a medical professional can
be glimpsed in Culbertson v. Mernitz, the first informed consent case
to cite the AMA revisions.31' In Culbertson, the physician had not
advised a patient of a possible surgical complication that material-
ized.3 12 A medical review panel, used in Indiana to screen malpractice
cases, read the proposed complaint, took evidence, and concluded
that "such non-disclosure does not constitute a failure to comply with
the appropriate standard of care, as such complication is not consid-
ered a risk of such surgery requiring disclosure to the patient."3 3 The
standard of disclosure the Medical Review Panel used was not iden-
tified, but the Indiana lower courts had been using the lay standard. 1 4
After the Culbertson lawsuit was commenced, the defendant moved
for summary judgment."' The plaintiffs' attorneys argued that the
"prudent patient" standard was the disclosure standard in Indiana,
and thus, no expert testimony was required in response to the mo-
tion.3 1 6 They did not provide any evidence on the risk, its chance of
occurrence, or the professional practice on disclosure.3"7 The trial
court granted the summary judgment motion, but the court of appeals
accepted plaintiffs' argument and reversed. 318
The Indiana Supreme Court framed the question on appeal as
follows "the issue squarely presented in this petition is whether expert
medical testimony is required to establish the standard of care of
311. 602 N.E.2d 98, 103-04 (Ind. 1992).
312. Id. at 99. The plaintiff's underlying condition, urinary stress incontinence, is the
subject of a federally sponsored Clinical Practice Guideline. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY
AND RESEARCH, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
URINARY INCONTINENCE IN ADULTS: CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE, AHCPR No. 92-0038,
(1992).
The etiology of the plaintiff's condition, primary anatomic obstruction, was described as
being "extremely rare" and appropriate for surgery. Culbertson, 602 N.E.2d at 99. The possible
risks from surgical treatment are not specifically listed in the guideline. CLINICAL PRACTICE
GUIDELINE, supra at 48.
313. Culbertson, 602 N.E.2d at 99.
314. See Griffith v. Jones, 577 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 1991), vacated, 602 N.E.2d 107 (1992);
Payne v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. 1990); Revord v. Russell, 401 N.E.2d
763 (Ind. 1980); Joy v. Chau, 377 N.E.2d 670 (Ind. 1980).
315. Culbertson v. Mernitz, 591 N.E.2d 1040 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d 1992).
316. Id. at 1042.
317. Id. at 1043.
318. Id. at 1040, 1043.
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health care providers on the issue of informed consent."31 9 The court
saw the answer to this question as being dependent on the disclosure
standard: "Resolution of the issue of the necessity of expert medical
testimony in informed consent cases depends on whether the issue is
viewed through the eyes of the physician or the patient. 3 20 The court,
in a 3-2 decision, adopted the standard of a reasonably prudent
physician and held that expert medical testimony was needed to
present an issue of material fact in light of the review panel's find-
ings.321
The majority dismissed the concerns that the professional disclo-
sure standard dishonors the patient's right of self-decision and places
the decision under the exclusive domain of the medical profession:
"While this viewpoint may or may not have been justified in 1972
when Canterbury, and Cobbs, were decided, a review of medical
ethics standards of care in 1992 should assuage this fear. ' 322 The
court then quoted with approval AMA Current Opinion section 8.08
on patient participation. 23
The Culbertson decision gives new meaning to the "reasonable
medical professional. 324 Surprisingly, to the extent that a "reasonable
physician" is one who adheres to medical ethics, the professional
standard of disclosure will now carry with it much the same respon-
sibility for disclosure as the reasonable patient standard. Watching
this interplay of legal standards with the revised professional norms
319. Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1992).
320. Id. at 103.
321. Id. It is not clear that the court had to choose the disclosure standard to decide this
case. Under a material risk standard, the plaintiffs would have needed to present evidence of
the existence and likelihood of the risk. They refused to do so, even in light of the finding of
the medical review panel.
322. Id. (citations omitted).
323. Id. at 103-04 quoting CURRENT OPINIONS-1992 § 8.08. The majority decided the case
based on the need of an expert witness to establish the risk that the complication would occur,
not to define the professional standard of disclosure.
We therefore hold that, except in those cases where deviation from the standard of
care is a matter commonly known by lay persons, expert medical testimony is necessary
to establish whether a physician has or has not complied with the standard of a
reasonably prudent physician ...
In the present case we cannot say that the risk of the adherence of the cervix to the
vaginal wall is a matter commonly known to lay persons.
Id. at 104.
This analysis also shows one danger of grafting informed consent doctrine onto the stock
of medical malpractice. In an informed consent case, if the risk is commonly known to lay
persons, there would be no duty to disclose it to the reasonable patient. It is not clear from
the opinion whether the risk that materialized for Mrs. Culbertson is one that would need to
be disclosed to other Indiana patients.
324. This reliance on national standards is consistent with the evolution of the general
malpractice standard in Indiana. Indiana had used the "same or similar community standard."
Worster v. Caylor, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1953). The standard was changed to the practice expected
of a reasonably careful, skillful and prudent practitioner in similar circumstances. Ex rel.
Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 185 (Ind. 1992).
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and the impact on clinical practice of U.S. medical professionals in
the United States will be an interesting sociological study. Unfortu-
nately for scholars and policy makers, the social context of medicine
continues to change, clouding the causal connections to changes in
practice.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE PATIENT-PROVIDER RELATIONSHIP IN
THE NEW WORLD OF HEALTH SECURITY
The health care crisis created by limited access and rising costs
emerged from the 1992 United States presidential campaign as a
leading domestic political issue. A growing number of individuals and
families lack the insurance coverage, government program eligibility,
or wealth to pay for needed care and, thus, face access restricted to
emergency medical care.325 Many employers have abandoned the tra-
dition of providing medical insurance as an employment benefit.3 26
Those continuing to provide coverage are finding ways to limit their
exposure.3 27 The escalating cost of medical care has limited the ability
of government to halt the erosion of access. A number of federal
programs, state government, and private initiatives have been under-
taken, with mixed results, to provide some categorical relief. Despite
these efforts, the cost of individual services, and overall medical care
spending, continues to rise faster than the overall inflation rate.128
Total medical care expenditures have increased to fourteen percent of
the gross domestic product, higher than any other major economy in
the world. 2 9
The origin of this problem lies deep in our economy and traditions
of medical practice. The federal government has been reluctant to
take the lead in reform efforts despite its growing role as a coverage
provider through Medicare and Medicaid. Deference to the medical
profession's tradition of self-regulation in matters of clinical judge-
325. On a given day, approximately 38.0 million Americans are without medical coverage.
Adam Clymer, Health Debate Splinters After Initial Consensus, N.Y. TIMES at B8. A portion
of this group has chosen to self insure, but many did not have a choice.
326. Id.
327. Among the means that have been tried are self-insurance, abandoning community
rated insurance plans, limiting the coverage offered and shifting costs to employees. See, e.g.,
McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. (1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482
(1991) (eliminating coverage for those in the plan with expensive medical needs). Employee
benefit plans are taking advantage of the protective ERISA provisions to refuse to contribute
toward the care of those outside the plan. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp.
996 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
328. An easy illustration of the rate of medical cost inflation is the annual rise of the
Medicare hospital deductible. This payment is calculated at roughly the cost of one day in the
hospital. It has steadily risen from $40 in 1966 to $696 for 1994. See 58 Fed. Reg. 58554 (Nov.
2, 1993).
329. Clymer, supra note 325, at B8.
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ment and billing practices is deeply ingrained.3 0 Additionally, the
federal government, especially Congress, has not wanted to frustrate
the rising expectations of providers and patients that the medical care
prescribed by the patient's physician will be covered.33" '
A major turning point was reached when the Reagan adminis-
tration, in response to federal budget concerns, promoted changes in
the Medicare program's hospital reimbursement method.33 2 The new
system is designed to induce hospitals to limit the cost of care they
provide. The changes also established a budgetary cap for Medicare
spending for hospital care. The Physicians' Medicare Fee Schedule,
implemented as of January 1, 1992, has similar goals of changing
care patterns and creating at least a "continental budget" for pay-
ments to physicians. 333 We are now just into the second decade of
this experiment of federal intervention into medical care decision
making.3 34
The Clinton Administration's proposed Health Security Act (HSA)
served to focus debate on the next round of governmental reform
efforts. 35 The proposed act built on the initiatives already underway
to expand access, control costs, and switch emphasis to preventive
and primary care. 336 Thus, we are becoming familiar with many of
the components that will define the next era of health care, even if
330. The Medicare statute starts with the following provision:
Nothing in this title . . . shall be construed to authorize any Federal official or
employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the
manner in which medical services are provided or over the selection, tenure, or
compensation of any officer or employee of any institution, agency, or person
providing health services; or to exercise any supervision or control over the admin-
istration or operation of any such institution, agency, or person.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 (West Supp. 1993).
331. Clymer, supra note 325, at B8.
332. Medicare based its original reimbursement formula on the fee for service set by the
customary or prevailing rate, a concept borrowed from private insurance policies. See generally
Gerard F. Anderson & Mark A. Hall, The Adequacy of Hospital Reimbursement Under
Medicaid's Boren Amendment, 13 J. LEG. MED. 205, 205 (1992)
The Prospective Payment System (PPS), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww (1993), was added by §
101(a)(l) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324.
333. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4 (West Supp. 1993).
334. The medical care industry is not a well-understood economic entity. We simply do
not yet understand the forces and values that direct the response to a financial intervention.
335. See supra note 11, and accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., David R. Olmos, Strength in Numbers: 11 Firms Join to Get Cuts in
Health Insurance Rates, L.A. TimEs, at DI (discussing private efforts to control costs); see also
Washington Health Services Act of 1993, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.72.005 (West Supp.
1994). The Clinton proposal adds the idea of "managed competition" in the purchasing of
insurance coverage. I will not address the major issues of streamlining the billing process and
reforming the insurance market. These are the most removed from the point of service issues.
Additionally, the lack of experience with health alliances makes analysis very speculative.
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their details remain to be worked out. The cost-consciousness being
promoted will have a more pervasive impact as federal policy replaces
localized initiatives. A global budget with explicit rationing of medical
services is possible if spending cuts are not realized through less
drastic changes.
Any mandated reform elements will be part of an evolving de-
livery system. Systemic changes have accelerated in response to the
current initiatives and the proposed federal reforms. For example,
medical care providers are moving toward integrated networks of
medical professionals, institutions, and support personnel with a strong
managed care emphasis. 37 The physicians' dominance in prescribing
care is eroding as their professional status continues to decline and
other providers are substituted when cost effective. The providers of
non-hospital special services, such as long term care, will continue to
grow because of changing demographics and health patterns, as well
as the growing sensitivity to the appropriate services 'for various
patient populations. The one-on-one interaction with an independent
practitioner which is the conceptual basis for the informed consent
doctrines is no longer representative of most medical care interactions.
Patients now have to deal with hospitals that are part of a national
chain, physicians in a managed care enterprise, or a home-health-aide
supplied by an agency.338
The organizational clustering of providers will support the rapid
and thorough penetration of two distinctive medical advances of the
late twentieth century, comprehensive utilization review and applied
outcomes research.33 9 New concepts and methods for reviewing med-
ical care are being driven by current theories of production manage-
ment and evolving capabilities to process massive quantities of data.
Reviewers can now analyze a provider's entire range of care in addition
to the traditional screening for individual instances of bad care. For
the near future, quantitative measures of a practice will dominate the
review process.34
In addition, qualitative reviews of practice patterns are developing
as practice guidelines mature. Care that is based on protocols and
evidence-based practice guidelines is replacing care based on expert
337. See generally UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANAGED HEALTH
CARE: EFFECT ON EMPLOYERS' COSTS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE, GAO/HRD-94;3 (1993) [hereinafter
MANAGED HEALTH CARE].
338. Id.; see also STARR, supra note 39, at 430-36 (hospitals).
339. See Stephen F. Jencks & Gail R. Wilensky, The Health Care Quality Improvement
Initiative: A New Approach to Quality Assurance in Medicare, 268 JAMA 900 (1992) (for
illustration of these advances to the Medicare areas and Health Care quality improvement).
340. Examples of such measures are a hospital's inpatient mortality rate and the level of
resources used by a physician for treating a particular condition. See infra Part V.
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opinion and customary practice.3 41 The content of the guidelines will
depend upon the information available from outcomes research and
the purpose of the guideline. Guidelines will assist patients and medical
professionals in choosing diagnostic approaches and treatment. They
also will supply standards for utilization review by peer groups, risk
managers, medical care administrators, and paying sources.
The rationalization of the medical care system that the changes
achieve will have varying impacts on different phases of care delivery.
There will be significant savings in standardizing forms for coverage
enrollment and eligibility and claim submission and payment.3 42 De-
veloping diagnostic approaches that are comprehensive without being
excessive is more challenging. Treatment standards for conditions that
have been identified will range from being obvious to those impossible
to agree upon and implement.
As the reforms are being put in place, the impact of change on
the provider-patient relationship is receiving limited attention, and
questions are left unanswered. For example, will the values underlying
the informed consent doctrine endure as they conflict with cost-
containment policies and the new clinical reality? The driving forces
behind reform give cause for concern.3 43 The most pressing concern
for policy makers is restraining the growth of medical care spending
by government and business. The interests of the various medical
providers, insurance companies, employers, and state governments
are being ably and persistently presented. Thus, their concerns may
well reshape the process of care and redefine the patient-provider
relationship. The transformation of the financing, provision, and
341. See Deborah S. Garnick et al., Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number of
Malpractice Claims? 266 JAMA 2856 (1991); David M. Eddy, Practice Policies-What Are
They? 263 JAMA 877 (1990).
342. The Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange (WEDI) estimates that $42 billion
can be saved over the next six years if all payers, providers and participants adopt electronic
data interchange standards promulgated by X12, an Accredited Standards Committee of the
American National Standards Institute. See 2 HEALTH L. REp. (BNA) 46 (December 2, 1993).
Uniform electronic claims administration is already being implemented by Medicare and various
state Medicaid programs. Florida, Texas, Ohio, California, and Illinois are among some of the
states which have imposed such requirements statewide. See Elizabeth Gardner, Ohio Hooks
Up Claims System, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Aug. 26, 1991, at 6.
343. Patient participation did not fare well as a legislative issue during the last flurry of
legislative activity responding to a medical care crisis. Organized medicine added the informed
consent issue into a larger debate over reforming medical malpractice litigation in the mid-
1970's. See supra notes 187-88, and accompanying text. The major proponent of patient's rights
was the plaintiff's personal injury bar. As noted above, in Section III, the legislatures were
most responsive to the physicians. Fourteen of the sixteen states that have made a legislative
choice on disclosure use professionally oriented standards. See supra note 222, and accompanying
text. Where there was not support for the position of organized medicine, little legislation was
passed.
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review of medical care threaten to overwhelm a principled approach
to patient participation in the patient-provider relationship.
Much about the patient-provider relationship of the near future
will depend on the details of the evolving system of care. In a more
highly regulated medical delivery system, will medical professionals
care less if they can decide less? Are patients prepared to accept the
challenge of increased responsibility for their own care? The practice
guidelines' treatment of the patient's role and the degree to which
patient participation is reinforced in utilization review will be two
important defining elements. While the patient's role may be enhanced
if the issue of patient participation is taken seriously, the reforms
have focused on structural elements that are easier to legislate. For
example, the Health Security Act directly addressed patient respon-
sibility solely in terms of enrolling in a health plan and making
copayments toward services.?4
There are many reasons for ensuring a fuller role for patient
participation in the evolving health care system. The respect for the
patient's autonomy and right of self determination are social values
that have grown stronger in recent decades and changes in the health
care system that fail to reflect these values may be seen as a threat
to quality medical care. Further, enhanced patient participation is
imperative to an efficient, science-based medical care system for the
same reasons it was important in the time of Thomas Percival. Good
health is not the product of the providers' efforts alone. For example,
no matter how elegant the science behind the treatment, results will
be disappointing if the patient does not follow the therapy regimen
or decides to stop taking the prescribed medications . 45 Involvement
of patients in the process of health care has consistently improved
treatment outcomes.34 The challenge is to encourage, or if necessary
344. Health Security Act, H.R. 3960, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1002, 1131-36 (1994).
345. Non-compliance has been found to be in the 25 percent to 50 percent range for
outpatients with prescribed drugs. Barry Blackwell, The Drug Defaulter, 13 CLINICAL PHAR-
MACOL. 841 (1972). Polypharmacy (multiple medications) is common, especially in the rapidly
growing elderly population. Their interaction raises the potential for harmful mistakes by patient
and physician. As many as 25 percent of hospital admissions for the elderly are the result of
the incorrect use of medication. Joan Morell et al., Receptivity of Physicians in a Teaching
Hospital to a Computerized Drug Interaction Monitoring and Reporting System, 15 MED. CASE
68 (1977).
346. See Sheldon Greenfield et al., Expanding Patient Involvement in Care: Effects on
Patient Outcomes, 102 ANN. INTERN. MED. 520 (1985). One study approach was to show
patients their own medical records and the treatment algorithm used by the medical professionals.
Id. at 521. Patients also had a pre-visit review of simple techniques for improving communication
with the physician. Id. Compared to the control group, these patients had a better understanding
of their own situation and they made better use of the face to face meeting with the physician
(which averaged 16 minutes). Id. at 523. Significantly, they also reported a greater improvement
in functional ability than did the more passive control group. Id. at 524.
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mandate, the labor and time intensive interpersonal work of health
care providers in the face of a generalized pressure to reduce care
costs.
In Part V, the changing practice of medicine the impact of these
changes on the patient-provider relationship will be examined. In
Section A, the systemic changes underway will be reviewed. Section
B will look at the expansion of the role for utilization review, while
section C will provide a view of the outcomes movement and the use
of practice guidelines. Section D will present some ideas on how the
changes will affect the patient-provider relationship.
A. The Changing Face of United States Medical Care
Responding to social expectations, cost containment efforts, and
the changing demands for care, the medical care industry is being
restructured. These systemic changes continue the trend toward de-
personalized medical care. The patient must deal with providers in
the context of, for example, a managed care plan or a home care
agency. Many of the important decisions regarding medical care, such
as when to refer to a specialist or what diagnostic tests to perform,
are being made one step removed from the provider-patient level and
without public involvement. Physicians likely will find that their ability
to make exceptions to the treatment protocols will decline over time.
The non-physician providers will be even less influential than the
physicians in such matters. Patients' rights that are defined in rela-
tionship to the individual provider, such as informed consent, will
reflect the diminished role of those providers.
1. The Decline of the Independent Practitioner
Physicians, perhaps more than other professionals, have had their
status challenged over the last twenty years. As Paul Starr has ob-
served, that challenge has redefined the relationship with the client:
"Indeed, few other developments so well illustrate the decline of
professional sovereignty in the 1970s as the increased tendency of the
courts to view the doctor-patient relationship as a partnership in
decision making rather than a doctors' monopoly. '3 47 The relationship
of patients to non-physician providers in the medical care system is
also changing. For example, nurses, therapists, and pharmacists are
being entrusted with greater responsibility for care provision and
patient interaction than ever before, but within the context of group
protocols.
347. STARR, supra note 39, at 389.
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The independent practitioner of medicine is becoming a rarity.
For a variety of reasons-increasing practice costs, need for office
and collegial support, increased paper work, malpractice concerns,
competition for patients-physicians are choosing either to enter a
group practice or become an employee.3 48 Those self-employed prac-
titioners and those in group practice increasingly have to rely on
income from managed care entities. 349 Nearly ninety million people,
including more than half of all employees covered under employer-
sponsored group health insurance, are enrolled in managed care plans. 350
These forms of financing and delivering care include staff, network,
and group model health maintenance organizations (HMOs), inde-
pendent practice associations (IPAs), preferred provider organizations
(PPOs), and several hybrid organizations. 351
All managed care has internal mechanisms to monitor and au-
thorize care.352 The roles of insurer and provider are brought closer
together or even merged into one business entity. Managed care
physicians often serve as "gatekeepers," controlling access to second-
348. There were an estimated 13,000 physicians in group practice in 1959. This number
tripled by 1969, to just over 40,000. ROSEMARY STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, T.14 at 425 (1972). The number has continued to increase. In 1980, 30 percent of
U.S. physicians in an office-based practice were in a group; by 1987, this had increased to
almost 50 percent. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 7TH REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF HEALTH PERSONNEL IN THE U.S. (APO 1990).
Employed physicians constitute 26 percent of active U.S. physicians.
349. Somewhat surprisingly, the loss of prestige and cost containment efforts have not
yet translated into a reduction in income. The average net income for U.S. physicians continued
to rise to $170,600 for 1992. AMA, Center for Health Policy Research, SOCIOECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE, 140 (1993).
350. MANAGED HEALTH CARE, supra note 337, at 5. As of January 1, 1993, over 40
million people were enrolled in HMOs, twice as many as there were in 1985. INTERSTUDY,
Competitive Edge (Minn. 1993) and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 6TH
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF HEALTH PERSONNEL IN
THE U.S. (June 1988 APO). The number of Medicaid participants in managed care plans
doubled between 1990 and 1993, bringing it to a level of 4.8 million. HHS News, October 18,
1993. PPOs have grown even faster. MANAGED HEALTH CARE, supra note 337, at 6, fig. 2.
351. In a staff model HMO, physicians are employed and work out of an office site
owned and operated by the HMO. MANAGED HEALTH CARE, supra note 337, at 6. This model
has had limited growth with approximately 2.2 million enrollees as of January 1, 1993. MANAGED
HEALTH CARE, supra note 337, at 6, fig. 2. Group and network models, in which the HMO
contracts for physician care with one or more group practices, account for about one-third of
the managed care market. Id. The largest segment of the HMO market is Independent Practice
Associations (IPA), in which private practitioners contract to provide care for some form of
capitated payment. Id. at 7. There are also mixed models that combine features of the group
model and IPA. Id. at 7 n.8.
The fastest growing segment of managed care are the PPOs, which combine features of
HMOs and traditional indemnity plans. These plans did not exist until the 1980s. Their
enrollment now exceeds that of the HMOs. Id. at 6, fig. 2.
352. The Health Security Act would have mandated disclosure of the protocols used for
health plan utilization and cost control. Health Security Act, H.R. 3960, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
§ 1412 (1994).
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ary care. The primary care they provide must follow protocols that
are, in part, fiscally driven. For participating physicians, these ar-
rangements entail surrendering some clinical independence in return
for administrative and professional support, with a steady supply of
patients. For the patient, this may mean better access to a medical
professional, but less contact with one primary physician.
Medical care administrators are increasingly involved in the areas
of medical care decision making and quality review that had been
reserved to physicians and their professional self regulation. As an
example, hospitals traditionally operated as "doctors' workshops." 3"
Today, the interests of the hospital, as an entity, are diverging from
the interests of the medical staff. 54 Changes in surgical and anesthetic
techniques, revamped reimbursement' policies, and changing demo-
graphics and care needs are contributing to declining hospital admis-
sion rates and shorter average lengths of stay. Fiscal concerns of the
hospital have increased the review of physician efficiency and profi-
ciency.355 Economic credentialing, the evaluation of physicians for
appointment or reappointment to a hospital medical staff based on
financial performance, is one example of the new merit system for
medical staffs. 56
Another response to the changing environment for medical prov-
iders is the development of integrated delivery systems. The systems
are designed to ensure a continuum of available care provided in the
most appropriate setting based on therapeutic as well as financial
considerations. In one form, a hospital becomes the center for a
medical care network through mergers, acquisitions, and joint ven-
tures. 5 7 On the admission end, the hospital purchases primary care
practices or affiliates with managed care entities to ensure a steady
supply of customers. On the discharge end, there are joint ventures
with home health care agencies and nursing homes to ensure that
353. STARR, supra note 39, at 178.
354. For a detailed discussion, see John D. Blum, Hospitals, New Medical Practice
Guidelines, CQ!, and Potential Liability, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 913 (1992).
355. See, e.g., Stephen B. Kritchevsky and Bryan P. Simmons, Continuous Quality
Improvement: Concepts and Applications for Physician Care, 266 JAMA 1817 (1991).
356. See generally John D. Blum, Economic Credentialing: A New Twist in Hospital
Appraisal Processes, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 427 (1991).
357. See, e.g., Tom Redburn, Rebounding from Crisis, New York Hospital Changes its
Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1993, at BI, 12; see also Peters, Integrated Delivery Can Align
Physician and Hospital Plans, J. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. Ass'N., Dec. 1991, 20; Johnson,
Dynamic Diversification: Hospitals Pursue Physician Alliances, "Seamless" Care, HOSPITALS,
Feb. 5, 1992, 20.
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patients can be discharged as soon as possible.35 The increased com-
plexity of these business relationships require more active and so-
phisticated hospital administration, counsel, and boards of directors.
In this process, there is a shift of responsibility from the medical
staff to the administrative staff. Patients have no direct input into
the decisions made at the administrative level.
The aging of our population and increased attention to the needs
of disabled Americans have driven an expansion of the long term
care industry to address chronic medical conditions. The concept of
the "least restrictive alternative" for imposed therapy has been adapted
to specialized medical services.359 Nursing homes and home health
care agencies have expanded in the last decades to address the need
for appropriate long term care.3 60 Hospice programs have become a
widely accepted means of care for terminally ill patients and their
families.3 61 Drug, alcohol, and mental health programs have also
increased with a strong non-institutional component. Special programs
designed for individuals with developmental disabilities or mental
retardation are among the most expensive treatments per capita.
These providers depart from the common medical model of a
physician assisting an otherwise healthy person through a short term
acute care episode. The health problems are long term and often
incurable, but proper care can improve the quality of the patients'
lives. Although still prescribed under the signature of a physician,
most of the medical services are directly provided by others. The
patient has contact with physical, occupational, and speech therapists,
nurses, counselors, social workers, and dieticians far more often than
physicians.
2. The Rise of Federal Mandates
The increased involvement of the federal government in health
care policy and payment includes mandates directly affecting the
provider-patient relationship. Three recent federal enactments impose
limited requirements on medical providers to begin to address concerns
358. See generally HCIA & ARTHUR ANDERSON, THE GUIDE TO THE NURSING HOME
INDUSTRY (1993).
359. Id.
360. Between 1960 and 1993, nursing home expenditures increased from $1 billion to an
estimated $76 billion. This represented 3.69% of national health expenditures in 1960 and over
8% estimated for 1993. HCIA AND ARTHUR ANDERSON, THE GUIDE TO THE NURSING HOME
INDUSTRY, 1993.
361. There are currently 1,800 hospices serving the United States. See Warren L. Wheeler,
Hospice Philosophy: An Alternative to Assisted Suicide, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 755, 757 (1994).
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about access to appropriate care and patient autonomy. First, under
the Federal Emergency Care Act of 1986,362 a person presenting herself
to a hospital emergency room while in active labor or in need of
emergency medical care must have her labor treated or be stabilized.1
63
This care must be provided without regard to her ability to have the
care covered. 36 Second, the Patient's Self Determination Act, effective
December 1, 1991, requires the hospital, nursing home, hospice pro-
gram, or home care agency to provide notice to the patient of her
state law rights to decide the course of medical care and of the
availability of advance directives.3 65 Third, concurrent amendments to
the Medicare and Medicaid statutes stopped nursing homes from using
chemical or physical restraints on residents "for purposes of discipline
or convenience. ' 36 The only restraints allowed are those ordered by
a physician for physical safety.3 67
The influence of federal mandates will increase. One dramatic
change would be a mandatory participation requirement, as in the
Clinton Health Security Act.368 The current national health care reform
debate has been built on strong support for the proposition that access
to primary care should be guaranteed for all lawful U.S. residents as
a matter of equitable social policy.3 69 Access and cost containment
are co-dependent because it would be financially difficult and politi-
cally impossible to increase access without cost containment. Con-
versely, participation in the new system of care by most members of
the population and most providers is needed or else cost containing
initiatives will be substantially weakened.
The federal government's program by program approach to cost
containment has achieved limited success as have ad hoc steps by
other payors. However, all paying sources have discovered that it is
often in their interest to shift costs out of their program or policy
rather than to identify and cut unnecessary care or to control medical
362. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd (1988).
363. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988).
364. Id. The mandate to provide care regardless of payment is notable because at about
the time of the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, the notion of charity care virtually
disappeared.
365. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(F)(i) (1988) (Medicare participating facilities); 42 U.S.C. §
1396(a)(57) (1988) (Medicaid'participating facilities).
366. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(3)(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1988).
367. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1988) (Medicaid). The need to comply with the law
led to a practice guideline developed by the nursing home industry. AmIucAN HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS (1992)
(available from the AHCA, 1201 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005).
368. Health Security Act, H.R. 3960, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1002(a)(l) (1994).
369. Id.
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cost increases.170 Providers have changed the way services are provided
to avoid the impact of cost-containment measures. This cost and
service shifting has contributed to the large and growing number of
individuals without the means to pay for care and steadily increasing
medical costs. To deal with this problem, the Clinton administration
proposal mandated that all eligible U.S. residents participate in the
medical coverage system, and, thus, effectively mandated participation
by medical care providers.3 7'
Cost containment measures will likely continue to take the form
of indirect regulations. Most legislative initiatives avoid directly man-
dating reductions in current levels of medical care. Politically speak-
ing, the more attractive options are spending caps that put pressure
on medical professionals and administrators to reduce spending.3 72
B. The New Role of Utilization Review
New processes and concepts in utilization review will dramatically
increase oversight of medical decisions and their outcomes. Medical
utilization review is an examination of the care that is provided to a
370. Medicare has kept the rate of increase of its PPS hospital payments under the rate
of medical care inflation. J. Greenleaf, et al., EDUCATING PHYSICIANS RESPONSIBLE FOR POOR
MEDICAL CARE: A REVIEW OF THE PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION'S EFFORTS, OIG Pub. No. OEI-
01-89-00020 (1991). Its once generous reimbursement now covers less than 90 percent of the
cost of care. Id. The shortfall has been made up by higher reimbursements from private insurers.
Id.
371. Health Security Act, H.R. 3960.
372. An example of such a politically acceptable option was Medicare's Prospective
Payment System (PPS) for hospitals. Beginning in 1984, it set payments for each hospital
discharge according to the diagnosis related group assigned to that patient. Facilities knew the
Medicare payment they could expect from treating any particular diagnosis. David M. Frankford,
The Medicare DRGs: Efficiency and Organizational Rationality, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 275 (1993).
Rather than comparing this income with their costs, and adjusting either the method of treating
or the pattern of their admissions, Frankford asserts that the actual response of hospitals "more
resembles the use of a blunt instrument . .. rather than fine cutting with a scalpel by DRG."
Id. at 322. Prior to enactment, there was concern that the PPS would induce hospitals to
increase admissions. Id. at 306-08. The predetermined payment for each discharge meant that
patient volume, rather than extending stays, would be the means to increase revenue. Id. The
utilization review mechanism was redrafted to better monitor inappropriate admissions and
readmissions. Id. at 309-10. The reaction of the providers was not as expected. Admissions
declined substantially. Id. at 309. Much of the decline is attributable to switching many lens
procedures, including cataract surgery, to outpatient settings. Id. The prospect of increased
review prompted the switch for these services that are "relatively simple, generally thought to
be overused, and good candidates for outpatient treatment." Id. This is even more surprising
since reimbursement levels in the first two years of PPS were "overly generous." See Robert
F. Coulam & Gary L. Gaumer, Medicare's Prospective Payment System: A Critical Appraisal,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., 1991 Annual Supp. 45, at 53.
PPS has had a limited impact on hospital efficiency and specialization, but may have had
a positive effect on patient outcomes by diverting some services to outpatient settings and
shortening hospital stays. See LouIsE RUSSELL, MEDICARE'S NEW HOSPITAL PAYMENT SYSTEM:
Is IT WORKING? 24-46 (1989).
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patient, conducted by someone other than the medical professionals
directly involved in the case.373 The review can be done by colleagues,
such as the quality assurance committee of a hospital medical staff,
or by reviewers outside the medical staff, such as contract agencies
working for paying sources.174 Utilization review by outside reviewers,
never popular among providers, will almost certainly surpass medical
malpractice litigation as the most noticeable critique of the provision
of medical care.
The Medicare law mandates utilization review to cut unnecessary
services and improve the quality of care.3 75 The current mechanisms
for conducting this review are Peer Review Organizations (PROs).
Until recently, the PROs have focused on screening for specific
instances of bad care.376 Medicare's utilization review, as a means of
quality improvement or fiscal monitoring, has a disappointing history
due to professional resistance, questionable standards of review, and
weak enforcement mechanisms.
77
The Health Care Financing Administration, overseer of the Med-
icare program, has undertaken a new utilization review strategy which
is embodied in the Health Care Quality Improvement Initiative
(HCQII) . 7 This initiative substantially alters the utilization review
tasks performed by the Peer Review Organizations (PROs):37 9
373. See generally KATHLEEN R. CICCONE & JONATHON T. LORD, IQA-2 CONTINUOUS
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT THROUGH INTEGRATED QUALITY ASSESSMENT (1993). Currently
between 300 and 400 organizations provide utilization review services to medical paying sources.
Reviewer's application of uniform screening and evaluation standards do vary. Thirty states
and the District of Columbia have begun to regulate this industry. However, most of the
legislation has been enacted since 1990 and a number of states do not yet have implementing
regulations.
374. Id.
375.. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (1988). The Medicare payments are restricted to medical
services that meet the statutory standard of being "reasonable and necessary." Id. See .
Greenleaf, et al, Educating Physicians Responsible for Poor Medical Care: A Review of the
Peer Review Organizations' Efforts (OIG Pub. No. OEI-01-89-00020) (1991). Physician spon-
sored PRO's are eligible to obtain contracts under Medicare. 42 C.F.R. § 462.101 (1991). A
"physician-sponsored organization," defined as a group comprised of at least 10% of the area's
practicing physicians "who are representative of the physicians practicing in the area" is awarded
extra credit in bidding for the contract. 42 § C.F.R. 462.102 (1991). The Secretary extends
contracts to perform this function in a given geographical area for two year periods. 42 §
C.F.R. 462.107(d) (1991).
376. For example, one study concluded that the PRO's detected only the most egregious
quality failures, See Hoya Rubin et al., Watching the Doctor- Watchers: How Well Do Peer
Review Organization Methods Detect Hospital Care Quality Problems?, 267 JAMA 2349, 2353
(1992).
377. See RUSSELL, supra note 372, at 64-65.
378. The Health Care Financing Administration has identified the four important forces
driving the HCQII:
Variations research: Research has revealed a substantial variation in patterns and
outcomes of care from hospital to hospital, and geographical area to area. Accu-
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Central to the HCQII is a fundamental change in the PRO program
from its emphasis on individual (and often isolated) clinical errors
to an increased emphasis on general improvements in medical care.
Under the HCQII, PROs will use statistical quality control to ex-
amine variations in both the processes and the outcomes of care....
The Initiative is intended to move mainstream medical care toward
best available practices, in contrast with a previous emphasis that
focused on correcting unusually bad care. 380
With evolving information technology, reviewers now have access to
patient specific data as well as aggregated data showing a provider's
practice patterns. Quantitative measures of an individual's practice
can be compared to national or regional averages, thus attracting
attention to practices outside the mainstream."" Profiling is rapidly
spreading. 8 2 A 1992 AMA survey found that almost half of the
physicians responding were subject to clinical or economic profiling. 3
The Health Care Financing Administration has taken the next step
by publishing profiles of individual U.S. hospitals.384
mulated evidence indicates that variations in risk-adjusted outcomes reflect variations
in appropriateness and quality of care.
Studies of peer review: A growing body of research is raising questions about the
reliability of physician review of hospital medical records to determine quality of
care.
New models for quality improvement: New approaches to quality improvement that
have entered the health care industry from other industries suggest that substandard
care generally results from poor process design, inadequate information, and poor
training.
Practice guidelines development: The Federal government and professional groups
have started a process to develop and publish clinical practice guidelines, which
provide potential blueprints for quality improvement efforts in the clinical areas they
address.
58 Fed. Reg. 12043 (1993). See also Jencks & Wilensky, supra note 343. Kathleen N. Lohr,
Medicare: A Strategy for Quality Assurance, (Institute of Medicine Report), February, 1990.
379. 58 FED. REG. 12043.
380. 57 FED. REG. 26871-01 (1992). As of April 1, 1993, the Peer Review Organizations
contracting with Medicare to perform the utilization review function were to devote approxi-
mately 50% of their time on HCQII.
381. See John D. Blum, Hospitals, New Medical Practice Guidelines, CQI, and Potential
Liability, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 913, 921 (1992) [hereinafter, Blum]; Kent, Patient Outcomes
Profiles Help Hospitals Evaluate Quality, Decide on Reappointment, 2 REP. ON MED. GUIDE-
LINES & OUTCOMES RES. (Feb. 1, 1991).
382. Blum, supra note 381, at 921.
383. AMER. MED. AS'N, CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, SOCIOECONOMIC CHAR-
ACTERISTICS OF MEDICAl. PRACTICE, 1993. The practice was most prevalent for physicians with
a managed care (HMO, IPA, PPO) contract. HMO staff physicians received a higher rate of
regular feedback regarding their clinical profile (7507o) than did any physicians other than
government employees. Id.
384. The profiles include basic descriptions such as the number of beds along with
performance statistics such as patient mortality rates and average length of stay. HEALTH CARE
FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (HCFA), MEDICARE HOSPITAL MORTALITY INFORMATION, 1988-90
(1992); see also Larry M. Manheim et al., Regional Variation in Medicare Hospital Mortality,
29 Inquiry 55 (1992); Wan, Hospital Variations in Adverse Patient Outcomes, 7 QUAL. ASSUR.
UT. REV. 50 (1992).
BEYOND INFORMED CONSENT
Utilization review focusing on patterns and outcomes of care are
data-intensive, and new systems for acquiring and analyzing data are
critical to their success. This raises several fundamental questions.
First, what data is, can be, and should be collected? It is more
challenging to translate patient participation into a number than it is
with cost or patient mortality. Inaccurate or incomplete data would
distort the pictre of what is being done.
Second, what standards should be used as the review criteria?
The choices reflect a particular balancing of the tension between three
values: medical care quality, patient autonomy, and cost containment.
The relative weights assigned each value will depend on the role of
the standard setter. Review by the medical staff quality assurance
committee would be expected to stress professionally defined quality,
while a paying source may put greater weight on cost containment
and identifying inappropriate care. Risk management review focuses
on high risk procedures and seeks to prevent actionable, bad results." 5
Practice guidelines, discussed in the next section, may be adapted for
use as review criteria.
Finally, the response of the reviewer and the degree of flexibility
of the standards as applied will determine the impact on practice
patterns. The Health Care Financing Administration is stressing a
cooperative approach under the Health Care Quality Improvement
Initiative.38 6 This is a significant change from their prior utilization
review efforts. For example, until recently, the Health Care Financing
Administration refused to disclose the utilization screens and guide-
lines used in determining whether services are medically necessary and
reasonable. This was to avoid "gaming" of the system by physi-
cians.387
385. Eleanor D. Lee & Marilyn M. Kinney, Medical Standard Setting in the Current
Malpractice Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 421, 423 (1989).
386. 58 Fed. Reg. 12042 (1993). The HCFA explains the approach as follows:
The PROs will systematically and regularly analyze these data to identify tiends,
changes in trends, and variations from national or peer group patterns. Once signif-
icant patterns have been identified, the PROs will, through their feedback and
cooperative projects, work with provider administrative and medical staffs, as well
as with interested expert groups, to improve the processes and outcomes of care
provided to, and experienced by, Medicare beneficiaries. The PROs will also use
baseline data to monitor progress toward sustained superior ("benchmark") perform-
ance.
The essence of each project is to combine the statistical interpretation of Medicare
data (for example, pattern analysis) with feedback to the medical community to
improve care and outcomes measurably.
Id.
387. Timothy P. Blanchard, "Medical Necessity" Denials as a Medicare Part B Cost-
containment Strategy: Two Wrongs Don't Make it Right or Rational, 34 ST. Louts U. L.J.
939, 993 (1990).
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The new utilization review effort is supported by popular theories
of production management, known as Total Quality Management
(TQM) or Continuous Quality Improvement.3 88 These theories stress
the use of statistical data to measure production outcomes.38 9 As
applied to medical care services, the theories support a central role
of management in coordinating work by the patient care team and
redirecting resources to address problems and shortcomings. 390 Besides
the Health Care Financing Administration, the other important over-
seer of U.S. medical care delivery is the Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Health Organizations (JCAHO).3 91 Both have
enthusiastically adopted Continuous Quality Improvement and are
integrating it into their standards for reviewing care providers.192 The
major revisions of the JCAHO accreditation standards are described
by a hospital industry publication as follows:
The central theme of the proposed 1994 changes is complete
organizational commitment to continuously improving the total qual-
ity of patient care. This commitment must be built into the hospital's
long-range strategic planning process, its allocation of resources, its
stated expectations, and its reward structures for employees. Ulti-
mately, hospitals will be expected to have a comprehensive self-
assessment system in place to support and promote continuous
improvement in the quality of patient care.3 93
388. See, e.g., W. Edwards Deming, Quality, Productivity, and Competitive Position
(1980); CICCONE & LORD, supra note 373, at 24-26.
389. CICCONE & LORD, supra note 373.
390. Mary T. Koska, New JCAHO Standards Emphasize Continuous Quality Improve-
ment, HosPITALS, Aug. 5, 1991, 41; Kritchevsky & Simmons, supra note 355, at 1819-22.
391. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) is
the world's largest health care standard and accrediting body. The organization's name and
work reflect the changes in providers of care. In 1987 the name was changed from the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals to reflect its expanding role in surveying and
accrediting the many other health care organizations.
392. CIccoNE & LORD, supra note 373, at 23.
393. Id. at 24. The 1992 JCAHO hospital accreditation standards already reflect the
increasing administrative responsibility for quality of care.
The revised standards place greater emphasis on the role of leadership in assessing
and improving patient care and further clarifying certain steps in the monitoring and
evaluation process. As stated in the preamble, the standards are based on the following
principles:
e A hospital can better improve patient care quality and satisfy patients by assessing
the process-the governance, managerial, clinical, and support functions-that most
affect patient outcomes.
e Some of these processes are carried out by physicians, nurses, or Governing Body
members; others are carried out by managers or support staff; and some are carried
out jointly. The goal of quality improvement is to coordinate and integrate these
processes.
*The role of the hospital's leadership is to help everyone working in these processes
to assess and improve them.
Id. at 23 (footnotes omitted) (citing JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE OR-
GANIZATIONs ACCREDITATION MANuAL FOR HOSPITALS, 137-38 (1992)).
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In contrast with this approach, prescriptive utilization review
standards can be applied to limit beneficial services solely for eco-
nomic reasons. 94 An example of a standard that overrides patient
autonomy and professional discretion is found in New York Medi-
caid's home care program.3 95 Before Medicaid coverage of home care
services is authorized, a medical and social assessment is conducted
to determine whether home care services are appropriate for the
individual.3 9 If home care is determined to be appropriate, a care
plan specifying the level, frequency, and duration of services is de-
veloped and authorized for coverage.197
Reacting to concerns about a state budget deficit, the state leg-
islature mandated the additional pre-authorization step of a fiscal
assessment. 98 After the care plan is developed, the cost of the services
to the Medicaid program is calculated. 39 When home care would cost
Medicaid more than institutional care, coverage for home care is
denied unless limited exceptions apply. 400 Since the Medicaid program
has restrictive financial eligibility criteria, Medicaid participants who
are above the cost threshold cap have only two options - accept
institutionalization or do without needed care. 401 The authorization
394. See Frances H. Miller, Denial of Health Care and Informed Consent in English and
American Law, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 37 (1992). Oregon has been granted a conditional waiver
from Medicaid requirements so that it can restrict coverage of certain treatments for certain
conditions as part of a plan to increase the number of individuals who have coverage. See
Oregon Request for Medicaid Waiver Approved by HHS with Conditions, 4 MEDICARE REPORT
(BNA) 13 (Mar. 26, 1993). The process of ranking the treatment-condition pairs was, in part,
a debate on their relative usefulness. Id.
395. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 365-a(2)(d) & (e) (McKinney 1993).
396. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 367-o.
397. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 365-(a)(2)(d) & (e).
398. See N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW §§ 367-j (home health services) and § 367-k (personal
care services). Some, but not all, local social services districts began to implement the process
in the latter part of 1993.
399. In keeping with the narrow focus on saving money for the Medicaid program, it is
the cost to Medicaid, not the total cost of care, that is the relevant figure. The assessing agency
must consider all "economies" that could reduce the cost. If, for example, Personal Emergency
Response Services can appropriately replace personal care aide hours that change in the care
plan must be done. Other economies include shared aide services, Medicare covered home
health care, patient managed home care, and adult day health programs. The remaining services
are then entered into a worksheet along with the cost of each category of care, e.g. Personal
Care Aide Level 1, Personal Care Aide Level 2, Home Health Aide, Physical Therapist, Speech
Therapist, Registered Nurse, Licensed Practical nurse, etc. The average monthly cost is then
computed. See id. § 367.
400. One major exception is that institutionalization is contraindicated e.g. would result
in a diminishing of the participant's ability to perform the activities of daily living, such as
toileting, eating, transferring or bathing. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 367-j(l)(e)(iv).
401. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(2)(a)(4) & (7). Clients would be unable to agree to
lower levels of care since the Medicaid program must be satisfied that the care plan is adequate
and provides for the safety of the individual. Id. §§ 367-j(2)(a)(l) and 367-k(2)(a)(1).
Current recipients of Medicaid covered home care who exceed the cost threshold will be
reauthorized for home care only until an appropriate placement is available. Id. §§ 367-j(l)(f)(ii)
and 367-k(l)(e)(ii).
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process does not take into account the desirability of allowing the
patient to.remain at home and retain a degree of independence.
The treating physician's only contribution to the assessment proc-
ess is the Physician's Order for Personal Care Services. 402 Effective
January 1, 1993, New York Medicaid policy is to preclude physicians
from prescribing the amount of personal care services for their patients
using that form. 4°3 The New York State Department of Social Services,
the administrator of New York's Medicaid program, explained the
reason for this policy as follows:
In recent years, many social services districts have reported increasing
difficulty in obtaining required physician orders which accurately
describe the recipient's/patient's medical condition and needs. Phy-
sicians are under increasing pressure from recipients/patients and
their families to order services to meet social and family rather than
medical needs.4
C. Redefining Quality in Medical Care Review
A medical practice guideline is a set of recommendations that
lays out one or more acceptable approaches to the provision of medical
care for a particular illness or medical problem. 405 The guideline can
include both diagnostic and treatment options. 406 The content of
practice guidelines depends on the information available and the
intentions of the promulgators. 4 The outcomes movement, a renewed
effort to carefully assess long term outcomes and analyze effectiveness
of treatments, was spurred by research showing significant variations
in medical care usage among similar populations? °8 A critical look at
402. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.14(b)(3)(i).
403. Implementation of this policy has been enjoined by, Kuppersmith v. Perales, 535
N.Y.S.2d 510 (1988) (Table, no. 35297N).
404. New York State Department of Social Services Administrative Directive; 92 ADM-
48 (December 1, 1992).
405. Another widely used definition is that practice guidelines are "systematically devel-
oped statements [of recommendations for patient management] to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical conditions." M.RILYN J. FIELD &
KATHLEEN N. LohR, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 8 (1990).
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) defines good practice guidelines as having the following
attributes: validity, reliability, clinical applicability, clinical flexibility, clarity, multidisciplinary
process of development, scheduled review to determine whether revisions are warranted and
documentation. Id. at 10.
406. See Blum, supra note 354, at 913 n.3.
407. Id. at 927-45.
408. See, e.g., John E. Wennberg & A. Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care
Delivery, 182 ScI. 1102 (1983); John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variation:
A Proposal for Action, 3 HEALTH AFFAIRS 6 (1984); Mark R. Chassin et al., Variations in the
Use of Medical and Surgical Services by the Medicare Population, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285
(1986); Payne, Identifying and Managing Inappropriate Hospital Utilization: A Policy Synthesis,
22 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 709 (1987).
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accepted medical practices found there were few with support of solid
outcome studies.4 Researchers, with increased financial support from
the federal government, have undertaken to review the outstanding
literature and proceed where needed with new studies.410
An essential step in the production of practice guidelines is
processing sound medical research results into diagnostic and treat-
ment algorithms useable in clinical situations and in utilization re-
view. 41" The production of high quality practice guidelines is time
consuming and expensive. For the greatest potential financial impact,
common conditions with widely variable treatment standards are being
selected for guideline development, as are the most expensive proce-
dures. For risk management purposes, the selection process focuses
on high risk procedures performed by high risk specialists.412 The
Maine Liability Demonstration Project is the leading effort in the use
of practice guidelines to reduce malpractice claims. 413
The influence of the practice guidelines will depend on the con-
tent, degree of acceptance by the providers, and the enforcement
powers behind the guidelines .4 4 The guidelines will have a greater
impact the more prescriptive they are and the less they comport with
409. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, (AHCPR) MEDICAL EFFECTIVE-
NESS RESEARCH DATA METHODS (M. Grady & H. Schwartz eds., 1992) (AHCPR No. 92-0056).
410. See generally Jencks & Wilensky, supra note 339. The HCQII is a preliminary step
toward what could approach one massive outcome study involving all care provided by Medicare.
411. In health care, an algorithm is a defined and prescribed sequential process whereby
clinical and diagnostic findings at a particular point in the process determine the next diagnostic,
clinical or therapeutic decision or action to be made or taken. URINARY INCONTINENCE IN
ADULTS, supra note 312, Glossary, at 109.
412. See, e.g., Deborah W. Garnick et al., Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number
and Costs of Malpractice Claims, 266 JAMA 2856 (1991).
413. See MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 294. Twenty practice guidelines for four high
risk specialties, anesthesiology, emergency medicine, obstetrics and gynecology and radiology
were identified as having the most potential impact on the number of malpractice claims filed
in Maine. Guidelines developed by the national medical specialty associations provide most of
those used, but some guidelines were developed locally where national standards had not been
developed. Id. The guidelines were incorporated into the rules of the Maine Board of Registration
in Medicine and the Maine Board of Osteopathic Examination and Registration through a
rulemaking process. Id. Physicians participating in the Project can introduce the guidelines to
establish the standard of care in a malpractice action. Id. Recent legislation opens the project
to any specialty that adopts practice guidelines. Id.
Three other states, Florida, Minnesota and Vermont, are developing similar programs. The
Health Security Act contained a national demonstration project very similar to Maine's. See
Health Security Act, § 5312 H.R. 3960, 103 Cong., 2d Session (1994).
414. Another recent effort, development of consensus standards for practice sponsored
by the National Institutes of Health, had little impact on practice patterns. See, e.g., Jacqueline
Kosecoff et al., Effects of National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Program on
Physician Practice, 258 JAMA 2708, 2710-13 (1987).
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accepted methods of practice. 4 5 As one commentator has concluded,
The prescriptiveness of the guideline will depend in part on the
extent of the outcomes research literature, but also will depend
substantially on the motivations of those developing the guidelines.
It is much easier to develop a guideline that encompasses the practices
of all but the real deviants than one that asks a substantial minority
or even majority to change their practice. Unless those who develop
the guideline are committed to making significant changes, the guide-
line is likely to have little effect on practice.4 1 6
Given the differing range of information we have on medical
outcomes for specific treatments, practice guidelines will range from
being completely prescriptive to those allowing considerable discre-
tion. 417 For the widely accepted or well enforced standards, evidence
based, national norms of care are replacing individual clinical judg-
ment, expert opinion, and prevailing practice standards.418 Given the
strong incentive for administrators and paying sources to rely on
practice guidelines, one noted commentator on practice policies has
concluded that "[i]t is not stretching things too far to say that whoever
controls practice policies controls medicine. '41 9
The federal government has committed substantial resources to
developing high quality practice guidelines and improving their ac-
ceptance by medical practitioners. 420 In 1989, the Agency for Health
Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) was created within the federal
Public Health Service. 42' It has a mandate to support the development
of clinically relevant guidelines. 422 The AHCPR guidelines must
415. See Paul B. Ginsburg, Alternative Approaches to Health Care Cost Containment,
30 JURIMETRICS J. 447 (1990).
416. Id. at 454.
417. For a description of the spectrum from practice standards to options, see David M.
Eddy, Designing a Practice Policy; Standards, Guidelines and Options, 263 JAMA 3077 (1990).
418. One of the first national practice guidelines, developed to standardize the steps in
anesthetizing patients, has been credited with improving quality. See AM. SOCIETY OF ANES-
THESIOLOGISTS (ASA), STANDARDS FOR BASIC INTRA-OPERATIVE MONITORING (1986).
419. David M. Eddy, Practice Policies - What Are They?, 263 JAMA 877, 880 (1990).
420. The federal agency budget for outcomes research and practice guideline development
increased from under $2 million in 1988 to $75 million in 1992. For an example of earlier
efforts, see REPORT OF THE U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVICES TASK FORCE, GUIDE TO CLINICAL
PREVENTIVE SERVICES (1989).
421. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 6103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 299(a) (1993);
amended by the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research Reauthorization Act of 1992,
1320(b)-12 (Supp. 11 1994).
422. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-l(a) (Supp. 11 1993). The guidelines' priorities are to:
1. Improve methods for disease prevention,
2. Improve methods of diagnosis, treatment, and clinical management for the benefit
of a significant number of individuals,
3. Reduce clinically significant variations among clinicians in the particular services
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1. be based on the best available research and professional judgment
2. be presented in formats appropriate for use by physicians, health
care practitioners, medical educators, and medical review organiza-
tions and providers, in formats appropriate for use by consumers
of health care;
3. include treatment-specific or condition-specific practice guidelines
for clinical treatments and conditions in forms appropriate for use
in clinical practice, for use in educational programs, and for use in
reviewing quality and appropriateness of medical care; and
4. include information on risks and benefits of alternative strategies
for the prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and management of a given
disease, disorder, or other health condition; and
5. include information on the costs of alternative strategies for the
prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and management of a given disease,
disorder or other health condition, where cost information is avail-
able and reliable. 423
AHCPR has issued several Guidelines and a number are in develop-
ment. 424 In compliance with the legislative mandate, the Guidelines
are issued in separate formats for providers and the public 4 25
D. The Future of The Patient-Provider Relationship
Unprecedented changes in the organizational structure and fi-
nancing of medical care in the United States offer the promise of
controlling medical cost inflation while improving access to primary
care. The financial stakes of the major organized interests ensure that
their concerns will be brought to the attention of the legislators writing
the statutes and the administrative agencies that will further develop
and procedures utilized in making diagnoses and providing treatments and
4. Reduce clinically significant variations in the outcomes of health care services and
procedures.
42 U.S.C. § 299b-3(a) (Supp. 1 1993).
The AHCPR practice guidelines are developed either by panels convened by the AHCPR
or through contracts with non-profit organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-2 (Supp. 1 1993).
423. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-l(b) (Supp. 1 1993).
424. Among the AHCPR guidelines released are URInARY INCONTINENCE IN ADULTS;
MANAGEMENT OF FUNCTIONAL IMPAIRMENT DUE TO CATARACT IN THE ADULT; ACUTE PAIN
MANAGEMENT: OPERATIVE OR MEDICAL PROCEDURES AND TRAuMA; DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT
OF DEPRESSED OUTPATIENTS IN PRIMARY CARE SETTINGS; PRESSURE ULCERS IN ADULTS: PREDIC-
TION AND PREVENTION; SICKLE CELL DISEASE; EARLY EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT Of HIV
INFECTION; AND DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF OTITIS MEDIA IN CHILDREN.
425. Each AHCPR Guideline set issued includes a Guideline Report, a Quick Reference
Guide for Clinicians, a Clinical Practice Guideline and a Patient's Guide. The Guideline Report
is the most comprehensive version, designed primarily for use by researchers. The two clinical
guides are intended as desk-top references for clinical decision making. They include algorithms
for various patient subpopulations. The Patient's Guide is for the public. See, e.g., URINARY
INCONTINENCE IN ADULTS, supra note 312.
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policy and oversee its execution. However, problems that do not
translate forcefully into political issues may get crowded off the
agenda of what must be addressed. The role of the individual in
medical decision making is one of these overlooked issues.
The widespread professional indifference to patient participation
means that the service-level practices will be responding to provider
self-interest, more so than to patient rights. In turn, provider self-
interest will be determined in light of the policy emphasis on cost
controls. This makes the future of the patient-provider relationship
dependent on the provider's reaction to federal policy aimed at lim-
iting the cost of care.
To date, the development of informed consent doctrines and the
broader right of patient self-determination have focused on the patient
and physician, with some acknowledgment that other medical profes-
sionals may be substituted for the physician in a one-to-one relation-
ship. This has been an inappropriate model for long term care
relationships. With the movement toward group practices and pre-
scriptive utilization review standards, the independent medical prac-
titioner model also will miss important new issues and conflicts in
primary and secondary short-term care. In long term care, we have
experience with cost-conscious, highly regulated, non-physician di-
rected care. 426 This experience can be instructive about the future of
the patient-provider relationship.
1. Utilization Review, Practice Guidelines and the Exchange of
Information
High quality practice guidelines will help narrow the information
gap between patients and medical providers. As an example, when
an AHCPR practice guideline is developed, the basic medical infor-
mation regarding the condition and the alternatives for treatment are
processed into a Patient's Guide.42 7 This assists the provider in de-
veloping fuller patient participation. Even if the provider is aware of
the outcome literature and understands the significance of the find-
ings, making the information available to the patient could be a time
consuming venture. Because of this, the Patient's Guides are of
significant importance.
As with other features of practice guidelines, the treatment of
patient participation will vary depending on the source and intended
426. Two such areas are nursing homes and long-term care facilities regulations.
427. See supra note 425 and accompanying text.
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use of the guidelines. The lay person versions of the AHCPR practice
guidelines encourage patient self-education. The Patient's Guides also
suggest that the patient make her concerns and preferences known to
the provider and ask questions when uncertain about the available
choices in care.
428
The AHCPR clinical guidelines stress the importance of patient
communication and provide some guidance to the practitioner in this
area.429 In contrast, the practice guidelines used in the Maine Liability
Demonstration Project address informed consent and patient partic-
ipation only superficially. 4 0 This is surprising considering the research
strongly connects poor patient relationships with high rates of medical
malpractice claims.43
The preparation of written patient guides is not a complete answer
for augmenting patient involvement. Significant portions of the pa-
tient population will find such information unhelpful. Furthermore,
the important interpersonal work of explaining what the medical
information implies for a patient given her particular circumstances
cannot be generalized and must be left to the provider.
Practice guidelines will have an educational value to providers if
the guidelines are made relevant to clinical practice. Providers are
coming to realize that current information and high quality recom-
mendation are a prerequisite to more effective communication with
patients. As was noted in a recent medical journal article,
Before they participate in a screening program, patients must
give informed consent. To do so, they need to understand the risk
of a false positive result and the invasive procedures that may follow
it. Rather than merely transmit expert recommendations, physicians
should match the appropriate level of screening with each patient's
unique attitude toward the risks of disease and the risks associated
with the screening procedures.
428. See, e.g., URINARY INCONTINENCE IN ADULTS, supra note 312.
429. For example, the Practice Guideline on urinary incontinence reminds the reader that:
Treatment options including their risks, benefits and outcomes should be discussed
with the patient so that informed choices can be made. As a general rule, the least
invasive and least dangerous procedure that is appropriate for the patient should be
the first choice. For many forms of UI, behavioral techniques meet these criteria.
However, an informed patient's preference must be respected.
Id. at 27.
430. See MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 294, App. IV, V, VI, VII.
431. Irwin Press, The Predisposition to File Claims: The Patient's Perspective 12 LAW,
MEDICINE, AND HEALTHCARE 53 (1984); see also Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That
Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries 267 JAMA
1359 (1992); Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients
Handle Medical Grievances 24 L. & Soc'Y REV. 105 (1990).
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But to inform patients, physicians themselves must be informed.
Strange et al. recently discovered that family physicians are more
interventionist in their screening than the U.S. Preventive Services
Task Force recommends. The study found correlations between lack
of compliance with the recommendations and lack of knowledge
(unfamiliarity with the recommendations, lack of residency training,
and lack of teaching experience). 432
Medicine is, and will continue to be, an inexact science. However,
the uncertainty in developing a diagnosis, in choosing the most ap-
propriate cause of treatment, and in predicting the patient's response
to a treatment or procedure will be reduced as clinical guidelines
develop .433
Many in the medical profession may welcome this form of con-
tinuing medical education. In return, physicians, especially the general
and family practitioners, may be quite willing to abide by even the
strictest practice standards. 434 The high rate of participation in the
Maine Liability Demonstration Project (between 87 percent and 92
percent of the original four specialties involved), and the recent
expansion of that project to all Maine specialties suggest that spe-
cialists welcome the guidance of explicit, professionally developed
standards. 45 The guidelines represent a more responsible approach to
"defensive medicine" than ordering extra diagnostic tests.436 Other
medical professionals, such as nurses, have had a long history of
complying with practice protocols or guidelines.4 3 7
As practice guidelines become better accepted, providers may be
less tolerant of patients whose treatment preferences fall outside the
recommended norms. It is possible that practice guidelines will be
written for various philosophies of care. Competing medical groups
may well differentiate themselves by selecting, for example, an oste-
opathic approach as compared to an allopathic approach. In large
432. John M. Lee, Screening and Informed Consent, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED., 438 (1993).
433. See generally FIELD & LoHR, supra note 405.
434. The primary care providers are under increasing pressure to deal with a large caseload
that presents a wide range of symptoms and maladies. To process those individuals, the physician
must rely on hundreds of rules they have learned. A newspaper reporter described the work of
a pediatrician, Michael Levitas, in a group practice in Cumberland, Maryland. Dr. Levitas sees
about 35 patients a day. There is opportunity to slow down, consult, study, but only when
absolutely necessary. It is largely a job of remembered knowledge, applied hour after hour. In
a day-and-a-half visit, Michael Levitas does not once consult a book. David Brown, Volume
Medicine, WASH. POST (National Weekly Edition, Sept. 27-Oct.'3, 1992), 10-11.
435. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 294, at 27.
436. Id.
437. See, e.g., Nancy K. Rhoden, Informed Consent in Obstetrics: Some Special Problems,
9 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 67 (1987).
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urban areas with a diverse cultural mix, there may be an array of
providers targeting various market niches. This would support the
care preferences of substantial minorities.
For the population without access to an array of providers,
practice guidelines could set up a strict orthodoxy in treatment alter-
natives. The lack of scientific studies on alternative medicine might
translate into its absence from practice guidelines. This may mean
that the acupuncturist or chiropractor will not be part of the medical
group serving an area and thus, may not be able to stay in business.
Practice guidelines might work better than the AMA Code of Ethics
to discourage professional contact with "cultists. '438 The tolerance
for unconventional approaches, with their uncertain potential, will be
tested .419
Unconventional patients also may be treated poorly in a cost-
conscious world of "efficient" care. With providers being reviewed
and compared on the outcomes for the patient population they serve,
there will be a strong preference for the "good" patients - those
who will comply with recommended therapy, appear at follow-up
appointments, and take up little provider time with questions, a need
for instruction, or complaints.
2. Monitoring Patient Participation
Patient participation, as part of quality medical care, can be
monitored and enforced . The incorporation of effective measures of
patient participation in the utilization review standards is made dif-
ficult by the lack of documentation of this aspect of medical care. 440
Without documentation, retrospective review is limited. What is im-
438. The 1956 AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETIcs contained the following:
A physician should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and
he should not voluntarily associate professionally with anyone who violates this
principle. All voluntarily associated activities with cultists are unethical.
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICs, Section 3, 1.
The importance of maintaining the dignity of medicine and of upholding the soundness
of the teachings of scientific medicine as opposed to the fallacies of sectarianism
must be emphasized. Either the theories and practices of scientific medicine are right
and those of the cultists are wrong, or the theories and practices of the cultists are
right and those of scientific medicine are wrong. The physician who maintains
professional relations with cult practitioners would seem to exhibit a lack of faith in
the correctness and efficacy of scientific medicine and to admit that there is merit in
the methods of the cult practitioners.
Id. Section 3, 5. But See, AHCPR CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE, ACUTE Low BACK PROBLEMS
IN ADULTS (acknowledging efficacy of chiropractic care for some cases of lower back pain).439. A recent survey reported in the New England Journal of Medicine describes the
"enormous presence" of unconventional medicine. David M. Eisenberg et al., Unconventional
Medicine in the United States, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED., 246, 251 (1993).
440. See generally Avedis Donabedian, The Quality of Care-How Can It Be Assessed?
260 JAMA 1743 (1988).
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portant is a monitoring process that prospectively encourages in-
formed participation, rather than relying solely on a retrospective
review or litigation. The second major hurdle is setting meaningful
review standards. 41 It will be tempting to establish a system of easy
and superficial compliance.442 Merely documenting that brochures
were handed out or videos played will not satisfy the professional
duty. Measures of patient satisfaction, such as surveys, will shed some
light but are only a proxy for the more elusive items of disclosure
and sharing of responsibility." 3
For institutional providers and medical groups, the quality control
process for patient participation could resemble that used in research.
One function of the Institutional Review Boards (IRB), reducing the
risk of each experiment or treatment, is within the jurisdiction of
institutional risk management and quality assurance committees. 4
Many institutions also have Institutional Ethics Committees. 4"5 These
committees primarily have dealt with the difficult, but narrow, ques-
tions of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining care. 44 With a
broader mandate, they could focus on the form and content of
disclosure that needs to be made to a patient, given the patient's
particular values and circumstances." 7 The key issue for surgery
patients will move from disclosure of known risks to the more chal-
lenging discussion of treatment alternatives.4"
Informed consent lawsuits are another option for monitoring and
enforcement. However, since the doctrines are aimed at protecting
patients from surgical procedures that would have been rejected by a
reasonable person, the essential facts of an informed consent cause
of action should rarely arise in a system with high quality practice
guidelines and comprehensive utilization review. The more likely con-
cern in a cost conscious system is undertreatment and underinforming.
Effective cost-containment could have a negative effect on the will-
ingness of fee for service providers to discuss alternatives that are less
441. Patient Judgments of Hospital Quality: Report of a Pilot Study, 28 MED. CARE SI,
SI-S2 (Meterko, Nelson, & Rubin eds., Supp. 1990).
442. One example would be accepting the entrance of the following into the patient's
record as proof of compliance: Date: XX Discussed risks and alternatives with patient.
443. See, e.g., Eugene C. Nelson, et al., The Patient Comment Card: A System to Gather
Customer Feedback, 17 QRB 278 (1991); Pilot Study, supra note 453.
444. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.113 (1993).
445. Gregory A. Jaffe, Institutional Ethics Committees: Legitimate and Impartial Review
of Ethical Health Care Decisions 10 J. LEG. MED. 393, 393 (1989).
446. Id. at 394-95.
447. See id. at 403-04.
448. Through practice guidelines and the risk lists developed in Texas, Louisiana and
Hawaii, there should be easy access to the material risks of invasive procedures. See supra
notes 197-99, 224, 231-37, 239 and accompanying text.
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favorably reimbursed from the provider's point of view." 9 For cost-
conscious managed care providers, the concerns are described in a
recent law review article as follows:
Under managed competition, a doctor's allegiance is divided between
her patient and the health plan that employs her. The pressure to
limit medical resource consumption may lead the doctor not to
mention to her patient possible tests and procedures. In her own
mind, the doctor will conduct a cost-benefit analysis and conclude
that the potential benefits of certain alternative tests or procedures
are not worth the cost. Discussing additional diagnostic or thera-
peutic options may result in a confrontation with the patient, who
may demand the further treatment. Thus, the risk that the doctor
may simply say nothing is substantial.
... For example, a doctor may be satisfied with a given level of
diagnostic clarity or a certain outcome of treatment, or a doctor
may decide not to administer any medical treatment at all. Battery
doctrine is inapposite in each of these cases where no touching
occurs. Informed consent doctrine may not provide any additional
protection because the rules governing informed consent are still
touch-oriented. Consequently, although each of these situations im-
plicates important autonomy interests, the patient's consent to these
decisions may not be required. 450
Furthermore, the informed consent doctrines are premised on inde-
pendent physicians, or other providers, substituting their judgment
for that of the patient. The choices may be removed from both these
parties by administrative choices of care protocols.
3. Expanded Access and the Patient-Provider Relationship
Expanded access presents a mixed set of consequences. One
immediate impact is that informed consent and participation in de-
cision making becomes relevant to millions of individuals. Substituting
a primary care office for the emergency room as the entry point for
care will offer those newly covered with an opportunity for greater
involvement in their own medical care.
Some provider-patient relationships will be entered into under
different circumstances with increased access. Currently, a patient
449. One proposal to counteract this is to identify interaction as a specifically reimbursed
service component, much as professional patient liability insurance costs were singled out as a
component of the RBRVS.
450. Elaine Lu, The Potential Effect of Managed Competition in Health Care on Provider
Liability and Patient Autonomy, 30 HARv. J. oN LEors. 519, 529 (1993) (footnote omitted)
(citing Matthew R. Gregory, Hard Choices: Patient Autonomy in an Era of Healthcare Cost
Containment, 30 JuRiMBTRics J. 483, 493-94 (1990)).
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must find a physician who chooses to accept her. Establishing the
relationship may be the only way for an individual to receive primary
and preventive medical care and it improves the chances of early
detection of progressive conditions. The relationship allows for the
entrance into a hospital other than through the emergency room. The
AMA has jealously guarded the right of the physician to choose her
patients. The long campaign against "contract medicine" was moti-
vated by the defense of this right.45 ' Even today, the AMA's Principles
provide, "A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient
care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with
whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical
services. '452 This ethic has strong backing in the common law and
statutes.453 The principle also has been well recognized on the clinical
level. The freedom not to undertake to serve a patient, combined
with the importance of receiving care, gives the physician a clear
advantage over the patient in establishing that relationship. Compe-
tition for patients has shifted this dynamic in favor of the patient.
Mandatory participation for providers would make patient acceptance
an administrative detail, rather than a professional prerogative, and
further neutralize the professional dominance.
In contrast, medical care services that do not have excess capacity,
such as nursing homes, will have an increased advantage over patients.
This is because more individuals will be competing for a limited
resource. 4 4 Starting with the nursing home admission process, the
451. See American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443 (2nd Cir.,
1980), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982), reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 966
(1982) (granting enforcement of an FTC order prohibiting the AMA and local medical societies
from engaging in unfair commercial practices such as the use of professional ethical codes to
restrict contract practices that limit the patients' choice of a physician); American Medical
Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (AMA and
local affiliate threatened to expel from medical society those who participated with an early
health maintenance organization. Such expulsion would result in loss of staff privileges at local
hospitals. Criminal conviction of antitrust laws violation upheld); Group Health Coop. of Puget
Sound v. King County Med. Soc'y, 237 P.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1951) (similar actions taken
by a local medical society found to violate state anti-trust laws).
452. AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Principle VI.
453. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395(a) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (Supp. II
1994) (guaranteeing such a free choice for individuals on Medicaid).
The federal statute establishing the Medicare program of government medical insurance
for the elderly and disabled describes free choice as follows:
Free Choice by patient guaranteed
Any individual entitled to insurance benefits under this title may obtain health services from
any institution, agency, or person qualified to participate under this title if such institution,
agency or person undertakes to provide him such services.
42 U.S.C. § 1395(a) (Emphasis added).
454. For example, New York State has successfully limited the construction of new nursing
home beds. This has been, in large part, a policy choice to encourage the use of non-institutional
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patient and her family may feel that they must please the administra-
tion and staff. This imbalance in bargaining position allows the
nursing home to use admission agreements with terms favorable to
the facility. Once admitted, the patient depends on the facility for
her food, shelter, and medical care and again may choose not to
assert rights for fear of some form of reprisal.
Federal law provides some patient protection. In the area of
patient participation, both the Medicaid and Medicare statutes provide
that residents possess
[tihe right to choose a personal attending physician, to be fully
informed in advance about care and treatment, to be fully informed
in advance of any changes in care or treatment that may affect the
resident's well-being and (except with respect to a resident adjudged
incompetent) to participate in planning care and treatment or changes
in care and treatment. 455
This supportive language has not been translated in the standard
practice of nursing homes, as shown by the later passage of legislation
prohibiting the use of physical and chemical restraints for the con-
venience of the staff or for disciplinary purposes. 45 6
A broader range of professionals such as nurses, midwives, and
pharmacists are sharing responsibility for patient care and counsel-
ling. 41 In a recent law review article, these professionals were por-
trayed as seasoned veterans in the struggle against physician-dominated
medical care:
48
Nurses and social workers would appear to be likely sources of
informed medical opinion and even encouragement to autonomy in
the face of physician power and authority. Both these groups have
acquired a fair amount of expertise at how best to preserve autonomy
in the face of authority within health care contents. 459
care (family, friends and formal home health care providers). One result is a median occupancy
rate for all New York nursing homes of over 98 percent. See HCIA, THE GUmE TO THE
NURSING HoME INDUSTRY, 1993, 67 (1993).
455. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(l)(A)(i) (1988).
456. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4711(f)(2)(G),
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-179 (1987).
457. The Health Security Act would have expanded Medicare payment for physicians'
assistants, nurse practitioners and clinical nurse specialists. Health Security Act, § 4022 H.R.
3960, 103 Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). It also proposed to override state practice laws that "restrict
the practice of any class of health professionals beyond what is justified by the skills and
training of such professionals." Health Security Act, § 1161, H.R. 3960, 103 Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994).
458. Nancy K. Rhoden, Informed Consent in Obstetrics: Some Special Problems 9 W.
NEw ENG. L. REV. 67 (1987).
459. Id. at 81.
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These professionals are closer to their patients, in personal relations
as well as class, than are physicians. The movement to patient care
teams may diffuse the sense of responsibility to discuss matters with
the patient. An unconcerned management can leave individuals with-
out someone to talk to or with insufficient information.
Patient education on the basics of a disease or condition may be
done better through means other than a face to face meeting with a
physician. Technical advances in word processing and video are lead-
ing to a library of patient oriented information that can be tailored
to the individual needs and circumstances of each patient.46° The
modifying factors can include a range of patient characteristics, such
as educational level and personal health beliefs.46'
It is not hard to imagine an interactive system that would allow
individuals to better assist in the diagnosis process. The programs,
available in medical offices, at home, or a central location, would
work much like the screening protocols and algorithms used in some
health maintenance organizations (HMOs). The branching logic used
in medical algorithms fits well with computer processing. The AHCPR
has a subcommittee studying the feasibility of developing a computer
based system that would help families to integrate a primary care
plan into their health management activities.4 62
Once a diagnosis has been reached, basic information about the
patient's condition could be available to her in a tailored format.
This would include print, video, and audio all in the appropriate
language. An information source such as this would avoid the need
for repetitious briefings by medical care personnel on basic concepts.
Specialists in patient education could personalize the information and
help prepare any questions the patient would have to present to the
physician. In addition to these efforts, the public will need to be
better educated on health issues. The health courses in our schools
must prepare students for the expanding role they will be expected to
460. See, e.g., Cathy D. Meade, et al., Educating Patients with Limited Literacy Skills:
The Effectiveness of Printed and Videotaped Materials about Colon Cancer, 84 AM: J. PUB.
HEALTH 119 (1994); Elaine DeRosa, Developing an Interactive Video for Patients Suffering
from Kidney Disease, 3 J. MED. EDUC. TECH. 15 (Winter, 1993).
461. See, e.g., Celett S. Skinner, et al., Physicians' Recommendations for Mammography:
Do Tailored Messages Make a Difference? 84 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 43 (1994).
462. These may become the modern equivalent of the 19th century home medical guides.
See supra note 49. The Agency is also studying the creation of uniform health care data bases
in order to better assess the impact of health care. AHCPR FACT SHEET (Nov. 1992). This is
essentially the resumption of one of Percival's crusades. He sought to improve record keeping
of vital statistics as a way of learning more about patient outcomes. In the Age of Information
we should be able to do much better.
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play in health and medical care."63 Supplementing this basic education
would be specific public health initiatives."4
One area of concern regarding expanded access is that more
patients with limited experience in medical decision making will be
meeting professionals who lack skills and training in interpersonal
relations, especially in cross-cultural encounters. Physicians today can
rely on the insurance coverage they accept to screen their patient
population. For example, if a medical group doesn't participate in
Medicaid, the physicians and staff will rarely, if ever, have a low
income client. In a world of Health Security, they may not have that
option.
Newcomers to a managed care provider will be expected to behave
in ways that would have been unnecessary or even inappropriate in
other settings. Neither the chaos of an emergency room nor the luxury
of unlimited access to specialists prepare patients for the managed
care environment. The medical providers facing stricter budgetary
controls may not be very tolerant of any perceived non-conformity
or demand for "extra" services. The inherent frustrations may se-
verely retard a broader experimentation with and belief in cooperative
decision making.
There is the likelihood of increased racial, ethnic, and class
tensions with the movement toward increased access. The current
system provides high quality care to some patients and low quality
care to others.465 Researchers are only beginning to understand the
health impact of such factors as poverty and race on access. At the
personal level, the differences in-outcome may be linked to variations
in how the medical professional interacts and assesses a patient de-
pending on her race and economic status. A medical profession
frustrated with the constraints of the evolving system of care may
find convenient targets in patients with lower socio-economic status
or personal traits that are easy marks for prejudice. On the other
hand, more uniform practice guidelines may reduce the bias in di-
agnosis and treatment.
The increasing role of management, and treatment protocols that
are influenced by financial considerations, suggest enterprise liability
463. The Health Security Act provided for a sequential, age- appropriate, comprehensive
school health education program for grades K-12. Health Security Act, Subtitle G, H.R. 3960,
103d Cong. 2d Sess. (1994).
464. Public Health efforts such as New York's Breast Cancer Detection and Education
Program show how a coordinated approach might be able to improve the health status of
individuals through education and early detection. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2405-8 (McKinney
1993).
465. See, e.g., Jane Perkins, Race Discrimination in America's Health Care Systems, 27
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 371 (Special Issue, 1993).
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for many aspects of care, including the information exchange. No
cases have yet held the medical enterprise liable for a failure to obtain
informed consent. However, it has been held that the hospital has a
duty to ensure quality of care.4 In the future, patient participation
may increasingly be viewed as an element of quality medical care.
While the general rule remains that a hospital cannot be held
vicariously liable for the negligence of non-employee physicians, recent
cases have held the hospital responsible for the negligence of inde-
pendent contractors employed in the emergency room. 467 The new
structures of medical care which increase the role for the medical
administration in promoting quality of care, make enterprise liability
more appealing. Having hospitals and other medical care corporations
as defendants in informed consent cases may change the juries' per-
ception of the claims.468
There is already increasing enterprise liability that is administra-
tively enforceable. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health-
care Organizations has recognized a general hospital corporate quality
mandate and is strengthening it in the revisions to its accreditation
standards. 469 Federal mandates have focused on the enterprise in
patient autonomy and quality related issues. For example, the Patient
Self-Determination Act requires that the providers have policies and
procedures in place to advise each admittee of "an individual's rights
under State law, (whether statutory or as recognized by the courts of
the State) to make decisions concerning . . . medical care, including
the right to accept or refuse medical or surgical treatment and the
466. See, e.g., Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989); Darling v. Charleston
Community Mem. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (hospital'
was liable for its failure to provide adequate and competent staff and its failure to require
consultation); Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 495 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984); Johnson v.
Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.3d 156 (Wis. 1981).
467. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987); Magana v. Elie, 439
N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985); Martell v.
St. Charles Hosp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1987).
468. See Valerie P. Hans and William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability
in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW AND Soc'y REV. 85
(1992). In a survey of jurors, the authors asked for a response to the statement: A company
should be required to tell the public about any possibility, however small, that its products
might be unsafe. Eighty-eight percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed, with an
additional 7 percent neither agreeing nor disagreeing. The authors noted:
Tort jurors held high standards for business in the abstract, as we saw in their
questionnaire responses, yet these standards become more diffused or difficult to
apply as jurors approached the concrete task of assessing responsibility and compen-
sation in individual cases.
Id. at 102.
469. JCAHO, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, 137-38 (1992).
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right to formulate advance directives .... ,,410 Providers also must
provide education for the staff and the community on these topics. 47 '
VI. CONCLUSION
Patient-provider relationships at the beginning of the century
were personal in nature with the participants on relatively equal
footing. The open marketplace for medical providers and remedies
supported a collaborative care venture. As organized conventional
medicine gained prestige and became more scientific in approach, a
gap developed between patients and providers, especially surgeons.
This proved to be dangerous for some patients who were subjected
to invasive procedures and suffered statistically predictable compli-
cations. The courts and legislatures developed protective doctrines,
first requiring consent for all segments of the procedure, and later,
informed consent. In the process, outsiders took a direct role in
setting minimum standards in patient relations. In 1980, organized
medicine began to reassert its professional prerogative to define the
providers' role in patient relations. Revised medical codes of ethics
acknowledge the importance of informed consent and the broader
patient right of self determination. These changes reflect and support
societal values that place an increasing value on patient autonomy.
The medical care structure underlying the patient-provider rela-
tionship is undergoing an unprecedented change. Independent prac-
titioners of medicine are giving way to managed care enterprises and
integrated delivery systems. More effective utilization review focusing
on cost is expanding the oversight of care providers. Accepted medical
470. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w)(1)(A)(i) (1988). See also
Interim Final Rule, 57 FED. REG. 8194 (1992).
471. Another example is the National Practitioner Data Bank which was created by the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 11101-11152 (Supp. 1994). Many
sources are required to report certain information to the Bank. See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Wenger,
227 N.E.2d 296 (1967) (for a holding that would no longer be viable regarding the hospital's
liability). The types of information reported includes malpractice claim payments, and adverse
actions taken by the hospitals and administrative or professional bodies overseeing the practice
of medicine. Id. at § 11131(b). Hospitals are expected to request a report on a practitioner at
the time they grant privileges, and every two years thereafter. Id. at § 11135(a). A failure to
request the information creates a presumption that the hospital knew the contents of the report
and that presumption may be used in a malpractice action against the hospital.
The National Practitioner Data Bank was created by the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act of 1986, P.L. 99-660, and is codified at 42 U.S.C. 11101-11152. It became operational as
of September 1, 1990. Those who must report include medical malpractice insurers, hospitals
and other medical care entities, state medical and dental boards, peer review boards or
committees of professional societies, and self-insured providers.
The Data Bank eliminates the defense that the hospital did not know about an adverse
action emanating from outside her own facility. The existence of the Data Bank has also
undoubtedly reduced the number of actions taken by hospitals and other reporting providers
that fall within the statutory definition of an adverse action.
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practices are being challenged and replaced by practice guidelines
drawn from outcome studies. The paradigm of the patient-provider
relationship for the informed consent doctrines involves a physician
with clinical autonomy. Patient care teams, operating under group
practice protocols, are replacing the autonomous physician. The re-
sponsibility for counselling the patient is being determined by admin-
istrative delegation. Government regulation provides the oversight to
this system. In short, the new relationships require a new framework
for analysis.
Perhaps we have been expecting too much of our physicians. We
want them to be the technical masters of their craft and the source
of our moral support. We also ask them to educate us on each malady
as it comes along in our lives. Some of these functions need to be
shared with others in the health care field.
These changes may bode well for increased patient participation
in medical decision making. Better medical information and new
methods of processing and presenting that information can relieve the
individual care provider of some basic medical counselling if It is
made an administrative priority. The institutional culture regarding
patient rights may be the ultimate barometer of the future of patient
involvement. New tensions will surface, and financial incentives may
limit the provider's interest in the time consuming interpersonal work
of talking with the patient. Nevertheless, the potential for moving
forward is there. What is needed is the social commitment to carry
it out.
